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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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**UAE Studying Pakistani Water Supply Project**  
44000469 London *THE MIDDLE EAST in English*  
Apr 89 p 36

[Text] The arid United Arab Emirates [UAE] is considering a novel solution to its long-term water supply problems: a 700kms pipeline from Pakistan across the Arabian Sea. Its construction, however, would cost billions of dollars and would "stretch present technology to its limits", according to a newly completed study by British engineering consultants, Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners.

The project would involve the construction of a major dam on the Hingol river in the southern Pakistani province of Baluchistan, at a point about 40kms inland. From the dam, a one meter diameter pipeline would lead to the coast and then 650 kms across the seabed to a landfall at al-Fujayrah, on the UAE's east coast. Water would be delivered at a rate of about six cubic meters per second.

The pipeline route descends to 600 metres below sea level. With existing technology, most pipelines of this

diameter cannot be laid deeper than 200 metres. The project could therefore go ahead only after new techniques had been developed.

Apart from the benefits to the UAE, the multi-billion dollar project would help develop southern Baluchistan, which is one of Pakistan's poorer regions, bringing new roads, a harbour and an electricity supply system.

The Pakistan scheme is the second long distance pipeline project to be mooted as the answer to the Gulf's water shortages. In the past two years the Ankara government has been seeking financial support for a \$20bn pipeline system to link the region with eastern Turkey, basing its case on a pre-feasibility study prepared by American engineering consultants Brown & Root.

The project calls for two lines. One would run 2,400 kms from the upper reaches of the Tigris river through Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to terminate in the emirate of al-Shariqah. The other would take a westerly route, taking water from the Ceyhan and Seyhan rivers in south eastern Turkey and running down through Syria and Jordan into Saudi Arabia. Each of the two lines would carry one billion cubic metres of water per year.

**'Rift' Between People, Soviet Leadership Observed**  
*46050023a Paris HARATCH in Armenian*  
*17 Mar 89 p 1*

[Article by A. Totoyan: "The Intelligentsia and the Government of Soviet Armenia"]

[Text] On 3 March, [Yerevan] GRAKAN TERT reported at length a meeting between the representatives of Soviet Armenian intelligentsia and the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party on 23 February. After reading the questions posed by various prominent individuals and the answers given to them, one gets the impression that the meeting proceeded within the limits of "necessity" and "expediency" and was not marked with any sharp edges. The only episode that could be considered an exception is Hrant Matevosyan's emphatic question about the arrest and offenses of the Karabakh Committee.

Despite this general impression, however, it is evident particularly from the concluding remarks of First Secretary S. Arutyunyan that the Soviet Armenian authorities are not pleased with the attitude and the conduct of the Armenian intelligentsia. This displeasure arises out of the perception that the intellectuals are not playing the role that is expected of them, namely to row with the current generated by the authorities.

Arutyunyan's remarks are very clear: "Today the Republic is experiencing difficult times. Today we need unanimity and unity like bread and air. I find it difficult to understand those representatives of the intelligentsia who sometimes forget rational wisdom and who are not opposed to pouring fuel over fire even in these dramatic times."

That heartbreaking expression becomes more comprehensible when we recall the appeals by the Armenian Academy of Sciences and the unions of writers, musicians and artists to the highest authorities of the country to rectify the decision on the fate of the Karabakh Committee. Arutyunyan's stance with respect to the Committee is even clearer. In response to a question he said: "They (the members of the Committee) were not the initiators of the movement. They simply became leaders and rose to the summit of the 'rally democracy.' They marred the Karabakh movement with their unwise and perhaps consciously self-serving actions. I would not consider them great martyrs of ideas. They effectively disrupted the solution of the problem with their irresponsible calls and activities."

After underscoring the unsatisfactory attitude of the intelligentsia, Arutyunyan defined the duty that the Soviet Armenian intellectuals must undertake: "If we want to have a strong republic, we must have a strong leadership in the sense of having strong authority. That is what the intelligentsia must be concerned with. It must convey to the mind and the heart of the people the positive developments observed in the life of the Republic and must strike back at any gossip and allegations

about an ideological rift between the people and the leadership propagated by people who have not sincerely endorsed the path of renewal we are pursuing." In other words, the intelligentsia must take on the task of reinstating the authority of the leadership which has been hurt by "gossip."

This expectation betrays the reality that the rift between the leadership and the people is so manifest that it warrants public disclosure by the most senior member of the Soviet Armenian leadership. It is also significant that S. Arutyunyan sees the assistance of the intelligentsia essential to rectify this situation.

The rift with the people is therefore highly perceptible. Otherwise it would be very hard for S. Arutyunyan to turn to the intelligentsia for help given that the it is precisely the decision on the fate of the intelligentsia's brightest and most popular representatives that is the source of the current undesirable polarization between the leadership and the people.

**Dashnak Party Warns of Loss of Confidence in Soviet Leadership**

*46050023b Paris GAMK in Armenian*  
*17 Mar 89 pp 1, 4*

[Editorial reproduced from Armenian Revolutionary Federation official press organ DROSHAK: "The Cup Is Overflowing"]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Armenian authorities are simply fooling themselves if they believe that by keeping the members of the Karabakh Committee in jails, by extending the so-called "state of emergency" and by generally using the threat of brute force they can force the Artsakh movement into despair and surrender.

Meanwhile, the leaders of Kremlin apparently do not wish to learn from the bitter lessons of history when they think that conformity forged by brute force can create stability and can be transformed into lasting solutions or when they believe that, after the awakening of Artsakh, the Soviet Armenian people can tolerate the forces who have been appointed to run the Soviet Armenian leadership and who wish to appear more Catholic than the Pope.

Beginning with the most recent of the bitter lessons, it must be emphatically pointed out that the new Soviet Armenian leadership that S. Arutyunyan personifies is apparently in the process of losing a golden opportunity. It was presented with the golden opportunity of assuming the leadership of the entire Armenian nation when the diverse branches of political thought in Soviet Armenia as well as the Diaspora challenged to commitment of the S. Arutyunyans to lead the Artsakh movement.

That challenge was also joined in by our party which, despite its ideological differences and its position as the free opposition, made it clear on several occasions that it

is prepared to view the leadership of the Soviet Armenian government and Communist Party as the government of the entire Armenian nation provided that it stand on the forefront of the struggle to lead the Artsakh movement to a just solution.

However, in the last few months incomprehensible and alien voices have been heard from Soviet Armenia's official forums. It is true that the anti-Artsakh offensive Gorbachev launched in December 1988 signaled the beginning of a pressure imposed from above, and in that context it would perhaps be understandable to expect a temporary a period of inaction to keep the Artsakh movement temporarily away from its confrontational phase. What is incomprehensible and alien is that the Soviet Armenian leadership personified by S. Arutyunyan went far beyond the hardening that would be required from above in its efforts to restrain the leaders and the active members of the Karabakh Committee, and by arresting them it became the unfortunate standard-bearer of the first despotic campaign in the Gorbachev era in opposition to democratic freedoms and basic human rights. [passage omitted]

Such a retreat is worrisome for the new leadership because in effect it turns the clock back on the Soviet Armenian government and subjugates it the stagnation of the Demirchyan period. We still see sufficient indications to state that the S. Arutyunyan will be able to realize the need to veer away from this worrisome path. On numerous occasions, from May 1988 through the beginning of December, that leadership offered eloquent manifestations of its determination to stand up for the Artsakh movement and its commitment to radically reform the style of government of the Soviet Armenian state. [passage omitted]

The present stance of the S. Arutyunyan has put a golden opportunity for the national unity of the Armenian people at risk, and the rectification of this mistake has become the unanimous demand of the entire Armenian nation.

After raising the hopes of the all Armenians, S. Arutyunyan has no right to ignore this imperative demand of Armenian political life.

The cup is overflowing.

**'Defense Committee' for Activist Formed**  
*46050023c Montreal HORIZON in Armenian*  
*6 Mar 89 pp 1, 3*

[Communique by Committee for the Defense of Igor Muratyan dated 24 February 1989]

[Excerpt] The Committee for the Defense of Igor Muratyan was formed in Yerevan on February 19 at the initiative of a group of intellectuals. The members of the Committee are Armenian prominent writers Zori Balayan, Sero Khanzadyan, Maro Margaryan, Alvard Petrosyan; Soviet people's actor Sos Sargsyan; the Chairman of the Armenian History Department of the University of Yerevan, Lendrush Khurshutyan; the Dean of the Orientology School of the University of Yerevan, Meri Gochar; the leader of the Association for the Defense of the Armenian Cause, Hovik Vasilyan; Sargis Bayandur and 25 other representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia.

The Committee's work is conducted by Igor Muratyan's colleagues with the leadership of Karabakh Committee member Gagik Safaryan.

The goal of the Committee is to defend the work of Igor Muratyan, the founder-president of the Karabakh Committee which initiated the pan-Armenian Karabakh movement, and to seek not only his relocation from Azerbaijani jails but his full freedom because all charges brought against him are baseless.

All members of the Committee agree with Igor Muratyan's views and the principles he has put forward with regard to the solution of the Karabakh problem.

The Committee has at its disposal tens of thousands of signatures as well as the resolutions of the assemblies of several institutions, enterprises and collectives for the defense of Igor Muratyan.

The Committee calls on all residents of Soviet Armenia to fight for the freedom of Igor Muratyan and to demand that this prominent national worker be proclaimed innocent and that charges brought against him be declared baseless. [passage omitted]

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Syria's 'Fear' of Peace Described

44040250 Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA  
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 30 Jan 89 pp 12-13

[Article by Johnny Munir: "Lebanon is Saved and Countdown Begins"]

[Text] It may be the good fortune of the Middle East and Lebanon, in particular, that the office of president in the United States is occupied by a man who knows the ins and outs of politics by virtue of his long tenure as vice-president.

Middle East leaders used to complain about the American system and the American president's short term in office which they put at two rather than four years.

These leaders believe that the American president spends the first year of his rule studying files, reading reports, and learning about global policy secrets to familiarize himself with the situation. In the fourth year, he removes himself from foreign policy affairs to devote his full time to his election campaign, thus leaving only the second and third years for actual governing.

With Ronald Reagan, however, the world experienced a measure of stability in American foreign policy, owing to his winning two consecutive terms. With George Bush, matters are expected to be more stable yet.

Bush followed American policy precedents and gained experience during his long tenure at the White House as vice-president. He enters the decision-making hall with good knowledge of all the region's dossiers. More important to Bush is that he will enter office with a warm and unrestricted line of communications with Moscow and with full knowledge of all the details of this line.

Bush's office, therefore, has to deal with the hot issues of the world and will proceed to solve them in agreement with the Kremlin leaders.

Among these issues is the Middle East dossier. American policy experts affirm that the title of the Bush rule will be "consolidation of peace," for solutions are on the way, and the Middle East abyss will not escape peace.

That is why British diplomacy moved to give new impetus to the idea of an international peace conference. Information in this regard affirms that successive meetings at the Middle Eastern foreign ministers' level are being held at the Foreign Office in London to discuss ways to make such a conference a success.

Hence the decision has been made in Washington and Moscow. It is a strategic decision for the coming phase, and it puts an end to conflicts in all areas of the world. Consequently, Lebanon is definitely headed for peace. The ambassador of a West European superpower said in

the presence of Lebanese politicians that the Lebanese were very lucky because they have been able to endure all this time and have not given any concessions at their country's expense. He added: "I believe that Lebanon has been saved and the countdown has begun."

In this regard, Minister Joseph al-Skaf disclosed a statement made by the current American secretary of defense, John Tower, about a Middle East solution. He recounted that during his visit to the United States in 1981, when he was minister of defense, he met with John Tower who, at that time, was chairman of the Senate defense committee. Al-Skaf quoted Tower as saying that, as far as the United States was concerned, the entire Middle East was but one country and Lebanon a spot in that country. When al-Skaf asked him about the promised solution to this region, Tower literally said: "A Middle East solution will be realized in no less than 5 years and no more than 10 years as of this date, or between 1986 and 1991." Tower believed that the solutions for this region would not mature before that time. Al-Skaf added that he had another meeting with Tower on a recent visit to the United States in 1986. Asked whether the time limit for a Middle East solution was still the same, Tower answer: "Yes, it may take less time."

In his private meetings, al-Skaf says that Tower's prophecy may come true, particularly since today, in the Bush administration, Tower is the secretary of defense [as published]. Al-Skaf attaches great significance to the fact that President Bush is surrounded by people of Lebanese origin who have a special standing with him, thus raising the hope that he will help Lebanon sift through the proposed solutions.

Things, however, will not proceed as easily as some people imagine. Syria is trying as usual to hold on to as many cards as possible to use for negotiation and barter.

In this peace environment, the Arab foreign ministers met in Tunis and decided to repave the Arab road to peace, hence, the interest in the Lebanese problem.

Syria, however, is worried about the peace environment because a solution in the region will rob Damascus of the power it has enjoyed in past years. It will seek to thwart any peace initiatives, but a settlement decision will remain greater than Syrian power.

Information disclosed by Eastern diplomatic sources in Beirut says that the Soviet Union has advised President Hafiz al-Asad via its ambassador to Damascus that Syria ought to be aware that there is a limit to its behavior in Lebanon. It is true that Syria has interests in this country, but these interests must not be turned into ambitions to which the Soviet Union is basically opposed.

The Soviet message to the Syrian president added that for 13 years Damascus had tried but failed to realize its objectives in Lebanon, and, therefore, Syrian officials

ought to submit to reality and give up trying to achieve these objectives. The long past years provide clear and ample proof that it is impossible for Syria to realize its objectives in Lebanon. Therefore, the Soviet leadership would henceforth oppose any Syrian initiative aimed at undermining the Lebanese state in favor of the Syrian regime, keeping in mind that Moscow admits to Damascus' need to obtain limited interests in this neighboring country.

The Soviet ambassador to Damascus completed the message he received from his capital by saying that it was impossible from then on to discuss plans to expand Syrian troop deployment in Lebanon because the Soviet Union would strongly oppose such a move. Quite the contrary, Damascus would have to reconsider its troop deployment in Lebanon because it is a time of peace and this peace includes the Middle East and the Lebanese region.

If we concede for the sake of argument, says the Soviet ambassador, that Israeli artillery will threaten Syrian territory, Damascus, to be exact, from Lebanon, logic says that Israel is capable of carrying this threat more easily from its positions along the Syrian-Israeli borders.

As for Syrian fears that an Israeli army advance from the south toward the Lebanese interior would threaten Syria's western borders or the Syrian-Lebanese borders, Israel is capable of such a threat from the Golan Heights. And assuming that the Golan borders have to be kept peaceful by UN guarantees, Israel would threaten Syria via the western al-Biqa' regions and not via the south, Beirut, or Mount Lebanon. Therefore, the Soviet message says, Syria would have to face in the near future a demand to withdraw its troops from the majority of its positions, save for west and north al-Biqa', until such time as a central Lebanese state that can guarantee the Syrian borders is established.

The Soviet message concluded by stressing to the Syrian leadership that the peace process had begun, that Moscow was serious about getting this process underway, that the Middle East ought to move into an oasis of security, and that Moscow remained committed to its strategic ties with Damascus and to the need to safeguard the security and stability of the Syrian state. This, however, did not mean helping Syria to achieve its objectives in Lebanon. On the contrary, achievement or pursuit of these objectives would create tension in the region, something the Kremlin would not accept.

The Soviet president assured President al-Asad at the end of the meeting that a copy of the message had been sent to the American Department of State to keep it informed of Soviet moves in the region.

That is why Damascus stood at the doors of the peace designed for the region stricken with panic and burdened with foreign debts which, as of the end of last year, amount to \$22 billion, 157 billion [as published] of which were obtained from Eastern Bloc countries for military use.

There is information to the effect that at this time Syria is more worried about the miserable economic situation it is experiencing, for economic failure has reached a point where it is difficult to keep conditions in check without huge amounts of foreign aid.

Diplomatic circles point out that, with the beginning of the Bush administration, Washington has found that not one moment can be lost in bringing "American peace" to the Middle East. An active American initiative away from the limelight has been launched to prepare for presidential elections in Lebanon by no later than next spring. Therefore, several meetings between American diplomats and Lebanese officials have been held to resolve this issue because a Lebanon without a president will lean further and further toward partition or fragmentation, which means new problems and greater tension in the area.

With the onset of such contacts which Washington maintains are serious, American Middle East envoy Richard Murphy, who forged the famous agreement with al-Asad, has been removed in an effort by Washington to make it clear to Damascus that the presidential election clause in the Murphy-al-Asad agreement must be overstepped and that it was serious about that. In Damascus, American diplomats discussed the price Damascus is demanding in exchange for its help in electing a new president for Lebanon acceptable to East Beirut, and Washington dangled economic aid before Syria, at a time when Syria is in dire need of this kind of help.

Syria will try vis-a-vis the Arabs to acquiesce as much as possible, because 1989 will witness the distribution of Arab aid to confrontation states. In 1978, the Arab summit approved a 10-year aid program for Syria. Now that 1988 has ended, every Arab country has to prepare a new economic aid program for Syria. Syria in 1989 does not hold any effective cards in its hands. The Gulf war is over and Syria is suffering defeat with Iran. Yasir 'Arafat has grabbed the Palestinian card and is proceeding, with Arab blessings, toward peace while Syria is floundering in the Lebanese problem when it does not possess even half of this card. Therefore, Arab aid will be contingent upon Syrian acquiescence to Arab directives.

Damascus is faced with three prospects for dealing with the Lebanese problem in the upcoming state: retreat, advance, or dialogue.

With regard to retreat, the Syrian decision is known. Damascus has not made all these sacrifices to then withdraw from Lebanon peacefully or voluntarily. Advance under these circumstances is impossible in view of the international and Arab climate.

Hence, the only thing left is dialogue, a solution put forth at the international and Arab levels. So why has Damascus allowed this matter to slip in the direction of Arab and Western capitals and failed to make the move itself in Lebanon, thus sparing itself many losses? That is why

people in the know believe that Syria will seek to open a dialogue with the Christians now that recent events have produced two main powers: Syria and East Beirut.

The Christians at this point are at the peak of their power. At the political level, East Beirut is experiencing a kind of unity which is difficult for anyone to penetrate. This unity has made it possible to revoke the American-Syrian decision on the presidential elections.

At the military level, there is full coordination and agreement on how the "Forces" and the army ought to deal with one another. A western military attache said in this regard that the "Lebanese Forces" today are five times as strong as they were in 1982 and that the Lebanese army's actual strength is three times greater than what it was toward the end of the Sarkis regime.

At the economic level, East Beirut, by Junblatt's admission, is the "Monte Carlo of the East."

As for the foreign level, for the first time since 1975, the Christians have been able to achieve alliances with more than one Arab country, after a long isolation. The Lebanese Forces were pursuing a policy of openness to the Arabs which began with 'Arafat and extended to Iraq, turning into an open relationship with most Arab countries. Add to that the very new relationship between East Beirut and European and American countries.

Naturally, this power will prompt the Christians to lean toward a solution obtained from a position of strength rather than weakness. Most important is the fact that the balance that exists today is with Syria and not with other Lebanese factions.

Therefore, informed circles believe that things are leaning toward a dialogue between the Christians and Syria. The time and place of such a dialogue are not known yet, even though speculation is that the time is near. Syria, however, will do everything it can to weaken the Christian position so that it may be the stronger party in the negotiations.

With a solution in the offing, the head of the Socialist party, Walid Junblatt, has launched an initiative to resettle Christian refugees in the mountain in coordination with Syria.

The Italian ambassador to Beirut disclosed to a deputy who visited him at his residence that Italy had made any aid to Walid Junblatt contingent on the return of Christian refugees to the mountain and that the Vatican had refused to have any extensive dealings with Walid Junblatt before this move is realized. West Germany followed suit.

There was an uproar over the stance of East Beirut leaders on this move! Informed political sources affirmed, however, that these leaders are in agreement and have arrived at a profound understanding among themselves on how to deal with the Junblatt move.

**Official on Arab Cooperation in Industrialization**  
*NC3004164089 Cairo MENA in Arabic*  
1315 GMT 30 Apr 89

[Text] Baghdad, 30 Apr (MENA)—Lieutenant General Ibrahim al-'Urabi, chairman of the board of directors of the Arab Organization of Industrialization, has declared that the organization places all its capabilities at the service of the Arab Cooperation Council's states in order to produce high-quality products. He affirmed that the organization welcomes joint Arab cooperation in breaking the arms monopoly, in acquiring the most modern technology in the world, and in training and enhancing the expertise of technical cadres.

Al-'Urabi, who is now visiting Baghdad, said in a statement today that Arab cooperation in this field is necessary for development and should go beyond mere words. He lauded Iraqi-Egyptian cooperation, which began in the 1960's, in all fields of military industrialization.

He added that the organization's factories have completed the production of the Fahd armored car prototype for Kuwait. He said that a Kuwaiti delegation will visit Cairo in the middle of May to prepare to receive the prototypes.

He noted that the production of the Ayn Saqr anti-aircraft missiles has already begun and that the Egyptian Armed Forces will receive them in the near future.

Lt Gen Al-'Urabi said that an experimental contract has been signed with an American company to manufacture parts of the F-16 plane.

He noted that the organization has also signed a contract with Brazil to manufacture another group of Tucano planes in Egypt. Iraq has acquired some of these planes that were manufactured at the organization's factories in Egypt.

He said: "We have begun concluding contracts for maintaining Gazelle helicopters for the Egyptian Air Force, and the organization is prepared to carry out such maintenance for the Arab and African countries."

Lt Gen al-'Urabi concluded his statement by saying that the Arab Organization for Industrialization is now constructing a new building for the electronics factory so as to keep abreast of the new projects and developments the organization will be introducing in the factory in the future.

**GCC Joint Rice Purchase Successful**  
44000461 *Muscat AL-WATAN in Arabic*  
22 Mar 89 p 12

[Text] 'Abd-al-Bari 'Abd-al-Ghaffar, director of the import-export company, said that the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] joint rice purchase achieved positive results and gave these countries greater negotiating leverage which so far has resulted in saving about \$35 million.

The GCC states, he added, have accorded the joint rice purchase project great attention in view of the importance of this commodity and in order to obtain a good quality [product], in addition to realizing great financial savings.

He pointed out that this attention was reflected in the formation of a permanent committee composed of the GCC officials concerned with the joint purchase of rice.

**Morocco, Egypt Sign Investment, Energy Agreements**  
45000145 *Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic*  
8 Apr 89 pp 24-25

[Text] It is expected that joint investment holding companies will be established between Egypt and Morocco to carry out investment projects in the two countries within the framework of plans for objective growth.

Official Egyptian sources explained that the establishment of these companies comes within the framework of the political rapprochement obtained between the two countries, in addition to their current similar investment trends toward attracting foreign capital.

The first Egyptian-Moroccan protocol was concluded recently, stipulating the formation of three specialized delegations to exchange expertise and set up projects in the fields of technical and transportation cooperation, energy use, and the connection of electrical grids on the Arab and African levels.

The two parties also agreed to concentrate their studies on the nuclear power generation program and research the use of solar and wind power.

It was decided to eventually encourage businessmen and private companies in the two countries toward joint industrial projects.

Official Egyptian sources explained that a joint coordination committee will be set up between the two countries under the chairmanship of a minister of energy. This is in preparation for assembling the supreme committee under the head of state of one of the two countries at the beginning of next year, with the participation of the ministers concerned with joint cooperation between the two countries.

**Iran Reportedly Assessing Sudanese Journalists**  
45000143 *London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic*  
17 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] AL-DUSTUR has information to the effect that Hojjat ol-Islam Mohammad Reyshahri, the Iranian minister of intelligence, has commissioned the director of a Sudanese National Islamic Front publication to prepare a report on the tendencies and inclinations of Sudanese journalists and publications. This commissioning was done during a meeting between the two in Tehran, which the director of this publication visited last month at the invitation of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance to attend a meeting organized by the Office "for the Export of the Cultural Revolution." [quotation marks as published]

**Professor Says Egyptian War Aid to Iraq Reaches \$5 Billion**  
45000144z *Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic* 27 Mar 89 p 7

[Report by Sami Murad]

[Text] Dr Rabi' Hamid, a professor of political science at Cairo University, has affirmed that Egypt's support for Iraq in its war against Iran helped to achieve the Iraqi victory, and that the amount of Egyptian military aid to Iraq as of last year totaled \$5 billion. Egypt also contributed training and the latest military expertise to the Iraqi fighters. He added that Egyptian aid also helped Iraq economically, taking in most of the production sectors. The number of Egyptian workers in Iraq totaled 2 million at a time when Baghdad's population was no more than 3 million people.

He also asserted that long-range missiles had been produced jointly by Egypt and Iraq with Brazilian expertise, Iraqi capital, and Egyptian labor. Egyptians also participated in protecting Iraq's domestic front during the war. At a symposium at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Dr Rabi' asserted that Egypt's absence from the Arab arena at the end of the seventies, due to the peace accord with Israel, led to the outbreak of the Gulf war and encouraged Iran to try to take control of the region. Dr Rabi' Hamid also demanded the organization of an emigration of Egyptian workers to Iraq. He indicated that the Gulf war allowed Egypt to return to the Arab nations to protect them from the Iranian threat. The war also allowed a true Egyptian military presence in the Gulf region and a chance for Egyptian labor to migrate to Iraq.

**Sea Transportation of GCC States Profiled**  
44040282B *Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic*  
19 Feb 89 p 11

[Text] The maritime transportation sector plays a prominent role in international commerce between the East and West, handling no less than 80 percent all import-export trade worldwide.

For the most part, the industrialized states have dominated maritime commerce. Their fleets transported about 83.9 percent of all goods transported in 1970; however, this percentage declined to 80.5 percent in 1979, 78.2 percent in 1984, and 72.1 in 1985.

This decline is attributed to the growth of the fleets of developing and eastern European states, an increase in the market shares of these states in the international maritime transportation market, the international economic crisis, a decline in world trade, and the increasing gravity of the raw materials crisis, especially oil.

The demand for the services of the fleets of developing countries reflects a completely different situation. The quantities transported by these fleets increased by 6.9 percent in 1970, 10.6 percent in 1979, 12.4 percent in 1984, and 14.8 percent in 1985. These increases reflect the concern of developing states for the development their national shipping industries, the entry of these states into the market, and their domination of steadily increasing shares of world trade in order to obtain greater revenues for their balance of payments.

According to a study prepared by the Gulf Industrial Consultations Organization, the demand for the services of the fleets of the GCC [Gulf Corporation Council] countries was modest in relation to the overall figures pertaining to international maritime trade, despite an increase of more than a 100 percent in the quantities transported by Gulf fleets in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

These quantities constituted an estimated 0.8 percent, 0.11 percent, 0.9 percent, and 0.12 percent of all world maritime trade in 1970, 1979, 1984, and 1985 respectively, and represent a composite yearly growth rate in GCC shipping services of about 27 percent. In 1970, 1979, 1984, and 1985, the fleets of the GCC states transported 1.6 percent, 1.8 percent, 0.73 percent, and 0.8 percent respectively of all that was transported by the fleets of the developing countries, and 0.95 percent, 0.14 percent, 0.12 percent, and 0.17 percent respectively of all that was transported by the fleets of the industrial states.

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia possess the greatest percentage of the dead-weight tonnage of the GCC states, followed by the UAE [United Arab Emirates], and Qatar. Crude oil constitutes the greatest share of the tonnage transported by the ships of the GCC fleet, with commercial goods representing only 2 percent and 5 percent of the tonnage transported by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia respectively. In addition to oil exports, significant development can be seen in the growth of basic industries, such as the petrochemicals, iron, steel, aluminum, and other consumer industries.

Despite the smallness of the GCC fleet, it represents more than 50 percent of the dead-weight tonnage for the transport of raw materials, and more than 70 percent of the dead-weight tonnage for the transport of commercial goods to all Arab states. Regarding imports, it is possible

to note a predominance of commercial imports over other imports. This indicates that commercial imports were relatively less flexible in relation to the changes affecting the export of crude oil and oil prices.

#### **Problems of Irrigation, Agriculture in Arab Region Discussed**

44040282A Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic  
17 Feb 89 p 9

[Text] A recently released study warns that food problems in the Arab world have become dangerously exacerbated and have created pressure to make agricultural development a top priority in development plans. It also notes that circumstances are especially appropriate for focussing on food problems as a result of the end of the Iraqi-Iran war, and the removal of all impediments to Egypt's full return to the Arab fold.

The study emphasizes that the effusion of Arab groupings—starting with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and including two new organizations, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Arab Cooperation Council—will contribute in a positive manner to strengthening and consolidating Arab integration frameworks which can devote the necessary attention to agricultural development.

The aforementioned study was one of several studies reviewed during a small roundtable conference held last Saturday at the Regency Hotel under the chairmanship of 'Abd-al-Nabi al-Shu'lah, the executive chairman of the Saqr Publishing Institute and the director of the Arab Agricultural Investment Company. The conference was attended by a number of foreign agricultural experts, and several representatives of international agricultural organizations.

In his opening address, 'Abd-al-Nabi emphasized that there is a growing realization on the part of the Arab states of the importance of making agricultural development a top priority in order to achieve self-sufficiency in food, and to balance plans to diversify the economic structure.

He stated that inasmuch as agricultural development is subordinate to the consumption of fresh water, it is necessary to conserve water resources and develop them in concert with agricultural expansion. He indicated that the proposed project to supply the Arabian peninsula with water from Turkey via a pipeline costing \$20 billion (7.5 billion Bahraini dinars) can provide the Arab Gulf countries with enormous quantities of water, which can be used in agricultural development.

Another study—presented by J. Shankar, the director of projects at the International Gulf Markets Organization, and Dr B. Bailey, the editor-in-chief of the magazine, AL-ZIRA'AH FI AL-'ALIM AL-'ARABI [Agriculture in the Arab World]—indicates that the Arabian peninsula is rich in enormous quantities of water hidden in the depths under the desert. The study states that these water

resources can be exploited through the use of modern technology, and can be used to achieve agricultural development in the area for centuries to come.

Conference participants also reviewed a study prepared by the International Food and Agriculture Organization [IFAO], which states that the Arab world requires \$78.2 billion through the year 2000 in order to develop irrigation resources and water sources.

The IFAO study indicates that ambitious plans to develop irrigation systems are being implemented in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria. It adds that the percentage of arable land in 21 Arab states increased from 17.8 percent in 1980 to 18.6 percent in 1986, and notes that 100 percent of arable land in Egypt is irrigated, while 87 percent of arable land in Oman is irrigated, and only one-third of arable land in Iraq is irrigated.

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### Outcome of Second U.S.-PLO Talks, Israeli Position Discussed

44040378A Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH  
in Arabic 2 Apr 89 pp 8-10

[Article by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Haqq: " 'Abd-Rabbuh: Some Progress; In Second Round, Washington Proposed Two-Phased Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations"]

[Text] By welcoming the idea of a "Mideastern Benelux" which is accepted in principle by Yasir 'Arafat and Shimon Peres, Washington has moved a step forward in its definition of the "Palestinian people's political rights" which are more than expanded self-rule but less than a fully sovereign Palestinian state. The core of the idea is: Three political entities, two states and two armies.

It is a foregone conclusion that the shape of the final solution to any conflict differs from the initial visions of the parties concerned. But this does not necessarily mean torpedoing all the mainstays of these visions and programs. However, the course that these visions take, whether rising or falling, is determined in light of the elements of strength which the parties concerned have gathered, especially the negotiating capability of the parties during the process of searching for solutions.

Therefore, by virtue of this conflict's complexities and bifurcations at more than one level, the final form of the solution to the Arab-Zionist conflict may be different from the visions existing until the recent past. This conclusion is made on the basis of the number of plans and ideas which are being put forward currently and which are beginning to shed light on some aspects of the picture, but without making its general features clear. This situation is made evident by the ideas proposed in the second round of the official U.S.-Palestinian dialogue and by the accompanying plans presented by other

parties concerned with the Middle East crisis, considering that these issues and ideas form the practical foundations to give shape to a solution.

In its second round, the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue surpassed the "symbolic phase," as Charles Redman, the U.S. State Department spokesman, has said in comment on the outcome of the second round of talks, held on 22 March 1989. In this round, discussion of the fundamental and practical issues was begun, as announced by the heads of the two negotiating delegations, namely brother Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, and Robert Pelletreau, Washington's ambassador to Tunisia. This is evidenced by the fact that the meeting lasted nearly 5 hours, whereas the first meeting, held on 16 December 1988, lasted less than one hour.

As evidence of its wish for a fruitful dialogue, the PLO prepared for the second round a memorandum entitled "A Cable to the U.S. Administration" in which it included its concepts and positions on a mechanism to the solution and on the fundamental issues connected with the Arab-Zionist conflict. The PLO also presented a detailed explanation on the conditions of our people in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, stressing that the international conference is the most suitable means for peace in the Middle East and that, therefore, Washington is required to participate effectively in preparing for the conference and for building bridges of trust between the parties to the conflict. This requires the U.S. administration to stop using the "veto" at the Security Council to veto resolutions condemning Israel's policy. The PLO hopes that the U.S. administration's position will develop to the point where this administration will exercise its political and economic influence over Israel. At the meeting, the two sides touched on some other fundamental issues, especially the plan to hold elections in the occupied territories and direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations which begin, according to Washington, with negotiations between elected or, if election is impossible, PLO-nominated Palestinian notables from the occupied territories and which may develop into negotiations between the PLO and Israel.

The discussion also touched on the concept of the right to armed struggle, on the transformation of the intifadah [uprising] into some sort of a political dialogue-oriented conflict, and on other fundamental issues.

At the meeting, the U.S. negotiator expressed his satisfaction with the Palestinian dossier generally and lauded in particular Palestinian leader Yasir 'Arafat's statements on the Palestinian state's willingness to establish a "Mideastern Benelux." It became evident from the discussion that there is place for agreement on some subjects of discussion and that there are fundamental controversial issues also.

In any case, the experience of the weeks separating the two rounds of dialogue has been a rich experience which shows how the PLO can conduct itself if it achieves

noticeable success in the area of its ideas on the principle of armed struggle. After the tempest of U.S. statements demanding an end to the fedayeen operations from South Lebanon when a number of such operations were carried out recently, the U.S. administration, through Secretary of State James Baker, backed down on this demand in the face of the PLO's adherence to this legitimate right. The administration also backed down on its demand for an end to the "violence in the occupied territories," changing it to a demand for a lessening of the intensity of the violence or transforming it into a political dialogue.

It is also noted that the U.S. political address has recently been free of the talk about Jordan's role in resolving the Palestinian issue and has been putting the emphasis on direct negotiations between Israel and Palestinian notables from the occupied territories—negotiations which later develop into negotiations between the PLO and Israel. This signifies a practical U.S. acknowledgment of the PLO's being the sole representative of the Palestinian people. On 14 March 1989, U.S. Secretary of State Baker conveyed this position to a U.S. congressional committee when he said: "If serious negotiations are impossible without the PLO, then there must be negotiations between Israelis and PLO representatives." Baker also told his visiting Israeli counterpart that Israel will have to inevitably negotiate with the PLO in the end.

What is striking here is that Shimon Peres, the Israeli Labor Party chairman, has formulated in cooperation with Reserve Brigadier General Ephrayim Sneh, the former head of the occupied West Bank civil administration, initial general ideas on a political solution compatible with these tendencies. In his address to the Jewish conference for solidarity with Israel, Peres threatened to leave the coalition government before year's end, alluding to the "historical option" if the government fails to put together a major diplomatic initiative.

This means one of two possibilities: The Labor Party will either arrange a parliamentary coup (and it seems that its leaders are paving the way for such an option, considering that they are engaged in contacts with the religious parties and with a number of the Likud members) or will dissolve the current Knesset in accordance with the articles of the coalition government agreement and hold parliamentary elections in accordance with a new election law that raises the "decision-making percentage," i.e. that excludes participation by parties that get less than five percent of the votes, and that divides Israel into regional electoral districts instead of the single district existing at present. If the second option is taken up, then it would mean giving Israel a respite from international pressures for nearly one year while the world awaits the outcome of the elections and the formation of a new government—a government that is not certain to be formed by the Labor Party in alliance with the leftist parties, for example. In any case, we note that the time

span about which Peres is talking is nearly equal to the period defined by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze for holding the international conference, i.e., a period of 6-9 months.

The provisions of Peres' plan agree with some U.S. tendencies, including the creation of a Mideastern Benelux, U.S.-Soviet supervision of the negotiations, and observer status for Egypt and Jordan. This concept paper has not closed the door in the face of the possibility of negotiation with the PLO and the creation of a disarmed Palestinian political entity.

Perhaps the most prominent feature of this plan is the Labor Party's dropping of its historical option (Jordanian option). What is more, Peres, commenting on a statement Foreign Minister Moshe Arens made in Washington on negotiating with a joint Palestinian (comprised of occupied territory notables)-Jordanian delegation, said: This proposal is much too late. Peres has also moved closer to the PLO condition for holding elections in the occupied territories—a condition which states that the PLO accepts such elections after withdrawal of the Israeli army and under UN supervision. Peres has proposed supervision by members of the U.S. House and Senate similar to the supervision over the Philippine elections which brought current President Corazon Aquino to power.

However, the analyses of some Israeli papers that Tel Aviv go as far as saying that the real objective of the deluge of Israeli "initiatives" does not go beyond creating confusion to influence the official U.S.-Palestinian dialogue. [sentence as published]

In this regard, Palestinian notables denied on 27 March 1989 a report published by 'AL HAMISHMAR on the previous day saying that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had met with four Palestinian notables, namely Fayiz Abu-Rahmah, Dr Sari Nusaybah, Hanna Sinyurah and Ilyas Furayj, in response to U.S. demands urging Israel to negotiate with the PLO if it cannot find people to negotiate with in the occupied territories. These notables, especially Nusaybah and Abu-Rahmah, have ridiculed these reports.

Despite this, the PLO believes that Washington is resolved to continue the dialogue and that both sides are motivated by the desire to continue and develop this dialogue. This was reaffirmed by Thomas Pickering, the new U.S. delegate to the United Nations, when he stressed in his first statement after assuming his position that the Arab-Zionist conflict is an "extremely complex conflict. But it is extremely essential to solve it." More than one Palestinian official has expressed the PLO's wish to develop this dialogue. This has been done by Abu 'Ammar who has expressed in more than one statement his satisfaction with the progress achieved by the second round of talks.

It is expected that the third round of the dialogue will take place after the Egyptian president's visit to Washington (on 3 April), the Israeli prime minister's visit (6 April) and the Jordanian monarch's visit (2 May), i.e. after a period of 4-6 weeks during which the U.S. administration will have studied the Palestinian dossier, will have prepared its observations on it, and will have heard the viewpoints of the three main parties concerned with the conflict and with the Middle East crisis.

Due to its eagerness to achieve a the Arab point of view, the PLO has worked to coordinate the positions of the three Arab parties so that they may put pressure on Washington to develop its positions on the mechanism for resolving the Palestinian issue. This is why the Palestinians coordinated with Cairo and why the tripartite Palestinian-Egyptian-Jordanian summit was held in Isma'iliyah on 25 March 1989 to achieve this objective and to prepare to hold an ordinary or special Arab summit attended by Egypt to develop a unified Arab position that bolsters the Palestinian and Arab negotiating position.

The PLO expects in advance that it will wage the dialogue battle with Washington ferociously because the points of agreement are much fewer than those of disagreement between the two sides, especially since Washington is still not considering political or economic pressure on Israel, according to President George Bush who has stated recently: "Israel is a close ally of ours and I don't like to use the stick with friends." In light of the Israeli prime minister's intransigence and his entrenchment behind his famous "no's," this statement will be reflected in one way or another on the course of the official U.S.-Palestinian dialogue. Therefore, it is not expected that the level of this dialogue will rise in the near future.

However, Baker's request to Arens, his Israeli counterpart, to prepare for negotiation with the PLO and to halt the government's settlement program has created a major controversy in Israel. Many voices in the government coalition parties have abandoned their vacillation and have called, in varying degrees, for avoiding disagreement with Washington.

It is not unlikely that Israel will witness in the next few weeks accelerating developments which will affect the given facts of the Middle East situation, especially the rounds of U.S.-Palestinian dialogue. Some Israeli media sources expect Shimon Peres, the Labor Party leader, to announce his plan officially upon Prime Minister Shamir's return from Washington and to perhaps embark on the "historical option" to which he has alluded.

Despite the importance of any Israeli political development, the PLO seeks primarily to develop a united Arab position that supports its views. It coordinates with Moscow and with friendly countries in this regard. On the day after the second round of dialogue, Brother Abu 'Ammar received a message from the Soviet leadership.

The bottom line is that the PLO is armed with a basket of varied ideas, proposals and options to overcome every obstacle, to contain Shamir's position and intransigence, or to break this position if he continues to be entrenched behind his obstinacy.

#### [Box, p 9] Pelletreau: New Dynamism in Middle East

The second round of the official U.S.-Palestinian dialogue was held at about 1400 GMT on 22 March 1989 in Dar al-Maghribiyah in Carthage a northern suburb of Tunis, the capital.

When brother Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh shook hands with the U.S. ambassador, he told the ambassador: I wish to remind you that exactly one year ago, the United States made its decision to close the PLO office in Washington. Here we are now, beginning the second round of dialogue.

The Palestinian delegation consisted of brothers Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh, member of the PLO Executive Committee, as chairman; and brothers Abu Ja'far, the Political Department general director, and Hakim Bal'awi, Palestinian ambassador to Tunisia, as members. Brother 'Abdallah Hawrani, an Executive Committee member, did not take part in the meeting so that the delegations might be equal in number. The U.S. delegation consisted of Robert Pelletreau, the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia; Gordon Brown, the embassy's number two man, and Rudmond Hill, the embassy's political adviser.

This meeting lasted nearly 5, hours whereas the first meeting lasted nearly one hour. The two delegations had coffee before the meeting. It was noticed that the members of both delegations seemed to be as relaxed at the end of the meeting as they had been at its start.

Brother 'Abd-Rabbuh expressed the belief that the meeting achieved some progress, while Pelletreau said that the dialogue with the PLO is a part of the new dynamism in the Middle East. We have tried to explain the principles and the practical considerations on which our viewpoints rest. We have presented a number of questions and answered a number of questions posed to us.

#### PLO Right to Armed Struggle, Talks With U.S. Discussed

44040377a Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH  
in Arabic 26 Mar 89 pp 8-9

[Article by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Haqq: "Mediation Coupled With Unequal Pressures; PLO Prepared Fundamental Working Paper for Second Round of Dialogue"]

[Text] The PLO realizes that Washington's position in favor of continuation of the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue is dictated by the facts of the conflict and that suspending the dialogue means pushing the conditions toward an explosion that harms Washington's and Israel's interests and international relaxation.

Yosi Beilin, Israel's deputy minister of finance (Labor Party), acknowledges that Israel has been floundering in a mistake for 20 years by failing to present its conditions for talks with the PLO, thus leading numerous countries, among them friends of Israel, to recognize the PLO. Beilin calls for defining these conditions promptly so that Israel may not be paralyzed while waiting for "national consensus on a diplomatic initiative."

This acknowledgment is an example of one of the forms of the limited Israeli official response to the "shocks" experienced by Israel as a result of the intifadah's [uprising] accomplishments, of the Palestinian peace initiative, and of the international trend toward consensus on dealing with the Palestinian facts, even in the United States which is seeking nowadays to rescue Israel from itself (or, to be specific, from its prime minister's intransigence) because this movement may not only break Yitzhaq Shamir but may also cause Israel a split that would be difficult to mend.

It goes without saying that Washington takes into consideration, first, its vital interests in the region, including a strong Israel, and then whatever is compatible with its international strategy as a superpower. Because of all of this, the White House administration has begun to move slowly in the trend of releasing a political process to achieve some sort of solution for the Middle East region. It has raised the level of its response to the Palestinian people's legitimate demands and rights. However, the final formula of what may be accomplished will be determined by the elements of strength which each party can amass and, ultimately, by each party's negotiation skill as one form of the conflict.

Within the context of this tendency, the U.S. Administration took two parallel steps in the middle of this month, namely: the decision to resume the official dialogue with the PLO, and James Baker's statements to a U.S. Congressional subcommittee on 14 March 1989. In those statements, Baker said: If serious negotiations are impossible without the PLO, then there must be negotiations between the Israelis and PLO representatives. Both President George Bush and James Baker, Bush's secretary of state, asked Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, who was visiting Washington, to discuss the possibility of holding direct talks with the PLO because such talks may ultimately be inevitable. Washington also asked Arens that his government stop its settlement program, otherwise Washington will not be able to stop with the barrier of the U.S. "veto" the deluge of Security Council resolutions condemning Israel.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, a U.S. paper, has said that Baker is working to develop a three-directional U.S. policy—one direction toward Israel, a second toward the PLO, and a third toward the Soviet Union—with the aim of nurturing a peace process that begins with talks between Israel and Palestinians in the occupied territories, and then expands later to include Arab countries and the PLO.

The new U.S. position has evoked varied reactions within official Israel and within the ruling coalition parties. Voices have risen within the Labor Party demanding separation from the Likud. Some of this party's wings have come to believe that the opportunity is now ripe for them to settle their accounts with the leadership of the Rabin-Peres duo, considering that they are the two leaders who led the party to failure in four rounds of parliamentary elections and, recently, to failure in the municipal elections.

At the Palestinian level, the U.S. State Department's decision to resume the official U.S.-Palestinian dialogue came as a result of a strife which lasted several weeks and which revolved around a number of concepts concerning terrorism and the practice of armed struggle, especially in the wake of the fedayeen operations witnessed by South Lebanon in recent weeks.

During his presence in Kuwait before resumption of the dialogue was announced, brother 'Abd Rabbuh, a member of the Executive Committee, attacked the United States strongly, pointing out that the PLO has not pursued Washington for dialogue but to prepare for the international conference on peace in the Middle East and that he will discuss this issue in the second round of dialogue. In this regard, informed sources have noted that the Palestinian side is seeking to begin a profound substantial discussion on four fundamental issues, namely: the international conference, Palestinian representation in the negotiations through the PLO, the means to establish the Palestinian state, and Israeli terrorism in the occupied territories.

At the time, informed sources, relying on what goes on behind the scenes in Washington, interpreted this U.S. behavior as being the result of a real split in opinion within both the U.S. Administration and Congress. Some supporters of Israel and others who are not enthusiastic for the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue see in these operations occasions for the United States to absolve itself from the decision made by former secretary of state George Shultz to begin an official dialogue with the PLO whereas other circles which support the dialogue see that the Palestinians should refrain from such operations so as not to give the first party the opportunity to reinforce its viewpoint, especially since this party has important influence in the Congress, where the influential decisions are made.

Various press circles believe that President George Bush's administration wants the dialogue to continue and is eager not to see gaps and obstacles emerge in the path of its development because the White House administration believes that the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue will help bring the viewpoints of the parties to the conflict closer to each other and will enable it to strengthen its role in a political solution to the Arab-Zionist conflict whereas Clovis Maqsd, the Arab League representative in Washington, sees that the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue has helped so far only in conveying the Israeli viewpoint.

Meanwhile, some Palestinian sources say that Washington truly wants the Palestinian factions to stage fedayeen operations in South Lebanon so that it may keep this issue the subject of its discussion with the PLO for a long period that lasts until the new White House administration determines its Mideast policy.

It is well known that this administration has faced and continues to face some problems with a number of appointments to its crew. Moreover, President Bush believes that he must be deliberate in making any move in the direction of solving the region's crisis so that he may not burn himself out quickly as his two predecessors, Reagan and Carter, did. Meanwhile, he has personally stressed in the course of his response to the Soviet foreign minister's Mideast tour that the principles are in place but that the movement needs to be studied deliberately.

In any case, one of the most significant objectives of the U.S. behavior vis-a-vis the dialogue with the PLO is to put as much pressure as possible on the PLO to extort from it, if possible, concessions that create comfortable circumstances for Israel and that ease the intense pressures engulfing Israel.

It is true that the results of some of the fedayeen operations in the field against Israel are unsatisfactory. But calculations that compare the losses do not, in this case, lead to a position contrasting with the prevailing position. This position is determined in the light of the PLO's firm adherence to the principle of its legitimate right to self-defense and its right, as a national liberation movement, to engage in armed struggle against a settlement-oriented enemy. An example of this enemy's response to a fedayeen operation in South Lebanon was its brutal air raid on the area of 'Aynab village and its vicinity in Lebanon, a raid in which 3 people were martyred and 21 students wounded.

In embodiment of this principle, the PLO refuses to bargain with some Washington circles over linking continuation of the official U.S.-Palestinian dialogue with Palestinian abandonment of this right as part of the pledge the Palestinian leader made in Geneva to renounce terrorism. This bargaining reached a critical point in the wake of the Democratic Front's two recent operations—Jerusalem 1 and 2—on the occasion of its 20th anniversary.

The Palestinian response, as expressed by the general commander at a press conference held in Abu Dhabi on 3 March 1989, was utterly clear. The general commander said that these operations "fall within the framework of the legitimate right to self-defense" and are compatible with the spirit of the commitments he undertook in Geneva on 14 December 1988, expressing the opinion that the Americans misunderstand these operations if they interpret them as a form of terrorism.

On 8 March 1989, Palestinian Leader Yasir 'Arafat told a press conference: The U.S. Administration must make a distinction between terrorist action and resistance activity, especially in South Lebanon. 'Arafat was thus responding to U.S. President George Bush's "wishes" that he, 'Arafat, would condemn the fedayeen operations in the South, considering that "a few words (from 'Arafat) work miracles!"

The following day, an authoritative Palestinian source in Tunis announced that the PLO informed the United States through the Swedish Government that it had decided to suspend the unofficial contacts with it until the official dialogue between the two sides is resumed. The source expressed the opinion that this dialogue should contribute to preparing for the international peace conference on the Middle East.

Brother Yasir 'Abdrabbuh, the head of the Palestinian delegation to the dialogue, member of the PLO Executive Committee (and member of the Democratic Front's Political Bureau), had met with Sweden's minister of foreign affairs in Vienna prior to and after the Swedish minister's meeting with his U.S. counterpart on the peripheries of the European conventional weapons disarmament conference.

The PLO realized early on that the U.S. officials' statements and Washington's various demands, especially those connected with the armed struggle and with ending or easing the intifadah, range from pressure on the PLO to a practical translation of domestic U.S. calculations. But the general tendency is for continuing the dialogue. This has been noted by more than one official of the U.S. Department of State who has lauded the PLO's cooperation with Washington in fighting terrorism, especially in uncovering the criminal who blew up the Pan Am airliner over Scotland last December.

The PLO also realizes that Washington's position in favor of continuing the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue does not emanate from a self-less U.S. desire for dialogue but has been dictated and continues to be dictated by the facts of the region's conflict. Halting this dialogue means pushing the region toward an explosion with unknown consequences. Such an explosion would fundamentally contradict the prevalent tendency in the international relations to cool the hot spots and to achieve relaxation between the East and the West.

There are even those who believe that a reason for Washington's decision to resume the official dialogue with the PLO is the outcome produced by the Baker-Shevardnadze talks in Vienna on 6 March 1989 on the peripheries of the talks on East-West arms reduction. The Soviet foreign minister's Mideast tour also motivated Washington to speed up its political movement toward the region.

The PLO prepared for the second dialogue session, held on 22 March 1989, a working paper which focuses on a number of fundamental principles, the most significant of which are: holding the international conference and the mechanism for its convocation, how to establish the Palestinian state, the issue of Palestinian representation in any likely negotiations, the U.S. concept of terrorism, and the Israeli terrorism in the occupied territories.

It is learned from various press reports and analyses that the U.S. tendency is founded on "lessening the intensity of the violence in the occupied territories." This means lessening the intifadah's momentum in return for halting the Israeli oppressive practices and encouraging direct negotiations between the two sides in the hope of achieving partial and phased agreements if it is difficult to achieve comprehensive agreements.

But Israel's prime minister and his kind seek to obstruct any direct dialogue with the PLO, and they are trying the impossible, to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state. This is why when his foreign minister failed to achieve in Washington positive results that pave the way for his coming visit to the United States at the beginning of next month, Shamir resorted to arming himself with what outcome may be produced by the Jewish conference for solidarity with Israel—a conference in which nearly 1,000 notables representing the world's Jewish communities, especially in the United States, are participating. However, the initial signs indicate that Shamir will not get all he wants from the conferees. A significant number of these conferees have stressed that they are in solidarity with Israel, not with its policy. Moreover, official Israel seemed to be divided itself in front of the conference. The Labor Party leader announced at the official inauguration session that his party may break away from the government in the near future or before year's end, noting that Israel has to make fateful decisions and introduce fundamental changes in its policy. Other Labor Party leaderships call for breaking away from the Likud and for forming a narrow government. Even though these people, excluding a few, have not spoken frankly of the possibilities of holding direct negotiations with the PLO, their statements keep the door open for such a likelihood.

What is interesting is that the time limit set by Peres for breaking away from the Likud, if the latter does not embark on a peace initiative, is close to the period (6-9 months) which Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has given for holding the international conference. This period is similar to that repeatedly announced by the Palestinian leader in this regard.

Shamir is also talking of new ideas which he will take with him to Washington when he visits there at the beginning of April and which are likely, as he says, to satisfy the aspirations of some Arabs without undermining Israel's security. But Shamir continues to hold to his position of opposing negotiations with the PLO and the [creation] of a Palestinian state. This is why all the signs indicate that the

reverberations of his visit to Washington will be low and that he will face U.S. pressures and positions which contradict in some aspects Washington's [as published] vision of a solution to the Arab-Zionist conflict. It is expected, meanwhile, that the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue round will produce agreement on some points.

The experience of the last few weeks indicates that the PLO has achieved considerable success in crystallizing its visions, as in the case of its disagreement with Washington over the principle of armed struggle. In its difficult dialogue with Washington, the PLO is arming itself with the intifadah, with political sophistication, international legitimacy, and with international consensus on its peace initiative.

#### **Views of 'Freedom Fighters,' Terrorism Contrasted**

44040378B Nicosia *FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH*  
in Arabic 2 Apr 89 pp 24-25

[Article by Sa'adah Sudah: "U.S. Formula for Armed Struggle"]

[Text] In an introduction he wrote for a document issued by the U.S. Department of Defense (the Pentagon) on terrorist groups in the world, U.S. President George Bush contrasted "terrorists" with "freedom fighters." The introduction includes a very simple and very clear definition of the two. Terrorists are people who attack non-military targets and who kill unarmed civilian children, women and men. Freedom fighters are, according to Bush, people who attack military targets, not unarmed civilians.

Ned Walker, the State Department assistant undersecretary for Middle East affairs, offered additional details on the U.S. official concept of terrorism in his testimony at the beginning of last March before the House of Representatives special committee for our region's affairs. We quote the following from Walker's exchange with Lee Hamilton, the committee chairman\*:

Hamilton: So how do you define terrorism? Do you define it as the concept of no-war?

Walker: The State Department's definition of terrorism, included annually in the report on terrorism, is that it is a politically motivated attack on non-combat targets.

Hamilton: Meaning that an attack on a military unit in Israel is not terrorism?

Walker: That does not necessarily mean that such an attack would not have a great impact on all that we might do for the PLO.

Hamilton: I understand this. But this is not terrorism?

Walker: An attack on a military target? No, not according to the definition. But wait a moment. This is not true. You are aware that there are attacks on military targets that are considered evident terrorism. It depends on the individual circumstances.

Hamilton: You wait a moment. I thought that you just gave me the State Department definition.

Walker: Terrorism is attack on "noncombatant targets." This definition does not specify "military" or "civilian" targets.

There is no doubt that Walker's confusion and his retreat from his initial statements are due to his recollection of the attack on the "marines" command headquarters in Beirut a few years ago. This attack led to the death of 200 U.S. troops, and Washington considered it an act of terrorism at the time. This is why the phrase "noncombatant" applies in this case. But Walker ultimately offers a simple and clear definition of terrorism which complements what we have quoted from his president.

Perhaps if the late U.S. President Lyndon Johnson had asked Yasir 'Arafat to sign this definition on 31 December 1964 (the eve of Fatah's inception), 'Arafat would not have hesitated for an instance in signing it. What is more, if Johnson himself had made a similar request to George Habash, the Popular Front [PFLP] secretary general, on 10 December 1967, the eve of the PFLP's inception, he would have received a positive response.

The fact is that even the Popular Front, which is well known in the west for its radicalism and its external operations, especially against the Israeli El Al planes and El Al's European offices, has never targeted unarmed civilians even though it has targeted "noncombatant" positions. In no cases where hostages have been taken, whether in operations carried out by the Popular Front or by other Palestinian factions, have the fedayeen killed their hostages. All those killed in such operations died as a result of the Israelis' or the Europeans' use of military means to confront operations with political objectives (as happened in the case of the Munich operation).

What is more, the West ignores the fact that the Popular Front itself renounced\*\* this kind of operation early on and adopted in August 1972 a decision freezing the membership of the late struggler Wadi' Haddad who, as a member of the front's Political Bureau, enjoyed our people's and our leadership's respect for his determination to continue external operations. The front expelled him in May 1975 for this reason.

The U.S. administration did well by backing down, prior to the second dialogue session with the Palestinian side, on its clamorous tone in dealing with the concept of terrorism and armed struggle—a tone adopted under the influence of the Israeli attempts to apply pressure in order to halt Washington's dialogue with the PLO on the pretext of what MA'REV calls the fedayeen "spring

campaign" and of the increasing Palestinian operations in South Lebanon even though all these operations have been against purely military targets, be they Israeli targets or targets of Israel's lackeys.

Through Secretary of State James Baker, the administration made it completely clear on 15 March 1989 that acts carried out by PLO factions who are not under the control of PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat do not justify severing the dialogue between the PLO and Washington, keeping in mind that the administration had previously expressed the opinion that the PLO cannot absolve itself of responsibility for the activities of the elements which make it up.

It is not unreasonable for us to urge the U.S. administration to try to persuade Yitzhak Shamir, when it receives him shortly, of its concept of terrorism, especially on the occasion of the latest Israeli campaign against the city of Nabulus and its environs, a campaign which has persisted from 24 February 1989 to the present, and its campaign against the entire Gaza Strip which has persisted from 18 March 1989 to the present.

The fact is that the PLO has two concepts of what the Israelis consider a cause for halting Washington's dialogue with the PLO. There is "armed struggle" and there is "terrorism" which is totally different from armed struggle. These two concepts are almost exactly identical to the two U.S. concepts of "fighting for freedom" and "terrorism." But the Israeli Government employs different criteria. When Shimon Peres, its foreign minister [as published], sought to slight the PLO Executive Committee chairman's condemnation of terrorism, he said that the throwing of a single Molotov cocktail in the occupied territories is enough "to torpedo the PLO's pledge to renounce terrorism." In a naive attempt to distort reality and to coercively enlist this reality to serve a certain theoretical concept, General Amiram Mitzna, the Israeli army's central district commander (the West Bank military governor), has resorted since the beginning of last January to characterizing the stone throwers as "saboteurs," which is the term ordinarily used to describe the resistance men who belong to the armed Palestinian factions or those who use firearms in operations against Israeli targets.

Israelis and people in the West ignore the fact that since the intifadah erupted, the PLO Executive Committee chairman has instructed that no firearms be used within its framework even though the Israelis have not lessened their indiscriminate bullets, all of which are fatal, in the streets, towns, and villages of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the wake of the Israeli troops' persistence in firing at Palestinian demonstrators, the chairman warned that he may reconsider his decision in light of the increasing number of martyrs and wounded among the ranks of our people on the home front.

Perhaps the chairman's decision, which is still valid, does not mean that one should not expect the presence of "spontaneous initiatives" on which Palestinian citizens in the territories embark as a result of a natural reaction to the oppression to which they are subjected by the occupying authority which kills, wounds, detains, departs, demolishes homes, and obstructs the means of livelihood.

We do not view the recent U.S. call urging the intifadah to abandon its "violent" character and to turn toward political dialogue as practical, despite the rectification which is attached to the call and which, according to an AFP report on 23 March 1989, says: "The intifadah has attracted attention, thanks to its destructive power(!) Even though we are not trying to stop it, we believe that it has reached a point at which the acts of violence(!) must be stopped and the search for political objectives must begin."

'Arafat spoke the truth when he interpreted the rancorous U.S. tone (now a thing of the past) dealing with the recent fedayeen operations as the result of a "big misunderstanding." This misunderstanding goes beyond this point to other issues, including the U.S. view of the intifadah. The course of "national realism" which the PLO has charted for itself since the resolutions of the PNC [Palestine National Council]'s 19th session in Algiers—this course could not have seen the light and could not have continued with steady steps despite the regrettable sharpness of the recent statements of some PLO factions if it did not have two supports, namely: the intifadah and national unity.

On this ground, the PLO can pursue the course of national and political realism to its conclusion. We can only interpret any endeavor to undermine the strength of either support, regardless of such an endeavor's intentions, as an endeavor to make the Palestinian side enter the settlement forest, so thickly wooded as to make visibility impossible at times, with eyes (or one of them) blindfolded or without any of its sources of strength.

Our people and leadership abandoned long ago the positions of political naivete and of reliance on promises and goodwill. They will never repeat what happened to the 1936 revolution when the Supreme Arab Committee, which was leading our national struggle at the time, responded to the "appeal of their majesties the Arab kings and of His Highness Prince 'Abdullah" to the Palestinians to "resort to tranquillity and end the strike and the riots" in reliance on the "goodwill of our friend, the British Government, and its declared wish to achieve justice." Though that response led to the famous London conference, held on 7 February 1939, to settle the Palestinian issue peacefully, that conference, which lasted nearly 6 weeks, produced nothing other than weakening the Palestinian side, dispersing its ranks and, finally, the loss of the homeland in 1948.

There is no doubt that the PLO is very serious in its current policy and in its readiness to accept a possible settlement in an international conference. However, this conference is not an objective in itself. The objective is a settlement founded on a possible and reasonable degree of justice. Until this is achieved, the PLO will protect its two wings, the intifadah and national unity, so that it may be able to fly and soar.

Here are the Americans offering more proof of their misunderstanding of most aspects of our people's cause. This misunderstanding does not dissipate until these Americans leave their positions of responsibility. This is what happened with Richard Murphy, former assistant secretary of state for Middle East affairs, who said on 11 March 1989 that Israel will "sooner or later" succumb "to the Palestinian reality" by virtue of the intifadah "which has changed the rules of the game in the region." Murphy expected the United States to end up with the "international conference" in some form. Will Bush and Baker break the rule, tell the whole truth, and work for this truth while they are in the White House?

It does the PLO no harm whatsoever if others characterize the armed struggle as "terrorism." While presenting the PNC resolutions to the UN General Assembly and repeatedly condemning "all forms of terrorism," the PLO Executive Committee chairman turned to the third world representatives in the hall and added: "I greet at the same time all those I see before me in this hall who were accused of terrorism by their colonizers and their henchmen during their battles to liberate their countries from the yoke of colonialism. They are today the faithful leaders of their people and the men who are truly loyal to the principles and values of justice and freedom."

#### Footnotes

\*Quoted from Haifa AL-ITTIHAD's translation of the details of the testimony and dialogue as transmitted by HA'ARETZ, 7 March 1989.

\*\*From LISAN AL-'ARAB dictionary: Renunciation, throwing something held in the hand in front or behind the holder. One renounces something if he throws it from his hand. Hence, the Hadith: He renounced his ring, i.e. threw it from his hand, and the people renounced theirs.

#### PFLP Leader Discusses Palestinian State, Struggle

44040377b Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 3 Apr 89 p 16

[Article by Raja Talab: "In Press Conference at Palestinian Embassy Premises, Dr Habash: Let Arabs Determine Their Relationship With Washington in Light of Its Position on Our Issue; PLO's Democratic Reform Bolsters Intifadah; Lebanon Is Confrontation Arena for Schemes of Regional Forces; Nothing New in Relationship With Syria; We Will Participate in Provisional Government, Unless...."]

[Text] Dr George Habash, the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] secretary general, has underlined the importance of four fundamental issues, i.e.:

national unity, the Palestinian state, the Arab link in the conflict with Israel, and the Arab masses' role in supporting the intifadah [uprising]. In a press conference he held on the premises of the Embassy of the "State of Palestine" in Kuwait, Dr Habash said that the PFLP believes that adherence to national unity is a decisive necessity dictated by the state of loyalty to the intifadah. The intifadah dictates this and the intifadah masses ask us for it. National unity is tied to the bases that preserve and bolster it. These bases are: adherence to the PNC [Palestine National Council] resolutions, especially the Algiers session resolutions; and preservation of the national constants, namely establishment of the Palestinian state and the right to repatriation and self-determination, i.e., the PLO's phased program.

In his press conference, Dr Habash stressed that forgetting or omitting any of the three national constants harms national unity. He defined the fundamental conditions that must exist in the independent Palestinian state, saying this state must have full sovereignty, Jerusalem must be its capital, it must not be unarmed, and it must be founded on all the territories occupied in 1967.

He noted that the path agreed upon by the Palestinians in the PLO for achieving this state is an effective international conference with full powers.

Dr Habash strongly rejected any formula of direct negotiations and considered talk about such negotiations a departure from the PNC resolutions, especially from the resolutions of the latest session in Algiers.

#### **State Is Struggle Task**

Dr Habash clarified the difference which the PFLP sees between the independence proclamation made in the Algiers session and creation of the state on the ground, saying: The intifadah has been able to transform the slogan of state from a historical possibility to a realistic possibility. The state has become a struggle task that requires greater struggle and strife from us and from our masses for this state to be built on real ground. He pointed out the official Israeli position which rejects the PLO, the state, and withdrawal from the territories [occupied in] 1967. He stressed that holding the international conference under the canopy of the current balances of power does not mean that Israel will capitulate on the issue of establishment of the Palestinian state, but that what is more likely is that Israel will talk about a confederation with Jordan or self-rule. To avoid this likelihood, Habash urged that the ferocity of the real confrontation with the enemy be escalated and that the intifadah be continued and given greater support. He also urged the masses to engage in greater struggle so that the banner [subject] of discussion at the international conference may be the Palestinian state itself. He pointed out that it is not in the Palestinian masses' interest to have matters simplified and smoothed out for them in a manner that magnifies the dream of a state and turns it into an illusion.

Habash added: Despite our deep faith in the importance of the diplomatic and political arena at the international level, we must not make the mistake of giving this factor more than its real weight.

On the other hand, he stressed the need to root and entrench the intifadah in order to change the balance of forces so that the state may become an implementable banner and slogan.

#### **Arab Link Is Weak**

Dr Habash characterized the Arab situation as being negative at both the official and popular levels. But he stressed that the Palestinians cannot succumb to this situation.

He pointed out that the Israeli danger is a danger to the entire Arab nation and that it is one of the revolution's and PLO's tasks to clarify this danger to the Arab nation so as to awaken the Arab position.

Habash also said that the Arab link is required in the conflict with the Zionist enemy. We are not content with the support which the regimes give the intifadah on the television screens nor with the material aid decided by the Algiers summit. We want political support.

Addressing his words to the Arab regimes, Habash added: If you are incapable of waging wars against Israel, then you can at least determine your relations with Washington, Israel's ally, in the light of its position on the Palestinian issue and of recognizing the PLO and the Palestinian state. Habash has considered this demand a fundamental criterion for determining the degree of proximity to or remoteness from the Palestinian issue.

The PFLP secretary general expressed the hope that our kinsmen in the occupied territories will soon hear of real Arab popular support.

#### **PLO's Democratic Reform**

Habash urged the need for a real democratic reform in the PLO's institutions and structure so that the PLO may turn into a single united front in which each faction can retain its right to its special ideology and organizational framework and a front which will have a single information voice and the same political tasks.

He stressed that this democratic reform is tantamount to fundamental support for the intifadah and a condition that must be embraced so that the PLO may rise to the very level of the intifadah's giving and organization.

Dr Habash expressed his extreme regret for the PLO's failure to develop, after 22 years of struggle, the principles of this reform on the basis of proportionate and democratic representation.

He demanded that the democratic reform include restructuring the PLO's fundamental institutions—the Executive Committee, the National Council, the Central Council, and even the PLO's offices throughout the world.

He said that when this is accomplished, the subject of respecting the institutions will follow. Habash also expressed the hope that the next PNC session will examine this issue more seriously and effectively.

Habash also expressed the belief that it is possible to form a unified Palestinian army and to impose the conscription system on Palestinians living in Arab countries if democratic reform is achieved in Palestinian institutions and if relaxation is achieved in the PLO's relations with a number of Arab countries.

#### **Central Council**

Regarding the reason for demanding convocation of the Palestinian Central Council, Habash said: We have demanded convocation of the Council to bolster the Palestinian national unity and to protect the intifadah.

He noted that the PFLP supports giving 'Arafat the position of head of the Palestinian state because he is the PLO's Executive Committee chairman.

He asserted that if a provisional government is formed, the PFLP will participate in this government because the PFLP had pushed the PNC in the direction of issuing its resolution on this government.

But if the PFLP finds out that this government has tasks other than the national tasks that serve the PLO's phased program and the PNC resolutions, it will not participate in this government and will oppose it.

#### **Egyptian Position**

Dr Habash expressed his regret at the continued presence of the Egyptian ambassador in Tel Aviv now that more than 16 months of the intifadah have passed and characterized this [presence] as a saddening and painful position.

He said: We view the Egyptian political movement at the level of the Palestinian issue with extreme caution. Habash reminded of the initiative Egyptian President Husni Mubarak offered at the intifadah's outset when he called for halting the intifadah in return for a halt in the construction of settlements in the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] Strip.

#### **Dialogue With Washington**

Responding to a question by AL-WATAN on his assessment of the dialogue with Washington and on whether the new administration is dealing with the Palestinian

issue more positively, Habash pointed out that the U.S. Administration's objective from opening the dialogue with the PLO is to outflank the intifadah.

He added: We must remain alert to the U.S. schemes against us. The first dialogue session focused on terrorism and on making sure that the [PLO] factions renounce terrorism. The second session focused on calming the situation and there were U.S. demands for toning down the intifadah in return for some superficial Israeli steps.

Habash urged the U.S. Administration to turn the dialogue into a sincere and true instrument actually contributing to solving the Palestinian issue and not into a procedure for foiling the intifadah politically.

He emphasized that Washington's decision to open dialogue with the PLO is the result of its inability to endure its isolation at the level of tackling the Palestinian issue, especially after the UN General Assembly sessions were moved from New York to Geneva. This event was tantamount to an international political referendum in favor of the PLO.

Habash rejected strongly the idea that the Palestinian political victory is the result of the recent PNC resolutions in Algiers.

He pointed out that the PLO's political victories have emanated fundamentally from the intifadah which has (generated) realistic political resolutions.

#### **Relationship With Syria**

Responding to another question by AL-WATAN on whether there have been developments at the level of normalizing Palestinian-Syrian relations and on whether his presence in Damascus serves this end, Habash emphasized that there has been no positive development at this level.

He recalled the slogan which the PLO raised immediately after the intifadah and which called for correcting the relationship with Syria and for providing a national nursemaid for the intifadah.

He said: I regret to say that we have not succeeded at the level of these two issues. He stressed that normalization serves the interest of both sides and noted that during his presence in Damascus, he pushed the issue of normalizing the relations between the two sides forward.

#### **Lebanon Is Cause of Disagreement**

Habash explained that the main reason for the disagreement between the PLO and Syria is the issue of the Lebanese arena and Syria's vision of the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

He said that this issue is still the subject of a disagreement that has not been settled to this moment. He urged the need to normalize these relations so as to serve the Arab causes.

In the course of his response to a question by AL-WATAN on his concept of the possibilities of a solution in Lebanon, Habash noted the presence of regional forces, each of which has its scheme that is in conflict with the other schemes in the Lebanese arena.

He expressed the belief that it is difficult to solve the Lebanese issue in isolation from a solution to the Middle East issue, and he called for focusing all the efforts at present on solving the Palestinian issue in its capacity as the key to solving the entire Middle East crisis.

Habash said that all the proposed solutions are tantamount to temporary palliatives, especially since everybody has become certain that the Lebanese refuse to return to the era of Maronite political dominance, particularly since more than 15 years of civil war have passed and since the balance of power between the nationalists and the isolationists, and even the regional parties, are in equilibrium.

He stressed that the solution is in bringing a president who solves Lebanon's political crisis and not a president who manages this crisis and said that there is a difference between sedative solutions and a fundamental solution to Lebanon's crisis.

He pointed out that the Palestinian plan in Lebanon is embodied in solving Lebanon's crisis, but provided that the [Palestinian refugee] camps' security is preserved and that the Palestinian revolution is permitted to continue military action against Israel from South Lebanon.

Dr Habash pointed out that a scheme is being hatched in Lebanon to divert attention from the intifadah and from the Zionist enemy's crimes.

He expressed his regret for the presence of some Arab parties that are taking part in this scheme, and said that Israel is experiencing a stifling crisis as a result of the world community's and the world public opinion's focus on the image of the brutality and barbarism Israel is perpetrating in the occupied territories.

Habash denied knowledge of a PLO plan to apply to join the three Arab groupings as an observer member to make certain that the Palestinian issue is central to the Arabs.

He said: There may be a plan in this direction, but, to this moment, I have no knowledge of such a step.

### Recognizing Israel

Dr George Habash stressed that acknowledgment of Security Council Resolution 242 does not mean recognizing Israel. He said that Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir acknowledged Security Council Resolution 242 but did not recognize the Zionist entity.

He explained that as a result of the poor Arab situation, the PLO is trying to strengthen its political positions and course by recognizing the international legitimacy of [UN] resolutions.

### Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh Interviewed

44040349 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic  
19 March 89 p 17

[Interview with Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, member of the PLO's Executive Committee by Ghazi al-Jasim and Niquila Nasir; in Kuwait; date not specified; first paragraph is AL-WATAN introduction]

[Text] AL-WATAN's diwaniyah [open meeting] hosted Mr Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, member of the PLO's Executive Committee and assistant secretary general of the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine]. Mr 'Abd Rabbuh addressed AL-WATAN's editorial staff and the diwaniyah's guests, shedding light on the most recent developments in the Palestinian question. These developments occurred in the wake of the continuing uprising, as recognition of the PLO grew around the world and steps to convene an international conference were being stepped up. Mr 'Abd Rabbuh then listened to comments made by the newspaper's editorial staff and guests, and he answered their questions. A summary of the meeting follows.

[Al-Jasim] We thank Mr Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh for accepting our invitation. Let us begin since our guest needs no introduction. Would Mr 'Abd Rabbuh be so kind as to inform us at the outset about the most recent new developments on the Palestinian scene?

['Abd Rabbuh] Thank you for giving me this opportunity. I am happy to have this meeting with you. Actually, significant developments on the political scene are expected during the coming period. These may be summarized under two headings. The first is that recognition of the PLO is growing on a broad scale worldwide; and the second is that the process of making preparations for an international peace conference in the area is being stepped up. These two matters are based principally on the continuation and relentlessness of the uprising, which, as daily events and incidents affirm, cannot be liquidated.

### The Weak Point

The weak point in the whole process which is going on now is not Palestinian but Arab. Let me say quite candidly that making Palestinian and Arab victories and

gains grow and lead to an international conference requires an Arab role that is more sophisticated and more advanced than that which has been played so far. As you know, we suggested some time ago that the five Arab confrontation countries coordinate their activities with respect to preparations for the international conference so they can apply pressure and bring about the essential elements, ingredients and principles for an effective international conference under whose auspices an equitable and a comprehensive solution can be considered. It is assumed that this meeting between the five countries would include those countries that are concerned in this matter: Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Palestine. The resolutions of the Arab Summit meeting, especially those of the recent summit meeting in Algeria, would be the starting point for this meeting.

Lately, however, we have been hearing conflicting positions and ideas, which essentially hesitate about this suggestion. There are those who say it is too early. They say we have to wait until an international conference is convened or until the United Nations or the two superpowers convene an international conference. Afterwards, we as Arabs can meet to coordinate our positions. But this is something that is neither administrative nor superficial; it is rather a political matter of the first degree. Waiting for others on the international scene to decide on the formula, the principles and the date for the conference and then meeting to coordinate activities is not the proper position. What is required of us is to coordinate our activities now so that we can apply pressure to have the conference convened as soon as possible. We are to coordinate our activities now so we can take part in all the operations which are required in making preparations for the international conference. We are to do this to unify the Arab position, especially that of the Arab parties who will be involved in the international conference. That is why we are adamant about this proposal.

This is a practical as well as a concrete response to all appeals, charges and statements which are being made about a so-called bilateral solution or bilateral talks. We advocate a comprehensive solution to the conflict, and that, as both the past and the recent history of the Arab-Israeli conflict proves, would guarantee the interests of all the Arab parties. Bilateral and unilateral solutions, however, would damage even the interests of the party which becomes involved in such a solution. The passive wait-and-see role is not the role that is required. In fact, it would seriously damage Arab interests in general.

#### **The International Position**

On the other hand, there is most certainly change and progress on the international level as the international position in general moves closer to accepting the formula which includes the PLO's participation in an international conference for peace in the area. This position is the one which all Europe accepts. It is also the same

position which has been adopted and is being promoted by the Soviet Union, by the People's Republic of China, and by various other international blocs such as the bloc of non-aligned countries and other blocs.

I can say that the outcome of Shevardnadze's travels in the area was very significant because it showed that the Soviet Union's role could not be overlooked. The Soviet official demonstrated that the Soviet role was acceptable to and even required by all parties involved in the conflict in the area. He demonstrated that the Soviet Union was the party which had a balanced relationship with all the parties to the conflict in the area. That is something which even the United States does not have. Convening an international conference and forming a preparatory committee are no longer being mentioned in general terms in Soviet political pronouncements. Instead, the Soviets are talking about elaborations and first steps which have to be taken to complete the preparatory process and then convene the international conference.

The value of these proposals lies also in the fact that they set a ceiling on the time for making preparations. Thus, they block delays and provide no opportunity for tampering with the time factor. We did not oppose this proposal, and we welcomed it as one step in the integrated preparatory process for convening the international conference. It may be said that the Soviet proposals do not set forth one manner in which preparations for the conference are to be made. In fact, these proposals set forth a variety of integrated manners in which the preparatory process may be completed. Even the meetings which Shevardnadze held in the area were also considered part of the preparatory process. We do not need anyone's permission—not Washington's or Tel Aviv's—to start the process of making preparations for the international conference. We can start this process by taking specific steps, and there are other steps to be taken. There was a meeting in Vienna recently between the Soviets and Americans, and a meeting between the Soviets and a committee from the market countries may be held to discuss preparations for the international conference. In addition, there is the dialogue between Palestinians and Americans. We know quite well that the Americans and Israelis are attempting to delay the process and gain time. The United States wants to give Israel an opportunity to dampen the furor of the uprising or at least weaken it by following increasingly repressive measures in the occupied areas. The United States is trying to alleviate the effect of Israel's international isolation by providing Israel with protection in the UN Security Council and elsewhere.

#### **The Dialogue With America**

It is for this reason that American policy was aimed at shifting the dialogue with the PLO from an official level, which is essentially a dialogue that would pave or prepare the way for the international conference, to that of unofficial contacts in which the United States would try

to confine the discussions to secondary, tangential and superficial matters. This is one of the tendencies of America's ploys. The other is an attempt to portray some of the meetings which are taking place between Palestinian nationals and Israelis in the occupied areas as meetings which could pave the way for finding an acceptable Palestinian party other than the PLO with which talks can be held. This is what the United States has been trying to create and affirm.

I am not saying that we are against these contacts which are taking place inside the country with the knowledge and support of PLO leaders. These contacts are taking place in accordance with the national policy which is pursued by the PLO and the unified national command inside the country. What I am saying is that the United States was trying to exploit these contacts.

To foil this ploy we informed the United States in no uncertain terms that until the parties can be brought around an official negotiating table to give serious consideration to preparations for the international conference, the PLO would stop these unofficial contacts which were taking place abroad and would also consider stopping the contacts which were taking place inside the country. This is because the international conference is the only suitable framework for peace talks in the area.

In Vienna, on the one hand, aside from the business of the European Security and Peace Conference, meetings were held between a number of European ministers and representatives of the Soviet Union who informed the Americans of our position.

On the other hand, the PLO flatly rejects all allegations and statements about so-called Palestinian terrorism which are used by the United States as an excuse to turn people's attention away from the principal subject. We asked the Americans this question: Do you consider a Palestinian operation in south Lebanon in which Palestinians clash with a unit of the Israeli army a terrorist act? This would mean that the United States thinks that Israel's presence in south Lebanon is legal and legitimate.

That is why we will not give any consideration whatsoever to so-called terrorism or acts of terror. Today the whole world can see that Europe is an important link in the general international position on the settlement process in the Middle East. Progress was made in the European position on Palestinian rights and on the international conference, but what is required from Europe is a bigger and a more effective role. Europe supported the Palestinian peace initiative as well as the concrete proposals that were made for making preparations for the international conference. We are calling for a political role for Europe that is more effective and more dynamic, and we expect some European countries to change their positions in the coming period.

### The Uprising and the Occupation's Dilemma

Let me move on and talk about another area of the Palestinian struggle and about revolutionary, Palestinian, political activity. Let me talk about the effect of the uprising inside Israel. After the uprising went into its sixteenth month, the impossibility of ending it by military means became an established fact which was even accepted by segments of the ruling Israeli establishment and parties to it. Despite the heavy human and material losses sustained by Palestinians and despite the economic hardships they suffered under the occupation, the Palestinian masses, led by their national forces and the unified national command, managed to come up with the appropriate forms and methods of struggle to ensure long-term steadfastness. But despite all the methods which the occupation resorted to, the Palestinian position remained unified.

The significant developments that took place brought about a national position, whose principles were unshakable, and they reinforced national and social cohesiveness and solidarity. The occupation had tried everything. Finally, Rabin himself went to the Ansar detention camp to meet with the detainees and to address them as leaders of the four well-known Palestinian factions in the occupied land. Rabin told the detainees that he would be willing to release them if they agreed to form a delegation that would hold talks with Israeli authorities for the purpose of finding a way out of the present dilemma for Israel. This shows that the occupation's dilemma is getting worse. Undoubtedly, the huge organizational operation which is taking place in the occupied territories on the broadest scale has shown that the uprising cannot be suppressed or liquidated. This operation is being carried out by people's committees which shape, organize and contain popular initiatives and provide the appropriate framework for driving popular initiatives to their maximum limit. This ongoing operation is a popular action on a broad scale that involves all the people. The people's committees, which were founded on the principle of the popular initiative, are being continuously nurtured and supported by this initiative. In fact, the people's committees are essentially an expression of the fact that popular initiatives are here to stay.

I would like to point out that our policy is based on a principle from which we do not deviate. We hold tenaciously to the relationship we have with democratic forces within Israel that firmly oppose the occupation and defend the rights of the Palestinian people. We hold tenaciously to this relationship to expand the foundation of the forces which support Palestinian rights within Israel. In this regard, the other ingredient in our policy is that of opening the door and extending a hand to any Israeli who is willing to meet publicly with the PLO. There are those in Israel who, until a short time ago, were opposed to our rights. These people are now getting closer to a realistic position. This is due to the effect of the continuing uprising. Then there are those who resort to ploys and request secret meetings with the PLO. We

receive many requests and many invitations to secret meetings, but we have nothing to say in secret that we do not say in public. We are willing to meet publicly, officially and openly with these forces, parties or even individuals, and we are willing to do so on the basis of the unequivocal principle of a just and equitable peace which basically guarantees the national rights of the Palestinian people, total Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and talks with the PLO in the context of an international peace conference.

We are continuing our work and our struggle in various directions. Success is guaranteed by the steadfastness and constancy of the uprising and by the activity undertaken by the PLO, the masses of our people abroad, and all the Arab forces and our allies in the world to provide support and backing for the uprising.

[Al-Jasim] The Arab world has major capabilities which have not been utilized by the PLO to support the struggle in the occupied areas. There are still forces and parties which have not yet been mobilized in a broad and organized action to develop the uprising, reinforce its steadfastness and constancy, and guarantee that definite results are achieved. That is one point. The other point [I want to make] follows up on what you said about the position of the American administration. Instead of becoming realistic, the American administration sends us someone from the new president's team, who was a senior supervisor in his election campaign, to tell us that the uprising is over. He tells us that the uprising has no future, that economic capabilities for the Palestinians are quite meager and that Palestinians will not be able to go on.

[Abd Rabbuh] We do not deny that PLO activity has been somewhat remiss in the Arab world. But let us bear in mind that it was the PLO that called for the revival of the Arab Front, the Palestinian Revolution's partner. Under the present circumstances it was the PLO that called for the Arab Front to become a partner in supporting the uprising. This invitation was extended to the various political parties and forces without exception. We asked that no differences or discrepancies in political positions between any Arab parties on the subject of supporting the uprising be brought into this front. Initiatives were made in a number of Arab countries where backing and support for the uprising assumed several forms. None of this, however, amounted to the required level of support. We do know and understand the connection that exists between the question of democracy in the Arab world and the Palestinian struggle. It may be said that the essence of the crisis in the Arab situation and within the Arab liberation movement in general is the subject of democracy. On the one hand there is no democracy, and, [on the other hand], the struggle of popular forces, political parties and organizations for democratic rights lacks effectiveness. Throughout our Arab world there is a lack of democracy and a lack of struggle for democracy.

To us, there is an actual connection between the Palestinian struggle and the Arab struggle. As a first step we called for the establishment of an Arab front that would reinforce and support the uprising. We called for a front that would not be at the mercy of one or another regime's dispositions and whims, a front that would not be bureaucratic and overbearing. But as far as the Americans are concerned, the American computer always comes out with such considerations, which also existed during the Vietnam War. The Americans used to estimate the Vietnamese people's steadfastness by the number of air raids they withstood and the tons of missiles to which they were subjected. But the American computer cannot take into account other human factors which are essential in such situations. It cannot take into account an entire nation's disposition for national independence. It cannot take into account the fact that all groups in one nation see their destiny and their survival as a nation contingent upon achieving independence.

During the years which preceded the uprising, the American plan called for the standard of living in the occupied land to be raised by means of a development plan. It were as though Palestinians were flocks of sheep that needed more food. If they were to get this additional food, they would become satisfied and quiescent, and the problem would be solved. So what happened after that?

[Al-Jasim] How do you see Jordanian-Palestinian relations now?

[Nasir] Did Egypt ask the PLO to condemn guerilla operations which were carried out in south Lebanon? I have another question. Some time ago the Syrian president spoke about the PLO renouncing the Palestinian National Charter. Would you shed light on this matter and on the proposal that a meeting be held between Palestinians and Israelis in Moscow?

[Abd Rabbuh] Jordan has declared its support for Palestinian policy and for the Palestinian peace initiative. Although we appreciate this support, we think that Arab support must be translated into a practical policy. That is why we proposed the meeting between the five countries, but we found the response to our proposal to be quite baffling. We were asked to wait until the world should determine for us a formula and a framework for a solution. We were not to play any part in formulating the international decision before it is achieved. This is something that we continue to talk about with the various Arab countries that are concerned in this matter, and we are adamant about this approach.

As far as the other point is concerned, we did not receive anything from the Egyptian government that has to do with military operations. If we did, our response would have been unequivocal. We would have declared unequivocally that resisting the occupation would continue and that the search for a solution must concentrate on the main, essential question: a solution to the conflict on a fair basis.

Regarding the PLO's course of action and policy, we welcome any criticism of our course of action and our policy from any Arab party, provided this criticism is based on equity, mutual respect, and non-intervention in internal affairs. Given these principles as our premise, we also say that the right to criticize is a reciprocal right. To us, recognizing the Palestinian state is not a moral issue or a superficial matter, but it is an issue that has political consequences and implications. We are an independent nation like other nations, and our people have their own representative organizations which determine the nation's policy and course of action. Anyone who wishes to comment on this course of action may do so if he wishes to address those comments to the organizations which represent our people, namely, the command organizations of the PLO. Our people are the ones who can, through their representative organizations, determine the policy that can serve their national interests and find a solution to their national question. Our people can do that just as the remaining fraternal Arab people can. This is something which we have accomplished by our struggle and by the sacrifices we made for many years. This too is one of the Palestinian uprising's accomplishments and gains. As far as Syria is concerned, we think it is necessary that the dialogue between Syrians and Palestinians be started on the basis of the resolutions that were adopted in Algeria. We think this dialogue should be held to put these resolutions into practice and to take joint action.

[Al-Jasim] We thank Mr 'Abd Rabbuh for the valuable clarifications he offered, and we hope that we meet with him in the near future.

['Abd Rabbuh] Thank you.

**Al-Azhar Religious Institute in Gaza Profiled**  
44040284 Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 28 Jan 89 p 4

[Interview With Shaykh Muhammad 'Awwad, Dean of Gaza's al-Azhar Religious Institute, by Hikmat Barzaq; Date, Place not Given; "Light Shed on Palestinian Religious Institute, al-Azhar, in Gaza and on Its Establishments"]

[Text] Gaza—To develop Muslims who are capable of making a positive contribution to themselves and to their nation, to achieve the wishes and aspirations of our children and of our future generations and to protect them from ignorance and aimlessness, for the sake of sound Islamic education, in order that concepts may be enacted in word and in deed, to prepare the faithful future generations whose voice reverberates with the words "there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is Allah's messenger," the Palestinian Religious Institute, al-Azhar, was founded in Gaza in 1954. An Islamic missionary institute whose light and learning shine all over the horizon was established on Gaza's glittering shore. Out of the desire to familiarize the esteemed citizens with the Islamic institutions which have filled a

major gap and which have contributed greatly to proliferating religious awareness under these difficult circumstances, we have visited al-Azhar, this venerable institute which has graduated numerous groups of scholars, some of whom have their Ph.D's, M.A's, B.A's, and licences in various religious, scientific, and cultural specializations. This institute's graduates hold numerous important positions.

We have conducted the following interview with His Eminence Shaykh Muhammad 'Awwad, the institute dean who has been with the institute since it was first founded.

[AL-SHA'B] How did the idea of founding the Religious Institute and the Strip's religious establishments materialize?

['Awwad] Several reasons led to their founding:

1. The institutes are inspired by the glories of our Islamic Arab civilization, especially the civilization of our good people, the guardians of al-Aqsa, the first of the two holy mosques. They are also inspired by the cultural and scientific heritage left for the Islamic and Arab world, not just for our country, by those geniuses who were produced by our pure soil, such as Imam al-Shafi'i who filled the world with learning.

2. Our people's condition after 1948: The citizens were displaced and compelled to live under extremely poor living conditions. A psychological war was launched to cast doubt on their Islamic faith and to encourage them to steer away from their religion which gives them their probity and their impregnability. The psychological war was escalated in the early 1950's. There was, moreover, the danger of children sent abroad to continue their higher studies in either east or west bloc countries. In both cases, students were subjected to inducements which led to delinquencies that drove them away from their religion.

3. The absence of Islamic religious institutions capable of protecting our people from aimlessness and of shielding their legacy from cultural challenges.

All these reasons were the real motive for founding the Islamic establishments generally and the Religious Institute in particular. Our people in the Strip had been thinking of such ideas and I was one of the fortunate citizens who proposed the idea of establishing the Palestinian Religious Institute in Gaza and of taking steps to crystallize it. A committee was formed of:

Shaykh Muhammad 'Awwad as representative of the Higher Islamic Religious Council, Munir al-Rayyis as representative of Gaza Municipality and of 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Farra as representative of Khan Yunus Municipality. This committee met with His Eminence Grand Imam 'Abd-al-Rahman Taj, al-Azhar's shaykh at

the time. We presented the matter to him and he agreed to set up the institute. He then supplied the institute with instructors, with a shaykh and with al-Azhar curricula and religious books.

[AL-SHA'B] When did instruction at the institute begin?

[Awwad] It began at the elementary level in 1954-55. It was then developed to the preparatory level and secondary (pre-college) level. An association was also founded for memorization of the venerable Koran. Al-Azhar University admitted all of the institute's graduates. The secondary-school level was completed in 1963. On 23 November 1963, the institute's board of directors at the time decided to develop the institute into an Islamic university. We contacted the authorities concerned, officials of the venerable al-Azhar and the Egyptian Ministry of Religious Trusts. We also met with his eminence the grand imam and shaykh of al-Azhar for that purpose. He promised to study the issue but then the 1967 war stopped us from pursuing the matter.

[AL-SHA'B] We are aware that the institute came to a halt in 1967 because of the war. When was it reopened?

[Awwad] Yes, the institute came to a halt because of the war and because its buildings were damaged, its instructors and students dispersed, and its resources cut off. Because the need to fill the gap in religious education became more urgent, a committee was formed from a number of honorable citizens who restored the institute buildings. Studies were then resumed. The committee consisted of Shaykh Muhammad Awwad, Ahmad Hasan al-Shawwar, Hajj Raghib al-'Alami, Hajj Tawfiq al-Yaziji, Hajj Sulayman al-Shanti, Hajj Sulayman Zari al-Astal, Hajj Raghib Murtaja, and Hajj Yunus Murtaja. The institute was reopened in academic year 1971-72.

The idea of establishing an Islamic university has existed since the Religious Institute was founded in 1954-55. The institute acquired nearly 105 dunums of land for the purpose and called it al-Azhar Town on 24 June 1964. As I have already noted, the institute's former board of directors decided on 23 November 1963 to develop the institute into an Islamic university, but the 1967 war conditions prevented such development. The institute then reopened and made good progress. Because of the dire need to solve the problem of university education for the nearly 5,000 high-school and al-Azhar students who graduate annually in the Strip, which has a population of nearly 500,000 people, the institute committee made on 12 April 1977 a resolution reaffirming the previous initiatives on developing the institute into an Islamic university. The resolution was conveyed to the Arab League and to numerous Islamic and Arab organizations and was greatly welcomed by the citizens. Dr 'Abd-al-Halim Mahmud, the late shaykh of al-Azhar, may God have mercy upon his soul, also welcomed the resolution. I should not forget the good reception I was given when I visited Saudi Arabia and the financial and moral support the Saudi universities have given the

Gaza Islamic University. We encountered severe obstacles in our efforts to establish this university. But thanks to God and to sincere efforts, goodwill, persistence, and patience, we were able to overcome those obstacles. The Islamic University now stands a lofty bastion and an invulnerable stronghold of Islam on the Muslim soil of Hashim's Gaza.

[AL-SHA'B] You said, your eminence, that the instructors and the students dispersed as a result of the 1967 war. How did you manage to reopen the institute and supply it with instructors?

[Awwad] Our good country abounds with graduates carrying degrees from al-Azhar University and these graduates have been able to do their duty by this institute. We contacted a number of ulema and professors who responded to the rightful call. When the institute was reopened in 1971-72, it had seven instructors only whereas we now have 170 employees working in the institute and in the establishments emanating from it.

[AL-SHA'B] Is there cooperation between you and the bank's religious institutes?

[Awwad] We welcome cooperation with the West Bank's religious institutes. We have visited them and we have had cultural contests, athletic tournaments, and other activities with them. We are the sons of a single nation living on the same pure soil. The strip's Koran Memorization Association also participates in religious contests in the West Bank.

[AL-SHA'B] Do you plan to re-publish NUR AL-YAQIN magazine?

[Awwad] It is well known that NUR AL-YAQIN was published by the Gaza Strip Koran Memorization Association which follows al-Azhar. But it was suspended in the wake of the 1967 war. We have applied to the authorities concerned to re-publish the magazine, but we have received no response yet. We will re-apply.

[AL-SHA'B] In your capacity as chairman of the strip's Koran memorization societies, can you familiarize us with the activities of the Koran Memorization Association and with its library?

[Awwad] The Koran Memorization Association is engaged in commendable activity and has a long history and numerous branches in the strip's various mosques. A number of young instructors work with the association to instruct the youth in the venerable Koran and its rules. From time to time, contests are held for the students and they are given incentive awards. The association has 35 branches in the various parts of the Strip. It also has a library stocked with most important books on various sciences. The library is open daily to citizens and readers who wish to enrich their education and expand their

horizon. It is worth noting that all the Koran memorization societies and the Jurisprudence and Hadith College emanate from the administration of Gaza's al-Azhar.

[AL-SHA'B] Can you tell us about the institute's curricula and academic stages?

[Awwad] The institute's curricula are the same as those of the curricula taught by the religious institutes of the venerable al-Azhar in the Arab Republic of Egypt. The institute has a preparatory stage and a secondary stage. The secondary stage has a science branch for boys and a literature branch for boys and girls. It is likely that a science branch for girls will be opened in the coming academic year. The institute also has a Koran sciences and studies section which offers a 2-year course after high school.

[AL-SHA'B] What are the prerequisites for admission to the institute?

[Awwad] For admission to the preparatory school, a student is required to have an elementary school certificate from the Education Directorate schools.

For admission to the secondary stage, a student is required to have a preparatory school certificate from Education Directorate schools.

[AL-SHA'B] How many students does the institute have?

[Awwad] Upon reopening in 1971-72, the institute had 198 male and female students. This academic year, 1988-89, the institute has 1,111 students.

[AL-SHA'B] We have learned that the institute has an employees fund. What are this fund's benefits?

[Awwad] This fund has numerous benefits:

1. It assists all institute employees who need loans.
2. It assists the institute's poor and needy students.
3. It encourages visits and courtesies between institute employees.

The fund has advanced numerous loans to its workers.

[AL-SHA'B] When was al-Azhar's Scientific Religious Guidance Committee formed and what are its objectives?

[Awwad] This committee was formed in 1975 under my chairmanship. It has numerous objectives, including the following:

Proliferate the Islamic call.

Explain the religious observances so that they may be performed properly.

Familiarize the Muslims with the glories of their great predecessors.

Fight the heresies and myths spread among the citizens.

Fight atheism among the youth through persuasion and gentle words.

Issue Islamic instructions dealing with religious affairs and matters that concern society.

Educate women religiously so that they may learn their duties toward their Creator, their families, and their society.

[AL-SHA'B] Who are this committee's members?

[Awwad] They are a select group of nearly 34 ulema specialized in religious sciences.

[AL-SHA'B] What are the Religious Guidance Committee's aspirations?

[Awwad] It has many aspirations and even more hopes. We work ceaselessly. For example, we formulated a program for the exchange of preachers and the diversification of sermons. This idea has been actually implemented and has been received by prayer congregations with satisfaction. Experience has taught us not to reveal the aspirations until they are accomplished. This is better. O how excellent are the verses:

Not all that one wishes is accomplished; winds blow contrary to ships' desires.

[AL-SHA'B] What are your future plans?

[Awwad] There is a number of proposed projects, including:

Building a third floor in the institute to accommodate students.

Building a lecture hall with an 800-seat capacity. The maps and architectural blueprints have been prepared and we are going to submit them to Dr Ahmad 'Ali, director of the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah.

Purchasing a car for the Scientific Religious Guidance Committee.

Increasing the awards given to those who memorize the venerable Koran.

Working to re-publish NUR AL-YAQIN, the Islamic enlightenment magazine.

[AL-SHA'B] The results of al-Azhar's secondary school examinations have been published. What is your opinion of the success rate?

[Awwad] The success rate in the first and second grades was 100 percent. This is good and it augurs well.

[AL-SHA'B] Could you please give us a glimpse of the Koran readings and sciences section?

[Awwad] The section conducts 2-year evening courses after which the student is issued a diploma certified by the Arab Republic of Egypt. In this academic year, 1988-89, the section has 713 male and female students, 328 of whom are in the first year and 385 in the second year. A student in this section studies a curriculum which includes such Koran readings and sciences as singing the Koran verses, Koran memorization and interpretation, religious and cultural materials, and foreign languages.

This section has graduated numerous classes whose diplomas are certified by the authorities concerned in the Arab Republic of Egypt. The graduates have concluded contracts to work in a number of Arab countries. We beseech God to give us success in leading this section, and the institute generally, toward the better so that it may perform its religious and educational duty perfectly.

[AL-SHA'B] The local press reports that the UAE University has decided to admit a number of the institute students. What is your opinion?

[Awwad] I have received a message from the UAE minister of education via the Jordanian Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Holy Places, and Religious Trusts and the Palestinian Affairs Department of the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs noting that the UAE University has decided to admit a number of the Religious Institute students next year. This message is in response to the letter I addressed to the UAE minister of education via the Jordanian Ministry of Religious Trusts on 20 September 1987. We have dispatched the files of 11 students so that the UAE may take the steps needed to admit them next year.

On the occasion, I express many thanks to the UAE's emir, government, and people for this noble gesture and hope that others will emulate it. This is not the first generous gesture by the UAE. The UAE, may God reward its officials most generously, has provided abundant aid to the Religious Institute and the Islamic University. I am also exerting efforts to enroll a number of the institute graduates in other universities, such as Qatar University and Imam Muhammad V University in Morocco.

We add our voice to their voices and urge all the Islamic circles and citizens individually and collectively to advance constant aid to these religious establishments to insure their survival and development and to rescue them from collapse so that they may perform their message perfectly.

We laud the great efforts made by His Eminence Shaykh Muhammad 'Awwad, the institute dean, by the institute's esteemed committee and by its honorable faculty to move this institute forward with strong steps that accomplish the desirable objectives and the aspirations attached to this institute.

#### **Local Gains Under 'New Islam' Praised**

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10 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by Ron Keslo]

[Text] Kamil Rayyan, head of the local council of Kafr Bara, his wise face adorned with eyeglasses and a well-groomed beard, and wearing jeans and a sport shirt, is 30 years old. When he was elected the previous term for the first time to the same position, he was 25. A week and a half ago, when Rayyan received 70 percent of the vote in the village, that was no surprise. When he was first elected to the council 5 years ago, that was a revolution.

For one thing, he was so young. Nearly all the village elders, including his father, opposed him. Second, his election shattered a clan tradition of the village. The 'Asi clan, twice as large as the Rayyan clan, had always ruled. The head of the 'Asi clan, 'Abdallah Latif Husayn, was the mukhtar from the time of the Turks until the mid-1950s. In 1965, the village council was founded, and its leadership passed by inheritance to Musa 'Abdallah Latif, the son of the old mukhtar. He ruled nearly 20 years until 1983, when Kamil Rayyan took the position from him.

Third, and most important, 5 years ago during the previous term, Kamil Rayyan won a place in the local elections as a representative of the Islamic movement. For 5 years, Kafr Bara served as an example of the rule of the new Islam. It is reasonable to assume that during those 5 years, that example had more than a little influence on what occurred this past week in Umm al-Fahm, Kafr Qasim and other settlements. In any event, Kafr Bara was the first in the chain.

Kafr Bara is a relatively small village between Kafr Qasim and Jaljuliya. It has about 200 homes and 1,100 to 1,200 residents divided between 2 clans. For scores of years, strangers have not been welcome here. Only the children of residents live in the village, build homes, and raise new families. Everyone knows each other, the crime rate is very low, and there are no drugs. In the past 5 years, says Rayyan, there has not been a single break-in in the village.

During the 40 years of the state, Kafr Bara has undergone development similar to that of other villages in the Triangle. When it was included within the borders of the state of Israel, all its residents earned their living from agriculture. The village then had 9,000 dunums of land. Through various expropriations, the village's land holdings were reduced to 1,800 dunums.

Today, no more than 40 percent of the families engage in agriculture, but it is agriculture of an advanced nature, primarily raising vegetables in greenhouses. The village also has a fair number of independents, contractors of various kinds, truck and tractor owners, and state employees, mostly teachers. But 50 percent of the wage earners are black workers who work in the Jewish economy outside the village. All in all, the economic situation is more than reasonable and the spacious homes are evidence of that.

But all this did not prevent feelings of discrimination as in every other Arab village. This arises first of all because of the unsuitable relation between that portion of the black workers among the wage earners, especially the young people, and the level of education. About 90 percent of those 30 or younger have completed high school. The great majority of them have not found themselves employment except in black work.

Rayyan claims that almost none of them is accepted at universities in Israel. Right now, 7 students from the village are studying in the country and about 20 in universities abroad. But even those who succeed in completing their advanced studies have a problem. "We have two engineers in the village who received degrees from the Technion in Haifa but work as black workers," says the head of the council.

The second reason for frustration is the neglect that was part of Kafr Bara for scores of years. When Rayyan took over the council 5 years ago, the situation of the village, he says, was one of serious neglect. Aside from the main road leading to the mosque, the village had no paved streets. The sole primary school lacked class space and even bathrooms and could barely serve half the students. There was no established water system and some of the houses received water through plastic pipes laid over hundreds of yards from the home of the father to the home of the son. In general, the electrical system was in a similar state. No one could even dream of a sewer system, sports installations, or playing fields for children. The village lacked an infirmary and residents requiring a doctor, or even nursing care, traveled to Petah Tikwa.

The two problems—the gap between education and the opportunities for employment, and municipal disrepair—are characteristic not just of Kafr Bara but of the entire Arab sector in Israel. As in every other place, these problems in Kafr Bara feed the radicalism of the young generation, but in a somewhat different way. It has found its expression not in RAKAH [New Communist List] and not in the "Sons of the Village" associations, but in the Islamic movement.

It may be that two factors have caused this trend in Kafr Bara: The traditional character of the little village, in which the clans and family connections have existed for a long time, and the proximity to Kafr Qasim, the focus of activity of the Islamic movement in Israel and the

home of its spiritual leader, Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish, who started to organize the movement as far back as the 1970s after he returned to the village following his studies in Nabulus. Rayyan, like many others active in the Islamic movement, is one of his students.

Kamil Rayyan joined the Islamic movement in 1978, a short time after he completed his studies in the teachers' institute near Netanya. At that time, the new movement, which Shaykh 'Abdallah had organized around Kafr Qasim, did not seem dangerous to the security agencies and other institutions dealing with the Arabs of Israel. Khomeyniism had not yet been born. The religious awakening seemed in fact to be a convenient tool in the struggle against Enemy Number One, RAKAH. In any event, Rayyan's identification with the movement did not cause any problem for him and his wife to obtain work teaching in a Bedouin school near Dimona.

But things began to happen in 1981. The General Security Service discovered an underground organization among the members of the Islamic movement. Some of its members, residents of Kafr Qasim, Baqah al-Gharbiyah, and Umm al-Fahm, organized themselves right under the nose of Shaykh 'Abdallah (he says he did not know of it), acquired weapons and even arranged training sessions for using them. The members of the cell were caught. Shaykh 'Abdallah was also arrested. He was sentenced to 3 years in prison and after his release was held for still another lengthy period under house arrest.

Rayyan was not involved in the armed cell, but when he reported for work at the Negev school on 1 September, he found to his surprise that he had been fired. His wife too was dismissed at that time. He tried to find work as a clerk in the ministry of the interior in Petah Tikwa, but there, too, the door was shut in his face. Fortunately for him, he did not need to turn to work in construction, as did many of his colleagues, but was given a position as an accountant in a quarry owned by someone from Kafr Qasim.

One may assume that, if not for these events, Kamil Rayyan would not have become head of the local council in Kafr Bara. Lacking any choice, he returned to his village and began to take part in the spirit of the Islamic movement: studying the Koran and struggling against any deviation from the laws contained in it, but also organizing volunteers among the residents for public works in the village. Almost naturally, this gave birth to his competition for the leadership of the council.

He describes his struggle against the local establishment in two areas: the struggle of the young against the older generation and the struggle of religion against tradition. Rayyan explains that the older generation does not know the religion, they did not learn it from the writings, but only from the tradition that passed orally from father to son and distorted the laws of the Koran. Their religious sense is satisfied with prayer in the mosque, and everything else, in both private and social life, is not connected to religion. To the new Muslims, the written word

is what counts. The Koran is not just a book of prayer but a complete guide to life that dictates all Muslims' actions, including his political behavior.

So, for example, Rayyan rejects the customs of the blood feud as contrary to the Koran. Likewise, traditional family rule is not necessary; not when it contravenes the laws of religion. Of course, he would like an Islamic state that would rule the entire world, but he knows that that is impossible. In the existing reality, he will be satisfied with a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel and, if possible, a state of Islam rather than of the PLO. Incidentally, he opposes the death sentence because "it prevents the sinner from returning to the faith," and because of that, he opposes also the death sentence that Khomeyni imposed on the writer Salman Rushdie. He forcefully emphasizes the difference between the Islamic movement in Israel and Khomeyniism. "Our movement began before the Islamic revolution in Iran," he says.

The political aspect apparently would not bring about an Islamic revolution in the Arab settlements. Another aspect of the activity of the movement is much more effective. Kafr Bara, as an example of a settlement in which Rayyan's movement has ruled for 5 years, represents this aspect.

During these 5 years, the village has changed through and through. All the municipal problems have been or are being solved. The problem of water was completely taken care of by the installation of a fixed water system and the creation of a pond for drinking water with a pump. The electrical system was repaired. Four new classrooms and new bathroom facilities were added to the school. A regular soccer field, the only one in the area, was provided. Half of the streets in the village were paved with asphalt and along some of them there are even sidewalks and trees, luxuries unknown in an Arab village. Paving of the rest of the streets was interrupted for completion of laying a sewer system that is now, wonder of wonders, at an advanced stage. A public park blooms in the village and a spacious cultural center has been built. For the past 2 years, a clinic of the national health program has operated in the village 6 days out of every 7 in a building put up by the council.

Not all of this came from money provided by the ministry of the interior or any other government agency. Rayyan specifies the council budget: 500,000 shekels for the regular annual budget and 30,000 shekels for the annual development budget. All this is on the scale usually seen for the Arab sector as a whole. "It is about a quarter of the usual budget for a comparable Jewish settlement," he claims.

So how was everything done? The Kafr Bara council gives an example. Four years ago, a cultural center was approved at an estimated cost of 700,000 shekels. They presented a request for money to the government lottery bureau and even to the American Joint Distribution Committee. Of course, they did not receive a penny. On

28 August, a young man who was active in the Islamic movement in the village and "beloved by all," according to Rayyan, died of heart failure. For the perpetuation of his memory, the head of the council and of the Islamic movement announced the mobilization of volunteers for building the planned cultural center. Residents of the village collected 80,000 shekels for buying part of the materials. Contractors from the village and outside contributed the rest of the materials. For the construction, all the residents of the village, supplemented by members of the Islamic movement in Kafr Qasim, Kafr Kanna, and other places, were mobilized. During this time of mobilization, some 1,000 of these volunteers worked in the village. They worked 18 days, from morning to night. In the course of those 18 days, they raised the walls of the center. Another mobilization will be conducted in the spring for a weeks or more to complete the work.

This is how the Islamic movement is proving that, in the Israeli reality, it alone is able to solve the problems caused by the neglect of 40 years in the Arab sector. It is also deriving a collateral gain from this. In Kafr Bara, one does not see a girl or a young woman dressed in anything, but a long skirt, usually gray, with a scarf on her head. Many of the young men on the street look like Kamil Rayyan: bearded and well dressed according to the custom of the new Islam.

## ALGERIA

### Second Group of Companies Change Status Under New Finance Law

45190065a Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French  
28 Mar 89 p 2

[Text] Here is a new list of companies "going over to" reform! It includes 59 companies from various sectors selected on the basis of their capital level, after study and notification by the National Planning Council (so empowered by Decree 88-112 of 4 October 1988) and following deliberation by company stockholders in profit-fund general meetings.

Sixty-six other companies have already switched to the reform model. They have already set up, in recent months, their boards of directors and management bodies stipulated by the laws on company autonomy. A total of 125 public companies, then, have presented clear-cut dossiers and are shifting without problem to PBE (Public Business Enterprise) status, without state assistance. These companies may help fatten the Special Autonomy Fund provided for by the complementary 1988 finance bill for the purpose of financing all or part of the transition to autonomy for companies in financial straits. The latter are presently preparing to switch to autonomous status. A methodological guide dubbed "No 1 Bis" was recently forwarded to them; it contains

methodological elements and a certain number of measures enabling them to shift to PBE status. These companies are coming forward at their own pace, depending on their financial situation and their ability to suggest measures.

Of 340 national-type public enterprises then, 125 are already autonomous. The others, termed types C and D and financially disorganized, are presently in the "treatment" stage and should be ready between now and the end of June.

#### The New PBE's

- OENICAB: National Rope and Cable Industries Company
- AMC: National Measurement and Control Equipment Company
- ENTPL: National Company for the Manufacture of Long Products
- FERROVIAL: National Rail Materiel Manufacturing Company
- ENASC: National Elevator Company
- ENCC: National Woodwork and Boiler Construction Company
- COSIDR: Steel Industry Manufacturing Company
- ANABIB: National Tube and Flat-Products Manufacturing Company
- EDIMEL: National Electrical Equipment Distribution Company
- ENIAL: National Company for the Development of Food Industries
- EMAC: National Leathers and Shoe Company
- ENATB: National Lumber Company
- ECDE: Cement and Derivatives Company, Chlef.
- CTC CENTRE: National Organization for Technical Control and Construction—Central
- EPLA: National Aluminum Light Prefabrication Company
- EVSM: Sidi-Moussa Development Company
- ENCOPHARM: National Constant Pharmaceuticals Supply Company
- EGH EL-DJAZAIR: Hotel Management Company, El-Djazair
- ENET: National Tourism Studies Company
- EGT CENTRE: Central Tourism Management Company
- EGT ANNABA: Tourism Management Company of Annaba
- EPTP TIARET: Public Works Public Company of Tiaret
- EPTR EST: Eastern Road Works Public Company
- LTP SUD-EST: Southeastern Public Works Laboratory
- EP ARZEW: Arzew Port Agency
- EP GHAZAOUET: Ghazaouet Port Agency
- EP JIJEL: Jijel Port Agency
- TVC: Passenger Transport Company—Central
- TVO: Western Passenger Transport Company
- EP ALGER: Algiers Port Agency
- LTP CENTRE: Central Public Works Laboratory
- LTP EST: Eastern Public Works Laboratory
- LTP OUEST: Western Public Works Laboratory
- EPTP ALGER: Algiers Public Works Public Enterprise
- SNOA (ENOA): National Works of Art Company
- EPTP ORAN: Oran Public Works Public Enterprise
- SET SETIF: Setif Technical Studies Company
- EPTP BOU-SAADA: Bou-Saada Public Works Public Enterprise
- SET ORAN: Oran Technical Studies Company
- SOTRAMO: Western Maritime Works Company
- BNEDER: National Office for Rural Development Studies
- ORLAC: Regional Dairy Products Office, Central
- ORAC: Regional Office for Poultry-Farming, Central
- ORAVI OUEST: Western Regional Office for Poultry-Farming
- CRV EST: Eastern Regional Office for Poultry-Farming
- ORAVI EST: Eastern Regional Office for Poultry-Farming
- ENAB: National Lumber Supply Company
- ENADITEX: National Textile Supply and Distribution Company
- ONAFEX: National Fairs and Expositions Office
- ENACT: National Agency of Standards and Technical Control
- ENAOQ: National Tools and Hardware Supply Company
- SNC: National Accounting Company
- HP CENTRE: National Hydraulic Projects Company—Central
- HYDROAMENAGEMENT: National Hydraulic Construction Company
- BNEF: National Forestry Studies Office
- ANEP: National Publishing and Advertising Agency
- ENTP: National Well Works Company
- ENSI: National Data-Processing Systems Company
- ENIEM: National Electrical Appliances' Industries Company

#### EGYPT

##### Open Letter Urges Bush to Abandon 'Traditional Bias'

45040244C Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 15 Feb 89 p 5

[Commentary by Raja' 'Abd-al-Malak]

[Text] I direct this letter primarily to the new American President, George Bush, to say to him: We Arabs are very optimistic regarding your presidency, and are expecting much from it with regard to solving the Middle East problem, giving this problem priority in your foreign policy, and renouncing the traditional American bias favoring Israel. The changes which have taken place in the region and the recognition given to the new Palestinian state by the majority of the states of the world, can no longer tolerate this blatant bias, especially

since these changes have engendered support for Palestinian rights on the part of world public opinion. American public opinion is also demanding that the Palestinians be granted their legitimate rights and that Israel not be supported continuously in its expansionist and aggressive policy.

I am not exaggerating, President Bush, when I say to you that the solution to their problems depends on a solution to the Middle East problem and recognition of the new Palestinian state.

Peace in the Middle East, President Bush, will to a large extent function to reduce the deficit in the trade balance, and consequently the deficit in the American budget, because, after the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the American Government will sell billions of dollars worth of weapons to the Arab countries without any reservation or opposition from the American Congress or the Zionist lobby. Thus, hundreds of billions [of dollars] will enter U.S. coffers annually. Recently, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia turned to Britain to conclude a \$17 billion arms deal after the American Congress refused to sell it these arms. The same problem occurred earlier regarding Kuwait.

The American citizen, President George Bush, has become well aware of this fact. The vast majority of Americans now realize that the expansionist, aggressive policy of Israel is being carried out at their expense, and that they are the ones who are supporting Israel with their energy, sweat, and taxes.

Finally, I hope, President Bush, that during your presidency, the American administration will renounce its policy of absolute bias toward Israel and join world society, which has extended its hand to the PLO and announced its rejection of the expansionist policy of Israel, the blowing up of houses, the shedding of blood, and the killing of children.

**USSR To Finance Steel Mill on Red Sea**  
*45040233b Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic*  
21 Jan 89 p 34

[Article: "Soviet Financing for the Largest Steel Mill in Egypt and the Middle East"]

[Text] Economic and industrial studies are now conducted in Cairo by experts of the Metals Industries Agency and a Soviet industrial delegation in order to set up the largest industrial project in Egypt and the Middle East, with a production of 4 million tons a year of iron and steel.

Engineer Diya'-al-Din Hantawi, chairman of the board of directors of the Iron and Steel Company, explained that this project, which the Soviet Union has given preliminary agreement to help finance, will be built in one of the coastal regions of the Red Sea. Its operation

will depend on local iron ores found in the regions of the Red Sea and the maritime oases and Aswan, though some of the production requirements might be imported from abroad.

He said that up to 4 billion pounds will be invested in this project, most of whose production will be sheet steel which is used in the manufacture of cars, ships, airplanes, metal home furnishings, and bridges.

The Soviet industrial delegation which visited Cairo discussed with officials in the Iron and Steel Company measures for implementing the project to increase production capacities of iron and steel from the current 1,200,000 tons to 1.5 million tons in 1992. This is the agreement which was reached with the Soviet side to help finance it with 150 million pounds Sterling and facilitated payments.

The delegation also discussed another industrial project to bring production capacities of the company's factories up to 3 million tons a year during the new 5-year plan, with investments of up to a billion pounds.

**Ministers of Health Council Delay Egyptian Participation**

*45000146 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic*  
25 Mar 89 p 8

[Excerpt] The Council of Arab Ministers of Health held its 14th session on 20-22 March in Tripoli. Nine Arab ministers of health and a ministerial representative attended the session, in addition to ambassadors of other Arab countries. Lebanon was absent from the session due to its special circumstances. The subject of Egypt's participation in the council's business was discussed 24 hours before the session was held. The antagonistic Libyan position forced the postponement of this participation until the next session, thus avoiding a crisis for the council. [passage omitted]

**Minister Describes Work on High Dam Improvement**

*45040235B Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 1 Feb 89 p 5*

[Article by Karimah al-Saruji]

[Text] Engineer 'Isam Radi, Minister of Public Works and Water Resources, announced that the most important supplementary project of the High Dam project had been finished. The project involved treatment, stabilization, and development of the eastern side of the back channel of the High Dam.

That came in an exclusive interview AL-AKHBAR had with Eng 'Isam Radi, Minister of Public Works. This project is called the outlet channel, and it is the sole source of water needed to cover all of the Egyptian Arab Republic's water consumption needs.

Where the water comes to the outlet channel out of the High Dam Lake via the front channel, there are six tunnels connected to the turbine station.

### **It Was a Delayed Project**

The minister added, "It is known that there was not enough time to complete a study of the eastern slope of the channel and implement it in accordance with engineering principles relating to irrigation and dam engineering. In 1964, after the first stage of the body of the High Dam had been implemented and the flow of the Nile finally cut off, all the water of the Nile had to be diverted through this channel. In addition, Egypt needed to put the electrical station of the High Dam into operation quickly in 1967, and then there was the war and the inadequacy of investments needed to establish thermal stations that went along with it. Moreover, it was needed in order to make use of water energy to generate the electrical energy needed by the republic at this time, in view of the fact that it is clean, cheap energy, the only costs being workers' wages and maintenance."

For these reasons it was urgent that the water be released into this channel, on the condition that at a later stage studies would be made and the necessary work be done to stabilize the eastern slope so that that side would not collapse and block the channel, and subsequently block off the sole source of water needed for consumption purposes in Egypt: for agriculture, drinking, navigation and the like, as well as bring the electrical station of the High Dam to a halt.

### **Necessary Project**

In recent years, the poor condition of this channel has been noticed as a result of erosion factors, moisture arising from water spurting from the turbines of the High Dam, and the disintegration of rocks. Parts of the rocks collapsed into the only passage into the electrical station, and not inconsiderable quantities fell into the course of the back channel. Consequently, the Ministry of Public works hastened to do a geologic study of the nature of the geologic structures of this slope and of the fractures and divisions present in the geologic structures, in addition to the water pressures resulting from the water stored in the lake, as well as the effect of possible earthquakes. The study showed that it was important to implement several projects quickly. These works included removing close to a quarter of a million cubic meters of broken rocks and giving the eastern side of the channel stabilized slopes by building several buttresses and fastening the rocks with steel bolts. In addition to the works of retention and lining with cement mortar, a horizontal drainage network was built and water pressure was alleviated, and a road 12 meters wide was built to ensure the arrival of workers and equipment to the High Dam electrical station.

### **The Engineering Form of the Project**

Included in the study and implementation was the fact that the slope should have a firm engineering basis in the form of several slopes, with each slope bordered by a horizontal buttress to increase the long-term balance and stability of the slope under any disruptive conditions, such as earthquakes or water pressure.

Moreover, the works of lining and roughcasting with mortar, the retention works, and the works of fastening the rocks together, will protect this bank from any erosion or future geologic affects.

These works were done along the entire elevation of the side of the channel from its summit at an altitude of 170, to the bottom of the channel at an altitude of 85, in other words, a height of 85 meters.

### **The Most Modern Methods of Implementation**

The minister went on to say that the most modern technical and technological methods pertaining to blasting without affecting neighboring establishments were used in these works. They included underwater photography, as well as underwater blasting and removing rocks with the help of barges and divers.

Advanced methods were also used to punch and fasten the connecting bolts of steel and to build the drainage network to alleviate the water pressure on the slope.

### **At Full Capacity**

Modern surveying methods were used to determine the balanced slopes, as were modern mechanical means pertaining to excavation works and raising the resultant rocks far from the course. That ensured that the back channel and the High Dam electrical station would not be exposed to any future threats, and that there would be a constant discharge of water and the electrical station would operate at its full capacity.

### **Four Years Work With Egyptian Expertise**

Eng Radi concluded his talk by saying that the work on this project lasted 4 years with Egyptian expertise from the High Dam Construction Agency and the Arab Contractors Company, in cooperation with a Yugoslavian company. The cost of the project was 17 million pounds.

### **Israeli-Arab Technological Gap Discussed**

45050233a Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic  
30 Jan 89 pp 22-23

[Article by Jamal-al-Din Husayn: "How Can the Technological Gap Be Met?"]

[Text] From 8-10 January, Cairo witnessed the second Arab Strategic Conference, which was organized by the Center for Political and Strategic Studies at AL-AHRAM, in cooperation with the Center for Strategic

Studies at the Jordanian University. Conference participants included intellectuals, military men, and academicians who discussed several issues, the most important of which by far was the technological gap between the Arabs and Israel and its impact on the conflict and the course thereof.

Staff Major General (retired) Tal'at Musallam and Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im Sa'id took up this issue in a straightforward address to the conference. At its start they mentioned what Yitzhak Shamir, prime minister of Israel, had said following the launch of the Ofeq-1 satellite on Monday, 19 September 1988, about the race between the Arabs and Israel, that had come to revolve around technical and military capabilities. He said that the technological dimension was one of the most important elements of the challenge and conflict, indeed, that it was the spearhead.

Military industries and war technologies play a leading role in this respect, since they are able to concentrate research and development not only on the manufacture of Israeli arms and the achievement of a greater degree of independence for political decisionmaking there, but also on the development of civilian industries and the creation of new markets for Israeli industries. Moreover, they have achieved for Israel an international position as an advanced industrial state. That is obvious from Israel's launching of its first satellite which—besides its military purposes as part of the system of warning and command and control against surface-to-surface missiles and air assault—aims to make Israel a partner in the upper ranks of modern technology and bring about economic superiority through its entry into the market for international communications satellites, a market worth \$10 billion annually.

The situation is not very different with respect to the Israeli nuclear program, for, in addition to its military dimensions, it gives Israel an international position as a "regional power," and a member of the world nuclear club. The same can be said about Israeli military industries, judging from Israel's expertise and technology, which have enabled it to develop small commercial aircraft, the "Arava" and "Astra" models. The Israeli aviation industries have also been successful in providing maintenance and complete repair work for large commercial aircraft, and in producing about 300 artificial aviation products belonging to more than 60 countries in the world.

The leaders of Israel believe that there is no substitute for its rush towards technological development to ensure its survival and continuation. It does this in three ways:

First, by depending on itself through concentrating on scientific research and development.

Second, by research and development through agreements with other states, especially the United States.

Third, by scientific theft, in which Israel excels, from the United States (including that which pertains to many of the designs of weapons and equipment), and from Switzerland (including that which pertains to the designs of the Mirage-5 aircraft, which Israel later produced under the name of Kafir C-7).

As a result of this, Israel managed to achieve an advanced degree of self-sufficiency in arms production, starting with infantry weapons, like the (Wurur) and Uzi machineguns and the Galil rifle, and antitank shells, like the Bazooka 73 and Bazooka 82, then the tanks themselves, like the Merkava-1 and Merkava-2, in addition to surface to surface missiles of the Gabriel type, surface-to-surface missiles of the Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 type, point-defense missiles to protect marine units, antimissile missiles of the Baraq-1 and Baraq-2 types, and air-to-air missiles of the Shafrir type.

Israel's participation in a strategic defence has provided it with a great opportunity to obtain much technological information in the fields of defensive missiles and space weapons. At the present time Israel is implementing a regional system to defend against medium-range surface-to-surface missiles by building defensive Hetz [Arrow] missiles.

#### What About the Arab Side?

Most of the Arab countries have turned to buying various kinds of weapons, such that the Arab armies have come to possess a shield of the most modern international weapons, including the AWACS and Hawk A2C early warning airplanes, multiple-mission F-16 aircraft, F-15 fighter-bombers, MiG-23s, MiG-27s and MiG-29s.

As for military industrialization, except for Egypt, which has made great strides in this respect, arms technology and manufacture are still extremely limited, though there are signs that Iraq has the capability to produce the medium- and short-range surface-to-surface missiles that were used successfully in the last months of its war with Iran. Iraq also recently made public its production of (Balshiki) antimissile defensive missiles under the name al-Faw-1, and air-to-air missiles that were called Ababil. In the opinion of Maj Gen Tal'at Musallam and Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im Sa'id, there is not enough information about these Iraqi accomplishments to enable one to estimate the technological progress that Iraq has made in this respect.

If it is necessary to turn towards military industrialization to take the place of imports, and some believe it is the way to get into the technology of arms manufacture, it should be realized that "others" will not readily accept their "replacement"—while at the same time the course of Israeli arms manufacture continues in leaps and bounds.

Therefore there must be a way of jumping ahead by getting into the technology of arms manufacture directly by way of reverse engineering and imitation (as the People's Republic of China does), or scientific theft (as Israel does).

Mr Amin Huwaydi, former director of Egyptian general intelligence, criticized the talk by Maj Gen Tal'at Musallam and Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im Said, saying that the capabilities of Israeli military manufacturing are exaggerated. He said that the engine installed on the Israeli airplane Kafir C-7 is American made, as is that installed in the Merkava tanks. Amin Huwaydi cautioned against exaggerating Israel's power, insisting that Israel's power comes from our weakness.

Staff Lieutenant General 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Majali, director of general security in Jordan and one of the participants in the conference, said that there are elements of weakness present in the Israeli side, the most important of which is the fact that most of the population of the Jews of Israel is crowded into the region of the coastal plain at a density of more than 195 persons per square kilometer. Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Majali expressed his optimism that it would be possible to catch up with Israel, technologically speaking, through political will, organization, and resources.

But Staff Major General Hasan al-Yadri pointed to the cost of scientific research as one of the elements needed to develop military industries. He said that the Egyptian scientist Ahmad Zawil, a candidate for the Nobel Prize in science and one of the few scientists in the field of lasers, said that every month he spends from 5 to 7 million dollars on his research in California, so how can we come up with research expenditures in this amount for the sake of catching up with state of the art technology in arms manufacture?

### **Shaykh of AL-Azhar Mosque Discusses Extremism Problems**

45040207 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
10 Feb 89 pp 35-36

[Interview with Shaykh Jad-al-Haqq 'Ali Jad-al-Haqq: "Extremism and Overreligiousness Phenomena Not Sanctioned by Islam"; in Riyadh, date not specified]

[Text] The head of al-Azhar Mosque, Shaykh Jad-al-Haqq 'Ali Jad-al-Haqq, called on the countries of the world to exert pressure on Israel to stop the brutal massacres it is committing inside the occupied Palestinian territories.

He told AL-HAWADITH that Israel is facing the heroes' rocks with plastic bullets and incendiary and asphyxiating gases and that the acts of repression and violence are more vicious than the Nazi acts of World War II. They are slitting women's bellies to abort fetuses in their mother's wombs, burying people alive, and breaking the bones of young people, all brutal and barbarous acts. The

world must move fast to put a stop to them and save thousands of women, children and old men from Israeli prisons and detention camps.

The head of al-Azhar Mosque affirmed that the Zionists have been practicing the worst form of barbarism known to humanity in order to quell the struggle of the Palestinian people, which will not die down unless an independent Palestinian state is established. He called upon the Islamic world, with all its organizations and institutions, to support the heroic acts and sacrifices of these struggling people who are not deterred by Zionist arrogance and Israeli haughtiness.

AL-HAWADITH met with the great imam in Riyadh to talk with him about the most important Islamic world issues and to solicit his opinion on them.

[AL-HAWADITH] With the exception of deteriorating Palestinian conditions in the occupied territories, what is the Islamic world situation in light of the current international detente?

[Jad-al-Haqq] If the intentions of the two superpowers are sincere, the world is definitely on its way to peace. Contacts and meetings between the leaders of these two countries attest to the fact that a wide-ranging trend toward putting the affairs of peace in order is in effect right now. Matters are looking up for the Muslims as well, if only the Islamic people and rulers would follow the same line by sitting down and discussing their regional, economic and political problems in the same spirit that is prevalent in the world today to achieve solidarity and brotherhood, two attributes of the Muslim people, and to come together in piety and benevolence, as enjoined by God Almighty. The Koran refers to Muslims as brothers: "The believers are but a single brotherhood." This brotherhood calls for intimacy, harmony and solidarity whereby the powerful can extend a helping hand to the weak and the rich can give assistance to the poor so that the nation may live up to the description of the Prophet when he said: "Believers in their mutual love, human understanding and affection are like one body in which, when one organ suffers, the rest guard and watch over it." This is the way Muslims should be and there are signs that they are proceeding on the right path toward solidarity. The Iran-Iraq war has stopped, even though its problems have not been solved yet. This war has sapped the strength of two neighboring Muslim countries, lasting for 8 years and destroying everything in its path. With respect to Afghanistan, there are on the horizon discussions and victories by the Mujahidin that may bring about an end to the war, Soviet departure from Afghanistan and the restoration of the country's freedom and independence, whereupon the burden will fall on the Afghan people themselves, for they will have to work together to restore sound and proper conditions within the framework of Islam, given the fact that Afghanistan has always been eager to safeguard its land, its religion and its people.

[AL-HAWADITH] Some people fear the outbreak of a civil war among the Mujahidin parties in the wake of Soviet military withdrawal. What would you like to say to them in this regard?

[Jad-al-Haqq] I think that an agreement among the Mujahidin with all their parties is the winning card. If they come together and agree on one plan and if they are not corrupted by conflicts, whims, personal desires or rash decisions about who will be ruler or president, I think that if they exercise patience and endurance and unite, they will overcome these difficulties and the Soviets will pack up and leave, no matter what secret or public actions they may undertake and regardless of the venom they exude here and there.

[AL-HAWADITH] The problem of extremism, terrorism and overreligiousness is looming once again. What are the dimensions of this phenomenon and how can it be rooted out or stopped?

[Jad-al-Haqq] The phenomenon of extremism has its roots in the lack of religious restraint in the hearts of people, Muslims particularly. Extremism is a dangerous phenomenon not sanctioned by the Islamic religion, because Islam is based on the principle of centrism, balance and moderation without extremism. God Almighty said: "Thus have We made of you an Ummat justly balanced, that ye might be witnesses over the nations, and the Apostle a witness over yourselves." For Islam is a natural religion based on belief and righteous deeds, and extremism is the product of overreligiousness and intransigence. God Almighty said: "O ye who believe! Obey God and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you. If you differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to God and His Apostle, if ye do believe in God and the Last Day: that is best and most suitable for final determination."

In our disagreement we must to turn to God Almighty, namely His holy book, the Koran, to those charged with authority, the ulema, and to the Apostle, meaning the holy Sunnah.

Hence the role of the ulemas in countering extremism and the extremists with wisdom and good words: "Invite (all) to the Way of the Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious." We have to look into the causes of extremism so as to arrive at a sound and scientific cure. Stating that extremism exists in a "limited area" and failing to identify it makes a cure difficult.

Officials in the Islamic world must hold deliberate discussions on the causes of extremism, be it in the form of religious, economic or social trends, because diagnosis is half the cure.

I believe that this phenomenon stems from two things: first, ignorance of the Islamic religion and submission to those who, without vision or thought, harbor malice to

their hearts against Islam; and second, limited knowledge of and absence of a lot of particulars about Islam in the affairs of life, the way to live and human relations. Man thus succumbs to those who distort details and misrepresent things that are the essence of the Muslims' thinking and behavior in Islamic society.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you believe that detention or police pressure leads to a cure for such extremism?

[Jad-al-Haqq] No. Extreme pressure does not lower and, indeed, may raise the number of errants. Moreover, it does not alter ideas at all and, if it does, it is only in a superficial manner and these ideas come back stronger whenever the opportunity presents itself. As for security matters adopted by the government, they ought to be directed at the unbelieving rebels who are disrupting production, terrorizing peaceful citizens and employing violence and terrorism. These are the ones who deserve the police measures of which you speak. The best cure is dialogue, for extremism in thought is propagated among the youth by organizations seeking to sow the seeds of discord and to revive obsolete doctrines—dogmatic and ideological differences in particular—which actually lead to confusion among the youth, who are unaware of the fact that the origins of such differences are old. Those responsible for [Islamic] propagation must counter distorted thoughts coming into Muslim countries, for these are actually a revival of old interpretations that have been an object of disagreement from time immemorial. Some of the Prophet's traditions urge and remind Muslims not to be overreligious because overreligiousness has destroyed nations before. Islam is a religion of welfare and compassion, and moderation is the best policy. Government officials must get to the bottom of the matter, and we must go back to the teachings of the true religion in our schools, our universities, our mosques, our factories and our companies. Abidance by the true religion must be our lasting course. It has been noted that schools or universities based on the study of religious sciences do not have an extremist system. We have the al-Azhar institutes and the al-Azhar University, but none of their members advocate extremism in any way. Why? Because they study religion, learn the Koran, live their lives trying to understand true religion and, therefore, have no extremist tendencies of any kind, be they the product of ignorance or overreligiousness. Overreligiousness may exist, but it also existed during the Prophet's time, not with the purpose of urging people to espouse it but as a personal and individual act. This is the way it should be with respect to those who want to go overboard in their worship or their belief, so that their overreligiousness, evil as it may be, will not force others to follow suit, thus creating differences.

Things would be easy if responsible institutions could dispatch ulema, sociologists and economists to these sects to talk to them, each in his own field of specialization.

[AL-HAWADITH] Can dialogue be organized to extend to the entire Arab nation?

[Jad-al-Haqq] I believe that dialogue should be local, or with the knowledge of local ulema, because they are better acquainted with their countrymen and with the problems of their country and their people, since fanaticism stems from personal problems. If we desire mutual understanding and harmony, dialogue has to be among the people themselves. If a nation does not have anyone to hold a dialogue, other Islamic nations can undertake this task. I believe, however, that the matter differs from one environment to another and from one people to another in terms of causes. When we think of Lebanon, for example, we wonder whether it is extremism or a political matter and foreign intervention. This matter must be treated within this framework and we must look into these people's roots and upbringing: how they grew up and how they think when they infiltrate [society], break it up, withdraw within themselves and err. They must be handled with patience and forbearance. If they use violence, they will be met with violence, but if it is a purely ideological matter, we must engage them in a dialogue and we ought to answer them ideologically.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you believe that a religious organization like al-Azhar ought to organize such a dialogue?

[Jad-al-Haqq] This is the way it must be. The call for a dialogue and the fact that some ulema took this up in their communique is a good thing. I believe that al-Azhar cannot tackle this dialogue alone. It must be a matter of advice and consent with all the officials whereby arrangements can be made to meet with these people on their own ground.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you believe that peaceful Palestinian moves and the declaration of the Palestinian state undermine the continuity of the holy war and the uprising in occupied Palestine?

[Jad-al-Haqq] On the contrary, holy war does not object to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on any part liberated as long as it is without concessions or recognition of the legitimacy of the occupation.

Israel is being asked, either through the popular uprising or through peaceful efforts made by the countries of the world, to withdraw from territory it occupied in 1967 and to give the Palestinian people a chance to establish their own state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in accordance with the partition resolution which the PLO has accepted.

If Israel really wants to live in peace and harmony with its neighbors, it must, as a first step, leave the occupied Palestinian territories and must give the Palestinians their freedom without influence or pressure that can impede their right to self-determination. If Israel can be so persuaded, we can arrive at a new era of peace to be enjoyed by all the peoples of this region.

[AL-HAWADITH] And Jerusalem, what is the extent of Islamic responsibility toward it?

[Jad-Al-Haqq] The return of Jerusalem is the responsibility of every Muslim. The Zionist menace is basically directed at the Judaization of Jerusalem and the destruction of its Islamic civilizational character, and at the creation of human and geographic faits accomplis that consecrate their occupation of the holy land. The Muslims are definitely called upon to preserve and protect their heritage, their religion and their land by saving Jerusalem.

Once again, I call on the world to apply pressure on Israel to understand and accept the new international and Arab realities and to submit to world consensus on a peaceful settlement and the spread of peace in the world.

[AL-HAWADITH] Some Arab leaders are engaged in massive efforts toward Arab reconciliation. How do you view these efforts and their repercussions on the Islamic world?

[Jad-Al-Haqq] This is true. Successful efforts are being made to restore Arab kinship. Arab differences have always had an adverse effect on the Islamic nation's march and are one of the main reasons for the nation's weakness, setbacks and backward status among nations.

Therefore, the Islamic nation is called upon to make efforts aimed at eradicating existing or future differences, and Islamic peoples and tendencies must persist in their efforts to unite their ranks and bring people together, a duty pursued by our devoted leaders led by the attendant of the two holy places, King Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, who has given the nation many positive results in Arab conciliation by fostering peace in the Arab East between Jordan and Syria and in the Arab West between Algeria and Morocco and then Syria and Morocco. A new spirit of joint Arab action has prevailed and we hope that it will continue and intensify because it is in the clear interest of everyone. I also believe that the way has been paved for Egypt to return to the Arab League and for the league to return to Egypt to underscore and enhance the spirit of true Arab solidarity vis-a-vis the enemies of the nation and Islam and to realize the nation's interests and aspirations of Islamic peoples everywhere.

[AL-HAWADITH] About Lebanon, do you think that current efforts are enough to get Lebanon out of its crisis?

[Jad-al-Haqq] No. I urge the Lebanese brothers to sit down together to put their country back in order and to rise above differences and conflicts. Lebanon has a good and important role to play among the Arab peoples and it should be restored soon.

[AL-HAWADITH] During your recent pilgrimage to Mecca, what was your impression of the projects to develop the two holy places?

[Jad-al-Haqq] The construction and development of the two holy places being witnessed by all Muslims are something for which the attendant of the two holy places, King Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, should be thanked. He is giving his undivided attention to these places that have become his main concern in terms of following up their projects and furnishing them with modern and innovative sciences and technologies in addition to open appropriations and precedence over other projects.

The first-rate attention to gigantic engineering projects which I have observed and witnessed, aimed at facilitating movement through and staying in the holy lands and at expanding, developing, organizing, cleaning up and managing the two holy places and looking after the comfort of visitors, is greatly appreciated by me personally and by the entire Islamic nation as well.

[AL-HAWADITH] How do you describe the anticipated visit of the attendant of the two holy places to Egypt in March?

[Jad-al-Haqq] The Egyptian people, who are brothers to the Saudi people, are impatiently awaiting this visit so that Egypt as a whole may express to the attendant of the two holy places the feelings and sentiments of the Egyptian people toward him. He is known as a wise Arab leader who is always working to serve Islam, unite Muslims and help the Islamic nation overcome the difficulties it is facing.

#### **Officials, Dissidents Recount Violent Events in Al-Minya**

45040204B Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Jan 89 p 4

[Investigation by 'Imad Mahjub: "Islamic Group: We Will not Retreat and Our Call Goes On. Police and State Security Stations Transformed into Torture Chambers"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

#### **What happened?**

The Islamic group took us through many locations amid chases, raids and gunshots to seek the opinion of one of its leaders, Engineer 'Ali al-Dinari, and some of his companions.

[Al-Dinari] Security has persisted in its abusive and repressive operations in recent weeks. Mr Sharif 'Abd-al-Majid and others were arrested and subjected to horrid torture in Lazughli. Nonetheless, the group kept on calling on the people to reject [coarse] bran bread, organizing peaceful demonstrations and putting out communiques. It also denounced the siege and storming of mosques. When popular rage swelled, the governorate decided to improve ordinary bread and the production of bran bread was confined to one bakery.

[AL-SHA'B] Great, but what happened in recent days?

[Al-Dinari] We were suddenly subjected to more intense detention campaigns in which governorate and government vehicles and taxicabs harboring security officers were used. These officers assailed people in the streets, arresting more than 150 persons who were subjected to brutal torture at the State Security Office in al-Minya. Engineer Muhammad Jamal Isma'il was also arrested and sent directly to Cairo where he was especially abused and tortured.

It is strange that security was beefed up following Shaykh al-Sha'rawi and the ulema's communique. The Islamic group tried to popularize the "call caravans" [qawafil al-da'wah] experience to expound its opinion since it had been deprived of its forums or the ability to state its opinion on how to face the attacks against it.

Last Tuesday (17 January 1989), the group formed a call caravan in the same area where al-Rahman Mosque is located. Al-Dinari said that he had not imagined that this form of call to the people outside the mosque could cause so much annoyance. We do not know what he had built this assumption on, for the Interior Ministry had decided to face with utmost force any action it deemed unlawful.

As soon as the caravan was completed and before the brothers, with people gathered around them, could leave, security forces suddenly surrounded the caravan and gunshots were fired from all directions, particularly from the Criminal Identification Bureau located 50 meters from where the caravan was standing—a few feet away from al-Rahman Mosque. The people rushed around amid the cries of women, and some young men scrambled to counter the bullets with rocks, especially when brother Subhi lost his life. The forces then rushed in and took control of the entire area. We later learned that one officer snatched a knife away from a butcher and placed it next to the dead brother along with a handgun and a briefcase. The body lay in place until 11:30 pm and was buried the following day under heavy guard, but no one was allowed to attend the funeral.[passage omitted]

[Muhammad Ahmad] I was on my way to work in al-Minya al-Jadidah when we were stopped at the bridge and ordered out of the car. We were subjected to verbal abuse and thereafter sent to the police station. We were a large group who had nothing to do with anything. We were held for 3 days, after which some of us were released while others were sent to jail.

Citizen R.A. is the most important eyewitness. We met with him and he told us his name, but in recognition of his valuable testimony, which some investigator may need, we will withhold it for now.

[R.A.] I was standing a few steps away from the scene of the incident and saw the caravan raising posters asking for the release of the detainees and the halting of torture in prison. One of the shaykhs spoke about the ulema's communique and the young people started to leave.

Lieutenant Colonel Sa'd al-Husayni and Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hakim were standing in front of the Criminal Identification Bureau watching the caravan. A while later, a group of soldiers stood behind Lt Col al-Husayni and began firing at the caravan. There were shots from other directions as well.

[Question unpublished]

[R.A.] No, no one from the Sunni group was carrying weapons. There were only 40 to 50 of them, some of whom used bricks to retaliate. As was evident from the outset, the police were provoking the group and waiting for an opportunity to hit them.

The late Subhi was running toward al-Junaynah Street when he was hit by a person sitting in a car coming from the opposition direction on the same street. His back was to the bureau and this could have been established during examination had the body not been moved a few meters, leaving it right in front of the bureau. A handgun and a briefcase, allegedly containing ammunition, were placed next to the body and this was witnessed by another person looking out of his balcony. But as you can see, the people are terrified.

Also at night, they sat around and built a fire opposite the dead body to keep warm, happily exchanging congratulations. Every time a man or a woman looked out of the window, they subjected them to verbal abuse.

The police continued to tighten their grip on the city on Wednesday and Thursday, using a great concentration of troops and sundry ever-ready weapons. On Friday, the group organized several marches that started out from several places, the most notable of which was the al-Mansurah quarter (where the victim lived). Another march started out from the Legal Society Mosque to denounce Subhi's assassination. As it passed the "al-Ajayibi Church, it came under fire from an ambush inside the church. A number of people were hurt while security forces shoved the detainees arbitrarily into their cars. For the past few days, the police stations at the al-Minya docks and the State Security investigators' office have been transformed into a human slaughterhouse for torture. Last Thursday, when a young member of the group was being tortured, he lost control of himself and began hitting the officers and informants. He then jumped out of the window under gunfire from all directions, leaped over the fence and the barricades and escaped!"

Shaykh Ahmad Hindi, general director of the al-Minya Awqaf [Religious Endowments], said: "With respect to the recent events, I cannot find one justification that gives these alienated young people the right to disturb the peace, upset the people and make al-Minya, primarily a tourist area, seem unsafe and unstable."

[AL-SHA'B] I beg your pardon, your excellency. Who is disturbing the peace, upsetting the people and opening fire all over the place? Only yesterday a man was killed and heaven knows what can happen tomorrow.

[Hindi] They did not have to take over the Criminal Identification Bureau and everything that was in it. By and large, the ulemas' communique came out and it was what we had expected and talked about, but it was issued by venerable ulemas of great standing in Egypt and the Islamic world. It would have been more appropriate if they had submitted to God's will and complied with His judgment, as explained by our ulemas. [passage omitted] I asked a security official (in a governorate) (who refused to give his name) about the new measures. He said: "Because security in Egypt has, for the most part, a central policy, under the current circumstances in al-Minya, especially when the minister says shut down, we comply. When he says strike, we strike. Today, anything called an Islamic group is banned. No activity, no persons and not even presence and reassembly in mosques is allowed."

About last Tuesday's events, he confirmed that troops were roaming the streets to maintain law and order, that he was always ready to strike, that not plastic bullets but live ammunition was being used and that the strikes were immediate because Shaykh Sha'rawi's communique explained everything and the extremists had to submit to law and order or face their lot. About the weapon and bombs found next to the dead body, he said they belonged to extremists.

I said: "But what about the weapon and the explosives and was he really carrying them?"

[Official] I can prove right now that you too are carrying weapons and bombs.

[AL-SHA'B] Thanks and peace be with you

[AL-SHA'B] The magnitude and the seriousness of the situation are expressed by security's attitudes as well as by the current state of affairs. The following words were uttered by the Islamic group:

"We are no longer facing tear gas and rubber bullets, but rather live ammunition in the streets, a development that accompanied the ulemas' communique and led to the murder of brother Subhi. Moreover, we cannot go out into the streets, cannot go out to work and cannot go about our lives. Security forces are now using a liquid to drug the people under arrest. Anyone who falls into their hands is crushed and tortured, as happened to Eng Muhammad Jamal Isma'il, not to mention the things they do to the brothers' families.

"Furthermore, security is rearresting those released by a court order before they leave [detention].

"As for the hundreds who are arrested, they are handled by officers Nabil Fahmi, 'Amr al-'Attar and Akram Hammudah. Each of these young men is given a choice of clubs to be used in beatings. [The prisoners] are dangled like a slain animal and stripped of their clothing and tortured until they lose consciousness.

"In the State Security slaughterhouse in al-Minya, officer Ahmad Hasan maims the tortured detainees to force them to sign the confessions he wants. He then pushes them down the steps into the basement and goes out, stiff as a corpse, to make more arrests. Eye witnesses have confirmed the torture of Ahmad 'Abdallah, who was wounded and left to bleed without medical treatment after being hit with a sharp object on his head and bones." [As published]

If this is what the picture is now, what can we expect it to be tomorrow? And how can we say that this is a country and not a jungle? This is a very serious matter that calls for high-level official and popular action. Otherwise, it will be a disaster.

**Leader Claims MB Will Remain Moderate**  
45040236B Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 7 Feb 89 p 5

[Article by Mustafa Mashhur: "We Are Moderate and Will Remain Moderate, God Willing"]

[Excerpts] Yes, we are moderate, and God willing we will remain moderate, in spite of all the pressure and attacks. We, the Muslim Brotherhood, have chosen the way of moderation, and we will continue to adhere to it because our Islam enjoins us to do so. We will not, as a result of those pressures and attacks, be drawn into extremism or terrorism, nor into weakness and passivity or containment.

It is surprising to find in these attacks those who accuse us of weakness and cowardice because we are not in agreement with them on methods of force and violence. At the same time, we see those who accuse us of terrorism, extremism, and violence without any evidence or proof.

We are not bothered by objective, constructive criticism, and we appreciate every thinker or writer who approaches us with criticism and advice, but as for those biased attacks, irresponsible words, and obviously false lies and distortions, we will not pay any attention to them and we will not renounce our moderation and relinquish our method in response to them. Rather, we pity them.

We follow the way of the Prophet of God, God pray for him and grant him peace, and we abide by his method and procedure in the mission. The Prophet of God, God pray for him and grant him peace, was not one to be weak or submissive in the face of falsehood and the violence and injury it caused. [passage omitted]

It is only reasonable and fair that we not confuse the issue with the holy war in God's cause that we practiced against Zionism in Palestine and against the English in the Canal, for that has been described as terrorism or extremism, as the Zionist enemy calls it. Also, it is not right that we describe violence and destruction as holy war. It has pleased some to cite the well-known al-Manashiyah incident as exemplary proof, but the group did not have any role in it, nor in the incidents of al-Khazandar and al-Naqrashi. They were individual events not sanctioned by the group, but the group has continued to be oppressed and restricted in and outside of the prisons. After we got out of the prisons and detention camps at the beginning of the seventies, no act or participation in any event that befell the scene originated from a single one of the Brotherhood, so why this incrimination?

Some accuse us of charging others with unbelief, and that is an indication of obvious ignorance, for everyone knows of the Brotherhood's opposition to the concept of this charge, and of Prof Hasan al-Hudaybi's rejection of this concept in his treatise which he wrote while in the detention camp and later published in the book "Preachers, Not Judges." The late al-Hudaybi disassociated himself from those who insisted on this concept. We challenge anyone to bring us "one individual of the Brotherhood who holds the concept of making a charge of unbelief," so why this incrimination?

We will remain moderate, not leaning towards charging with unbelief, but at the same time we will not concede to any secular or godless idea that wants to separate religion from the state, and we will undertake to refute these deviant ideas and thwart them through argument and evidence.

We will continue to call by all available means for the application of Islamic law and to tirelessly do what we can to gather public opinion around this Islamic quest that is obligatory for all Muslims, no matter how many obstacles there are before us or attacks against us, and we are confident that the Islamic solution will impose itself in the end, even if there are those who hate it.

We will continue to raise our voices with the word of truth on every pulpit available to us in an acceptable, moderate manner, without fearing in God the censure of a critic, and we will not be silent or refrain from stating the truth for fear of harm. Also, we will not resort to the method of insulting or defaming persons or organizations, since that is not the nature of a Muslim.

God willing, we will remain moderate and humble, without being overcome by conceit or a feeling of superiority over others. We will also not be subdued or humble ourselves under any pressure or threat. There is, however, power in humility and strength in gentleness. We follow what God Almighty said about the characteristics those whom He loves and who love Him: "Humble

ones over the believers, powerful ones over the unbelievers" and the Almighty's statement: "Merciful ones among them." One of Imam al-Banna's statements in this context is: "How beautiful is strength with truth, and how ugly is weakness before falsehood."

We will continue to be moderate in our pursuit of the mission, and we will not rush things without study or close examination, and we will not try to pluck the fruit before it is ripe, neither will we slow the pace in a way that would cause us to fall behind and fail to keep up with events and circumstances. But we pursue the rapid, enlightening course, accompanied by serious, appropriate good work, which is good for Islam and Muslims.

We will remain moderate in our positions towards current events. We will evaluate them judiciously and with deliberation, without getting excited and having fits, and we will weigh them in the balance of justice and wisdom and the directives and rulings of Islam, aiming for the pleasure of God Almighty, and that might anger some people. We also prefer comprehensive solutions to the issues of our societies, even if they are delayed somewhat, to hasty, incomplete, partial solutions, for the issues of our societies are intertwined, affecting one another, and they should not be treated separately from one another. The Islamic solution is comprehensive and covers all aspects of life, and it gives them the best treatment, because it is from one who is wise and knowing.

We will also remain moderate in our positions and our dealings, for we will not be rigid, narrow-minded, and bigoted, nor will we be lax and easygoing. Experience has taught us that moderation is followed by abundance, and bigotry by scarcity, and that moderates continue the course without fatigue or toil, whereas bigots often find their road blocked, their spirit fails to continue the course, and some of them may be turned back. The Prophet of God, God pray for him and grant him peace, spoke truly: "This religion is firm, so apply yourself to it gently, for what is settled covers no ground and maintains no back."

We do not withdraw or dissociate ourselves from society, rather we incorporate ourselves in it and work to better it. We take the hands of its members that they may become acquainted with their Islam and do what it asks of them. We command the citizens to do good and forbid them from doing what is reprehensible with gentle words and moderate means, and by good, practical example. We also offer the citizens what we can in the way of social, medical, and educational services, living assistance, or other services. We encourage vitality and moderate, disciplined enthusiasm that can be directed towards doing good, reform, and production, that we may achieve self-sufficiency and be rid of any dependency on account of need, but we do not accept undisciplined fanaticism that often embroils its adherents and others in unwholesome behavior that does more harm

than good. We also condemn sloth, apathy, neglect, and indifference, those characteristics which reflect negatively on the nation and its future.

Our Islam directs us towards moderation and a wise balance between the demands of the hereafter and the demands of the world, for we do not believe in monasticism and the complete renunciation of the pleasures of the world and the demands of life, neither do we believe in disregarding the hereafter and immersing oneself in the pleasures and appetites of life. But we take what share is appropriate for our life, that we may perform our mission in it as God wills, and we make it subservient to the work of the hereafter and eternal life.

We stick to moderation even in our spending of money, displaying neither extravagance nor miserliness or tight-fistedness, following what God Almighty said about those who worship the Merciful: "Who when they spend are neither profligate nor niggardly, that being the middle ground."

We will remain moderate and loyal to our nation, looking out for its security, stability, and prosperity, in spite of what we have found and what we still find of hardship, oppression, and injury from the successive government regimes. Islam calls upon us to love our country and to work for its betterment according to the pattern of Islam and its law, especially since our nation of Egypt represents an important part and center of gravity of the Islamic world. At the same time, we reject nationalism, which calls for chauvinism and tears apart the unity of Muslims. Neither will injury and oppression draw us into feelings of hatred for the country, or to negativism and indifference, or lack of feeling of responsibility towards it, for the country is our country and not the country of the rulers alone, and we share with them the responsibility towards it and towards its future.

Moreover, the injury, oppression, torture and killing to which we have been subject will not induce us to think about revenge or reprisal against those who have injured us and killed some of us. Rather, we are patient in anticipation of what we will receive from God. We entrust them to God, and we call upon them—we all pity them because of God's punishment—to hasten to repent before God and to desist from injury, torture, and leading the believers astray, for God Almighty says: "Those who lead the believing men and women astray and then do not repent will have the punishment of Hell and of the fire." Will they make amends for themselves by repenting and asking for forgiveness before death makes that impossible for them? [passage omitted]

#### **Faysal Islamic Bank Director Discusses Achievements, Plans**

*45040244B Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 14 Feb 89 p 5*

[Interview with Ahmad Zandu; date and place unspecified]

[Text] When the legislative bill to establish the Egyptian Faysal Islamic Bank was referred to the economic committee of the People's Assembly on 27 May 1988 for discussion of this exemplary idea, and when the topic was

presented to the late President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, he stipulated that the draft law had to be approved by the renowned economist Ahmad Zandu before its enactment. The late president made this stipulation out of his belief in the vision of this man, who was the governor of the Central Bank at the time. It is no wonder then, that the board of directors of the Faysal Islamic Bank, which is composed of leading financiers, economics professors, and Islamic law experts, decided to select this world-class economics expert, Ahmad Zandu, as the president of the Egyptian Faysal Islamic Bank.

The board of directors of the Faysal Islamic Bank includes: His Excellency Prince Muhammad al-Faysal al-Sa'ud, the chairman of the board; Dr Ahmad Thabit 'Awidah, the former chairman of the Council of State; Dr Ibrahim Jamil Badran, the former minister of health; Engineer Ahmad Hilmi 'Abd-al-Majid, the deputy chairman of the Arab Contractors; Dr Ahmad Sayyid, the vicar of the Egyptian Awqaf [religious endowments] Organization; Dr Ahmad al-Najjar, the general secretary of the Islamic Banks; Eng Hasan Anwar 'Abd-al-Wahhab, a former major general engineer; Shaykh Haydar Ibn-Ladin, a Saudi businessman; Dr Sultan Abu-'Ali, the former minister of economy; Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah Abu-al-Fada, the president of the University of Riyadh; 'Ali Ahmad Hamdi, the general director of the Islamic Education and Culture Organization; Dr 'Amr 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Azzam, an Egyptian businessman; Muhammad Kamal 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hashim, a leading lawyer; and Dr Yusuf al-Qardawi, an Islamic leader.

In the following interview, Dr Ahmad Zandu, the director of the Faysal Islamic Bank, provides details concerning the bank and Islamic business transactions in general.

### 32 Production Projects

I asked Dr Ahmad Zandu what the Faysal Islamic Bank has done to serve the national economy and development programs in view of the government's policy to encourage the role of the private sector.

He stated that, as of the end of 1408 A.H., the bank had established and had a share in about 32 companies with capital totalling around \$662 million, of which the bank allots 9 percent or \$59.5 million, \$54.5 million of which has been paid out. He remarked that the bank does not limit itself to contributing capital, but also finances projects within the scope of the conditions established by the Egyptian Central Bank, and in accordance with methods compatible with Islamic law, such as resales with specification of gain, partnerships, limited partnerships, leases, and purchases. These projects embrace agricultural, livestock, industrial, and pharmaceutical production; investment; foreign and domestic trade; tourism; and banks and financial institutions. Twenty-two of these projects have actually begun operating, and eight companies are under implementation. For example, the bank has contributed 6.3 million Egyptian

pounds to three projects in the field of agriculture and animal production, 12.3 million pounds to 10 industrial projects, 11.9 million pounds to two projects in the pharmaceutical and medical care industries, 3.1 million pounds to the investment field, 2.4 million pounds to a foreign and domestic commerce project, 18.8 million pounds to five projects pertaining to Islamic banks and financial institutions, and 800,000 pounds to several other areas.

### 151 Representatives

Zandu added that in the area of foreign commerce, the bank opened and implemented 1,292 lines of credit (import + export) during fiscal year 1408 A.H., and that the bank has a network of 151 representatives throughout the world, including 41 in the Arab and Islamic world, 13 in North America, 74 in Europe, and 23 in other states.

### The Import of Food and Strategic Commodities

I asked the president of the Faysal Islamic Bank to speak about the figures and indicators pertaining to the bank's contribution to Egyptian society.

He stated: "First, the bank provided more than \$500 million in the form of an Islamic limited partnership to the Egyptian Central Bank to finance the import of different strategic and food commodities. This figure represents 50 percent of the foreign currency resources of the bank for serving the basic needs of the state, in addition, of course to the legal reserve deposited in the Central Bank.

### Almsgiving Fund

"Second, the Faysal Islamic Bank is the only bank in Egypt that pays the alms tax on its profits in addition to other taxes. I consider the alms tax fund one of the most important achievements of the Egyptian Faysal Islamic Bank. This fund plays an exemplary role in the Arab and Islamic world in the area of charitable assistance, donations and on-going almsgiving.

"It suffices for me to mention that almsgiving funds totalling close to 13.5 million pounds have been spent since the establishment of the bank. Disbursements include 5 million pounds worth of monetary and material aid for the needy, the provision of artificial limbs for the handicapped and assistance in defraying medical treatment costs; 500,000 pounds for emergency aid to handle public disasters and catastrophes; 4 million pounds in monetary aid for students and for charitable housing projects for students of the universities of al-Azhar, Sawhaj, Asyut, and the universities of al-Minufiyah and al-Mansurah; 3 million pounds in contributions for well-known charitable societies and medical equipment for the hospitals; and 1 million pounds for the construction of national mosques and the clinics attached to them."

He stated: "The success of the bank in this area has prompted those responsible for the almsgiving funds in sister Arab countries to contact us to learn more about our experience and the methods for charitable work associated with our almsgiving fund, especially activities and services related to housing for university students.

#### Trustees of the Alms Tax

"Third, there are many Muslims—who do not have any deposits or accounts with the Faysal Islamic Bank—who submit to us their required share of the alms tax on their wealth. They do so because they are confident that the almsgiving fund of the Faysal Islamic Bank is most capable of directing alms tax resources to the bank's legitimate funds and to those in true need of such funds."

#### One Million Pounds to Build a Hospital at Al-Azhar University

He stated that the bank contributed 1 million pounds last week for the construction of a university hospital at al-Azhar University that will provide free medical services to the poor.

#### Discussion With American Banks

At the conclusion of my interview with the president of the Faysal Islamic Bank, I asked him about the bank's relations with foreign banks.

He stated: "Praise be to God, we have an excellent reputation abroad and we are currently preparing to receive a delegation representing large American banks for discussions concerning the promotion of business relations and the consolidation of banking ties between the Faysal Islamic Bank and its representatives in Europe and America. We have succeeded, by the grace of God, in enjoining foreign banks to respect the requirements of Islamic banking regulations, even to the extent that several banks have taken it upon themselves to establish special administrations to monitor transactions pertaining to the Faysal Islamic Bank. It is no secret that several international banks ask the large banks in Egypt if the Egyptian Faysal Islamic Bank honors the lines of credit opened by those large banks for their clients. Is there any measure of confidence greater than this? In other words, if the financial center of the Faysal bank is not strong, what then is a strong financial center enjoyed by any bank?"

#### New Islamic Contracts to Attract Savings

At the conclusion of my interview with Dr Ahmad Zandu, the president of the Faysal Islamic Bank, I asked him about the bank's role in attracting private savings following the abatement of the wave of investment companies.

He stated that the bank will shortly issue new Islamic investment contracts that will function as a repository for absorbing the savings of citizens. He added that these

savings will be invested in projects benefitting the country and citizens, thereby filling the vacuum resulting from the abatement of the wave of investment.

#### Dissertation Sees Link Between Batiniyah Sect and Zionism

45040226 Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic  
3 Feb 89 p 7

[Abd-al-Latif Fayid column "Al-Din li al-Hayah": "Zionism Major Beneficiary of al-Batiniyah"]

[Text] The latest university study on al-Batiniyah [Shi'ite sect established in tenth century AD] political thought maintains that al-Batiniyah is still the fertile source from which all mystic groups and political movements draw that harbor enmity and hatred for Islam and its state. They have all agreed on this objective, notwithstanding the difference in their ideological orientations known under several labels, be it communism or secularism, or in the form of other movements infiltrating Muslim ranks such as the Babiyyah sect, the Baha'i sect and the Freemasonry sect. The major beneficiary of this is Zionism.

The study was prepared by researcher Ahmad 'Arafat al-Qadi in his masters' dissertation entitled "Political Thought of the al-Batiniyah Sect and al-Ghazali's Position on It." In it he maintains that these movements and temples are a natural extension of mystic groups from the time of the Magi [Zoroastrian priests]. The al-Batiniyah sect is a faction that emerged at the beginning of the third century A.H. [After the Hegira], using Shi'ism as a screen to achieve its objectives, which are summed up in destroying the Islamic religion and undermining its state, under different names which Imam al-Ghazali narrowed down to ten labels: al-Batiniyah, al-Qaramitah, al-Qaramitiyah, al-Khuramiyah, al-Khuramdiniyah, al-'Isma'iliyah, al-Sab'iyah, al-Muhammarah and al-Ta'limiyah.

#### Al-Batiniyah and the Philosophers

To those who claim that the Sunnis level false charges against all movements that have social content and economic goals, such as accusing them of permitting marriage to mothers, sisters and daughters and of wife-sharing, al-Ghazali says: "These accounts are supported by historians, some of whom espoused those faiths to become acquainted with them, such as al-Hamadi, who says that he joined them to learn the truth about them. He relates that their concept of paradise is copulation with women!, [punctuation as published] hence making it easy to believe these tales."

He adds: "Permitting the killing of Muslims and committing aggression against the Ka'bah bears this out as well."

He points out that the true state of affairs does not refute these tales. Many examples of this kind have appeared in newspapers and magazines and, if we add to that awareness of the objective of these misguided groups, this notion becomes acceptable.

Using as an example the injustice suffered by the Prophet's family at the hands of the Sunnis, the researcher invoked al-Ghazali's opinion to show how the al-Batiniyah group gained mastery over the Shi'ite creeds by joining them to try to gain their favor.

He explains how al-Ghazali made a close connection between al-Batiniyah and the philosophers, particularly in opinions pertaining to prophecies, in the close relationship and goals that bring them together, and also in his own attitude toward Sufi radicals. For he, al-Ghazali, believes that Sufism means faithfulness to God Almighty and good treatment of people, in addition to abidance by the shar' [the Revelation], because he who goes against the shar' is not a Sufi but a liar.

### Concept of Imam and Divine Self

The researcher said that the al-Batiniyah concept of the imamate is based on two premises: commandment, and rebuttal and infallibility. This sect has fabricated a hadith [traditional narrative] about the prophet called The Stream which says that, when encountering a stream upon their return from the farewell pilgrimage, the prophet held 'Ali's hand and said: "This is my beloved friend, brother and successor, so listen to him and obey." The first one to mention the commandment was 'Abdallah Ibn Saba'.

Al-Ghazali replies by saying that this text was not handed down [from the time of the prophet] because, if it had been, the people would have known of it as well as they know of the existence of the prophets and [holy] places.

As for [al-Batiniyah's] claim of the imam's infallibility, he says that the imam does not receive revelations and is not born a theologian. He is taught and there is no difference between him and others in learning and education.

But the most dangerous allegation of the al-Batiniyah sect is the contention that the imam is a divine being who was incarnated with human attributes and, therefore, should be worshipped.

### Al-Batiniyah and Zionism

The researcher explains that, in its political movement, the al-Batiniyah used what is now known as "dialectic" that mixes the concepts of the call [al-da'wah] and of propaganda [al-di'ayah] as two of the methods of psychological interaction, a technique originated by 'Abdallah Ibn Saba' and used after him by his pupil, Maymun al-Qaddah, a Jew, according to the best sources, to create a state to threaten the Islamic state and

to be a thorn in its side in a fashion rivaled only in the modern age when Zionism used religion to spread its principles among the Jews by contriving harm and ruin among them, then letting out cries of despair and resignation, such as their propaganda that they were persecuted by the Nazis.

Zionism also benefitted by the al-Batiniyah political propaganda technique when it established the Hebrew University in Israel for the linguistic and intellectual benefit of the Jews in the fashion of Dar al-Hikmah, which al-Batiniyah established in Egypt to teach their faith and proscribe the learning of other creeds such as the al-Malikiyah, the al-Hanafiyyah [Sunni schools of Islamic law] and others.

Zionism also employed the method of assassination and physical liquidation against popular resistance figures and moral assassination of intellectuals through slander, the same technique successfully used by al-Batiniyah groups.

The researcher also reveals that the al-Batiniyah tried to achieve its goal of destroying Islam and annihilating its state by means of another plan represented in a call for a so-called unity of religions by "contriving" a relationship between the teachings of revealed religions and the views of philosophers whereby it would not hurt a person to be a Magus [Zoroastrian], a Christian or a Muslim. He warns that Zionism is currently trying to profit from this malicious idea to control the world by calling for a global government with a global religion, using bribery and sex to recruit student missions to be its messengers in the world and through masonic temples in various countries.

The researcher says: "The Zionists have planned for three world wars. The first one was to remove czarist rule in order to turn Russia into a bastion for the communist atheist movement and use it to destroy other governments and religions. The second was aimed at destroying Nazism and setting up the Zionist state on the land of Palestine. Roosevelt and Churchill were commissioned to implement this plan. The third is the consequence of the struggle between the Islamic world and Israel aimed at the total destruction of the region.

### Theocratic Government

As for the legal judgment regarding this group, the researcher says: "Al-Ghazali divides these people into two categories. The first comprises the majority, who believe that the head of al-Batiniyah is worthy of the imamate and is infallible, but do not regard the shedding of Muslim blood as permissible and do not charge them with unbelief. A person who does this is not proscribed, but must be deterred from the error of his ways and heresy as the imam sees fit.

"The second category is those who charge Muslims with unbelief and outlaw them. These people must absolutely be charged with unbelief and must be treated as apostates."

The researcher then goes on to talk about the imamate as al-Ghazali saw it, saying that he thought it was essential because a religious system can only be brought about via an obeyed imam.

He maintains that the main thing is to offer the best possible [imam]. Nonetheless, al-Ghazali does not object to less favorable imamate if they can ward off trouble and sedition. He considers them a form of secondary authority.

The researcher refutes allegations that al-Ghazali called for a theocratic or religious government when he said that the caliph is God's shadow on earth, because he meant a caliph to be anyone who is obeyed and loved by the people, a fair individual under whose wing the country could enjoy comfort—all essential attributes a caliph must possess in order to rule the Muslims. This is made clear by the ten attributes al-Ghazali set down for the imam, which he divided into moral attributes, such as maturity, intellect, freedom, manhood, Qurayshi lineage, sound senses—especially hearing and sight—and acquired characteristics, such as courage, efficiency, knowledge and piety.

The researcher cites al-Ghazali's division of the attributes of ministers and jurists who serve as the imam's aides in order to defend al-Ghazali. He believes that a good minister must be disposed toward benevolence in order to help the sultan be merciful toward the people and to guide him and that he must be aware of the mutual need between the people and the sultan.

He refutes another charge leveled against al-Ghazali that he called for the rule of the jurist because he believed that policy was the job of the jurist. He explained that al-Ghazali meant a policy of justice based on the shari'ah, which is totally sufficient for those who understand it, as underscored by his warning to the ulema not to associate with sultans unless they mean to ward off injustice or give advice.

The researcher concluded his dissertation by saying that the rule of the majority on which modern democracies are based is a principle al-Ghazali had already espoused when he advocated the rule of the majority in choosing an imam, thus underscoring the originality and authenticity of political thought in Islam.

The dissertation was discussed by Mr al-Julaynid, head of the philosophy department at Dar al-'Ulum College, as moderator, and Dr Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq, dean of the Religious Studies School, and Dr Abu-al-Yazid al-'Ajami, professor of philosophy at Dar al-'Ulum, as members. The researcher was granted the Master's degree with distinction.

### **Citizens Complain About Bottled Gas Shortage, Price Hikes**

45040235A Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 27 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Raji al-Wardani]

[Text] It is not strange that the price of a bottle of bottled gas on the black market should reach 150 pounds—the government itself raised its price by 150 percent in less than 2 months, bringing its price up to 79.50 pounds!

It is not strange that the lines of people wanting to exchange their bottles should fail to get them, as long as the number of bottles which come daily to the distribution outlets come at 6 am, only to be snatched up by the women paid to stand in line, leaving less than half the amount for the citizens!

It is not strange that the managers of the distribution outlets should oppose journalists and refuse to speak to them or to state their names, and refuse to allow pictures to be taken of what is happening to the citizens. What happens these days is that any senior official may issue an order forbidding the little guy from talking to the press and unburdening his mind of the heartache. Never does the attention of the censoring agencies waver and remove doubts about the existence of violations or mistakes!

### **We Begin the Tour**

A bottle distribution center in al-Duqqi: a line of people carrying empty bottles is more than 100 meters long; there is no giving up because one cannot do without the commodity. Cars block the streets. Bilateral agreements are made quietly between the paid women and those at the head of the line: "Buy your comfort and your time .. the bottle costs 65 piasters, pay 120 piasters and receive the bottle in your car!" In short, there is a holiday every day.

We entered the center and approached the manager. As soon as he was informed of our journalistic identity, the color of his face changed, and he sprang up, gathering some papers up from his desk. He excused himself from any exchange of words with us in any form, saying that he had many things on his mind. We asked him his name, but he refused to tell us. Before he left us he pointed to another man saying, "This is the inspector, ask him."

We had no better luck with the inspector. He also refused to tell us his name, and with complete candor he locked all doors to conversation with us. Worst of all was a security man who suddenly hurried towards us to ask us to leave the office.

### **Talk in the Lines**

Every day the al-Duqqi distribution center receives from 3000 to 4000 bottles—in the summer the amount decreases by half. If this number actually went to the people of al-Duqqi, there would not be a crisis, or a

crowd, or lines. The amount distributed increased by 30 percent until it was up to the number mentioned above. In spite of that, the crisis worsens. The number of bottles needs to be increased. Most of those standing in the lines are from outside the al-Duqqi area. Some had completely failed to get a bottle from the distribution centers of their own areas, and others are from the black market.

Hasan 'Ali, a driver, in line for the third day in a row, says, "The bottled gas crisis began a month ago, and it exists in all areas of the country. I have been standing for two hours. This line is moving very slowly. I have taken off from work and devoted myself completely to looking for a bottle of bottled gas. A house without a bottle is half paralyzed. No drink, no cooking, and no bathing. I am thinking of buying a kerosene stove, or an alcohol one!"

Samir Muhammad Mustafa, a teacher, says: "Yesterday I stood in line until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the center's closing time, without getting a bottle. There must be a shortage in the number of bottles, otherwise these long lines would not have formed. The winter is biting cold, the rains come upon us unexpectedly, but in spite of that, no citizen thinks of leaving his place in line!"

Majdi Jum'ah lives in Shubra. "What induced you to come to al-Duqqi, Brother Majdi?" He replied, "In 6 days not a single bottle came into the Shubra depository. Yesterday I was in the neighborhood of Misr al-Jadidah, the day before yesterday I went to the depository of al-Manil, and, today, here I am at al-Duqqi, and, if I knew or heard that tomorrow there would be bottles on Mars, I would be at the head of the line of the Mars bottle depository!" "One last question, Brother Majdi. What, in your opinion, is the reason for the crisis?" The man replied, "It is not one crisis, there are two crises. The first is the crisis of exchanging the bottles: there is a large number in the depositories, and this number has become the property of the drivers. The trucks go by the houses, and the price of changing a bottle customarily varies between 150 and 175 piasters! As for the second crisis, the price of buying a bottle, this is what has risen unimaginably in an extremely short record time, creating a black market that exploits the people's trouble. Of course, there is a strong link between the two crises, and the lines of people pay for this link!"

Hasan Rizq is from al-Haram; he insists that the bottle truck never comes to his home, and if by chance the truck should come down Hasan's street, it does not distribute bottles, and if a miracle should happen and the car should stop in front of his home, they refuse to go up to his apartment. There are many who own several bottles, those who are favorites of the distributors. Hasan added, "There are six depositories in the al-Haram neighborhood, but not a single bottle goes into them, so we are here in the al-Duqqi neighborhood."

#### **Do You Want to Buy a Bottle?**

In one of the populous neighborhoods in the al-Haram region, there is another long line of empty bottled gas bottles, men and women on both sides of the line,

watching and waiting for the arrival of the bottles. If only they knew that the bottle truck would not come, that it came at 7 am, bringing the depository's daily supply of 400 bottles. The lines begin at 10 am. Anyway, we parked AL-AKHBAR's car at a distance, and I approached the manager of the depository. I whispered in his ear that I would like to buy a bottle. The man began to look doubtful, and he tried to get away from me. After some talk the manager was convinced of my "good intentions," especially after I pulled 120 pounds out of my pocket, which I would gladly pay as soon as the bottle got to my house. I am sorry to say that the agreement was concluded with the arrival of the bottle that evening, in exchange for 120 pounds.

#### **Public Sector Bottles**

Muhammad Mahmud, deputy manager of the Saydnawi branch in al-Duqqi said, "Some people bought heaters and bottled gas [stoves] without getting the bottle. The increase in the price of a bottle is based on an increase in production costs, and the one responsible for that is military factory 99, which is the one that sets the cost, and thus the price of a bottle is fixed. The plant produces 10,000 bottles of bottled gas without importing bottles. The private sector has agreements with the government that the latter will supply some of the products that it cannot manufacture. It must be taken into consideration that we give the the factory the opportunity to produce the bottles instead of importing them, especially since last year we heard that the importation of 400,000 bottles from abroad had been authorized!"

#### **The Reasons for the Crisis**

AL-AKHBAR met with Ahmad al-Jaziri, general director of the bottled gas company, and we asked him about the reasons for the crisis. He said, "It is known that the winter cold doubles the people's consumption. During the summer, a bottle runs out in 20 days, but in the winter the gas in the bottle runs out in 10 to 15 days. I do not consider the current situation to be a crisis, though the crowding plays a role, of course. There are stations that operate with greater efficiency. Our production has not decreased, but has risen. Also one of the reasons for the crisis is increased consumption by the people of the villages"

Ahmad al-Jaziri added, "I am not responsible for the black market; I deal with the white market. As for misdeeds and violations, those are the work of the local agencies, such as supply and the popular councils. Those are the ones who are responsible for oversight and for solving the stifling crises one by one. We deal with the companies producing the bottles that belong to them, and the military factories deal with the production of Factory 360. We meet the needs of the bottles of the factories, but frankly, the production of the agencies does not parallel the rate of consumption."

"One other question. We had expected that after natural gas was distributed to many neighborhoods in Egypt, the pressure on bottles would decrease, but the opposite has happened. Why?"

We could not get a "logical" answer to this question from any official. One says, "Wait until the work on the natural gas project is completed." Another says, "Whether it be the project or the bottle, it makes no difference; both are subsidized."

#### **AL-AKHBAR Urges Islamic Conference to Support Afghans**

45040235C Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 6 Feb 89 p 5

[Commentary: "The Role of the Islamic Conference After the Pullout From Afghanistan"]

[Text] In a few days the last Soviet soldier will leave Afghanistan, after a bloody war that lasted 9 years, in which one of the two world superpowers was unable to subdue its people and yoke them to the Communist wheel, in spite of all the effort that it expended, all that it has in the way of the most modern means of killing and destruction, all the money that it spent, and all the lives that it lost. The Afghani people, who take pride in their religion, traditions, and freedom, were able to force the forces of the aggression to leave their land, and once again the words of the Arab poet came true: "If some day the people want life, destiny must respond."

However, the Soviet pullout will not be the end of the Afghani tragedy; rather, all indications are that it will be the beginning of a new tragedy that the land of Afghanistan is expected to see. This time its events will take place between the people and their Marxist rulers who want to impose themselves by force on a country that bore arms for 9 years to affirm its rejection of any puppet government and to bring back its freedom, honor, and independence under a free, non-aligned policy.

Though the Islamic Conference, which includes more than 40 states, may not have done much to support the bitter Afghani struggle, of which the Mujahidin bore the greatest burden, supported by meager outside assistance from Islamic states or from foreign powers that have their own motives in preventing the Soviet occupation from securing a foothold in a large Islamic state that occupies an important strategic position in the heart of the Asian continent, the Islamic world is now required to give the maximum aid possible, so that the Afghani people may avoid new massacres whose victims will only be from among its native sons. It must at least swiftly call for an emergency Islamic conference to discuss the situations that are expected to arise when the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan is completed, in order to solve internal problems between the various groups of citizens there, and it must offer aid to the brother people in rebuilding what the war destroyed—and that is very much!

#### **Columnist on Debts to United States, IMF**

JN1104124089 Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic

9 Apr 89 pp 5-8

[Salah Muntasir article: "Mubarak and Bush in Washington—Excellent Beginning With a New U.S. Administration"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Among the proposals made by the previous U.S. Administration of President Reagan, there is a proposal to transform the debts on governments from governmental debts—that is, on the borrowing government, be it Egypt or any other country—to commercial banks, provided that the U.S. Government guarantees 90 percent of these loans and the borrowing government provides 10 percent guarantees for the banks from which it will buy the debts.

Such a proposal has advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages is that it will guarantee a reduction in the burden of the interest rate from a high rate, which prevailed and was dealt with when these loans were made, to a low rate that represents the current interest rate (soon the interest rate will drop from 14 percent to 7 percent). But the disadvantage of the proposal is that it will transform the debts on the borrowing governments into commercial debts after they were governmental ones. This means that the maximum delay period permitted on the repayment period is 90 days, while in governmental debts the delay period may reach a year; and, with good relations between the governments, they can be rescheduled. The repayment of debts, when transformed to banks—even with the drop in the interest rate—will become a binding commitment, from which the debtor states cannot escape. Also, at the time when it is proposed to exempt debtor countries from a specific percentage of the debts if governmental debts are transformed into commercial debts, as stipulated by the U.S. proposal, the percentage of exemption is not applicable to these debts.

In spite of all these disadvantages, Israel was among the first countries to transform a large portion of its old debts to the United States from governmental debts into commercial debts. This action on the part of Israel provokes thought. How could Israel do such a thing while we know that, when it comes to financial relations and dealings, the Israelis consider things very carefully before doing anything?

To answer this, we say that Israel chose certain banks in which Jews play an influential role, so that one can say that Israel transformed its debts to banks with which it can deal easily and from which it may even guarantee certain exemptions in the future due to the strength of the Jewish influence inside these banks. This is not available to other countries such as Egypt, although it is very important for us.

Thus, the subject of military debts is still a subject of discussion and contacts between Egypt and the United States.

While talking about the results of Mubarak's visit to Washington, it may be said that concerning Egypt's ties with the IMF, we would not be merely optimistic, but rather stating a fact, when we say that there has been progress in the U.S. position within the IMF. However, every Egyptian must clearly understand the following:

A. While it is not difficult to postpone payments of the debts that are due this year, the issue is not one of postponing the debts for this year only. What about next year and the year after that?

B. The IMF is the creditors' monitor of the government performance. The IMF's duty is to safeguard the creditors' money and ascertain the Egyptian Government's future ability to repay the debts. Therefore, the IMF asks the government to effect a number of measures that the IMF deems necessary to achieve what it calls economic reform. However, it should be understood that this required aim is not merely to appease the IMF. It is not a mere request addressed to us from abroad, but a vital requirement. Unless we take practical, effective measures to undertake such reforms, we will face big problems—much bigger than our current problems—regardless of the IMF connection. We must remember that we have a balance of payments deficit—we import much more than we export—and a budget deficit—the state spends more than its revenues. We also consume more than we produce. Such a situation will only increase and exacerbate our difficulties.

C. Any external support, be it from the United States, the IMF, Europe, or others will not be forthcoming unless there is tangible proof of internal reform measures.

It is unjust to deny that certain steps have been taken over the past few years, especially when we consider that the Mubarak administration assumed responsibility when Egypt was in shaky condition because of starting economic projects that were very costly and which bear fruit only in certain areas and only in the long run. A case in point are the telephone, electricity, water resources, road, and sewage systems projects—all of which are very essential to attract foreign capital. [passage omitted]

We must be very clear and should realize that there are measures—possibly harsh ones—that must be taken, not for the IMF's sake but for Egypt's sake. What is important is that these harsh measures should not harm the underprivileged sector whose sighs we do not stop hearing. But there are other sectors that are capable of paying and bearing the brunt of the reform bill, because the collapse will pose more threats to the capable ones. [passage omitted]

### **Columnist Praises Egypt's Capability as Arms Maker**

45040236C Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 7 Feb 89 p 3

[Commentary by Mahmud 'Abd-al-Mun'im Murad]

[Text] One of the most important issues that serves the interests of the Arab nation is the issue of manufacturing the arms which the Arab states need, collectively or individually. It is natural that there would be arms manufacture in Egypt, serving Egypt's interest specifically, but at the same time, it serves the interests of the other Arab states, i.e., the collective interest on the level of the Arab world as a whole. The day before yesterday, the Qatari minister of education paid a third visit to the military plants of the Arab Organization for Industrialization [AOI]. The Qatari minister praised the vastness of the projects that the organization is working on, and he said: "Arms manufacture in Egypt will play a part in enabling the Arab nation to be free to make the political decisions that it believes in, far from the dependency and chains which the arms exporters impose, especially when Arab leaders become convinced of the need to support this Arab industrial edifice and to develop its production quantitatively and qualitatively."

Many Arab leaders also believe that. In recent months there have been frequent statements by many, similar to and confirming what Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Hamad al-Thani, the Qatari minister of education, had said. For our part, Egyptian officials affirm that Egypt welcomes cooperation with its sister Arab states in this respect, and it also affirms that it could greatly develop its military industries, bringing them up to the same level as those of the largest industrial states that export arms, if it could get the money needed to expand and develop this vital strategic industry.

In this respect, one might mention that Lieutenant General Ibrahim al-'Urabi, chairman of the AOI, said recently, in the context of Israel's manufacture of a satellite which it launched, that Egypt is also capable of manufacturing its own satellite and that satellites are easy to manufacture if those who launch them can make the rockets that carry them into space. In Egypt, we have worked on developing rockets to a large extent, and we are also now working on manufacturing arms and very advanced and complicated military equipment. All these arms and equipment have proven to be effective and competitive. Moreover, they cost less than their foreign counterparts and they are able to cover the needs of the Arab nation and allow it to escape the cycle of foreign dominance and control.

### **Writer Sees U.S. Education Programs as Means To "Control Minds"**

45040204A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Jan 89 p 6

[Article by Dr Sa'id Isma'il 'Ali: "The World Bank and Educational Development in Egypt"]

[Text] When we used to say, as many others did, that Egypt has made great strides beyond all imagination on the road of dependency, the political leadership used to

affirm every now and then that the "Egyptian will" alone made all political decisions relevant to Egypt. The leadership's evidence of that was truly ludicrous and, indeed, pitiful. For those who talked of Egypt's dependency were not so naive as to claim that the "type" of foreign direction assumed the same old forms whereby the U.S. ambassador would force his way into the government palace to give his instructions or warnings, as did Lord Killearn on 4 February 1942 when British domination was at the peak of its power. No. It is possible for the ambassador or anyone else to stay out of the picture altogether. Taking care of situations, of the source of financing and of everything else associated with them can steer decisions from afar—by remote control—in this or that direction even if they appear on the surface to be "locally made."

Perhaps the most notable example of this is the American hijacking of the Egyptian plane in 1985. It is the one incident that deeply injured the pride of every Egyptian, and no one has gotten over it yet. Its details are known, so we see no reason to remind the readers of them so as to reopen their wounds.

The latest example is that sordid American aggression on two Libyan planes. The Egyptian leadership failed to do the very least: to condemn and denounce the incident. Rather, it came out with a disgraceful statement calling on both parties to exercise calm and self-restraint: the killer and the killed...the assailant and the assailed. It was truly a rotten thing to do.

In education, we definitely know for sure that Dunlop departed Egypt and the world decades ago and none of his descendants or his kin have an office at the Ministry of Education to run it in accordance with colonialist designs. However, when one does something that wins the approval and the praise of our nation's enemies, suspicion inevitably finds its way into our minds and fear inevitably creeps into our hearts. We all remember the American attempts at the beginning of the seventies to pull Egypt into dependency on it. These attempts reached their peak right after the October 1973 war when the switch actually got underway, making Washington our Mecca. In only a few years, the American invasion actually succeeded in spreading its influence and tightening its iron grip in accordance with novel forms of neo-colonialism that are too numerous to mention here.

And since it is no longer a matter of "soldiers," "army camps," "military weapons" and "territory," it was natural that education should constitute a principal means for reshaping the Egyptian mind to conform to American policy objectives: through joint research, through the transfer of technology to tighten the attachment to producing companies and their interests, through the lures of loans, grants and visits and by planting certain Americanized personalities, pushing them forward and upward to play their roles from behind the scenes in the educational decision-making process.

Just as foreign banks and suspicious projects that sap the Egyptian economy and consume its revenues have grown and spread dangerously, so has foreign education in its modern form represented in language schools hoisting the Egyptian flag but inculcating distorted foreign culture, promoting foreign languages and pulling the rug out from under the national language, which has become alien to the new generations.

The destructive role the American University is playing is worthy of attention, particularly since the university has grown so powerful and turned into a factory for shaping leaders. Most of its students are in places of authority and hold political positions and economic power.

Those who have read the valuable study Dr Kamal Najib has prepared on this university cannot help but be alarmed. According to this study, the university's alumni council has succeeded in drawing the attention of the president's wife, from the time he was vice-president. She is now the first chairperson of the American University Alumni Council. She earned her BA and MA degrees from there and her two sons were studying there at the time. This Alumni Council has raised money for the university in the amount of \$1.5 million from Egypt and \$9.8 million from Gulf Cooperative Council countries. Foreign and American banks and companies operating in Egypt contributed the sum of \$11 million to this fund-raising campaign. The American Government reached an agreement with the Egyptian Government in 1985 to appropriate 50 million Egyptian pounds from the money surplus the United States has in Egypt to be invested by the American embassy in Cairo for the benefit of the American University, which receives the annual interest.

Notwithstanding the international status some organizations and agencies enjoy, many indications confirm that these organizations and agencies are a "Trojan horse" through which neo-colonialist influence can infiltrate without raising the American or any other flag. Two of the most famous such institutions are the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Hence, it was natural that foreign endeavors in the political, economic and armament fields be coupled with endeavors in the educational fields.

In the mid-seventies, in August 1975 to be precise, the mission sent by the World Bank to explore education in the Egyptian interior had concluded its report: Education and Manpower Development Division, EMENA Region, Washington, D.C. [As published]

We will pick only two points in this report to use as a basis for our query about the significance of putting the report's recommendations into practical application in 1988:

1. If the various statistical indicators were to confirm that the Egyptian population is growing by almost 1 million persons every 10 months (2.8 percent), creating

by necessity a growing social demand for education, from the elementary up to the secondary level, the logical consequence would be a growing social demand, year after year, for university education as well. This trend used to be actually addressed by raising the number of university admissions. As of 1987, however, the new policy began reversing the trend. This reversal was underscored in 1988 by the lowering of the number of university admissions and the announcement of plans to consider various ways and means to channel this social demand away from this kind of education toward other endeavors. Here we call to mind a recommendation contained in a World Bank report (p 20 of the Arabic text), and the public has to accept the concept that not all high school graduates will go into higher education.

The notorious government argument justifying this policy is unemployment among graduates. This is an argument against and not for them because it bespeaks, beyond any doubt, the patent failure of development policies. The country is still experiencing a decline in development projects, and it is inevitable that the market should fail to absorb the graduates.

2. Now we come to the second issue, which is the duration of basic education. The report suggested that it be 8 years, followed by 3 years of secondary education, but later favored another option (p 27) consisting of 8 years of mandatory basic education followed by 4 years of different kinds of secondary education. This may explain something that has astonished many people: after implementing the first part by reducing the number of mandatory years from 9 to 8, new official statements came out talking about a plan to raise the period of secondary education to 4 years, a means countries employ step by step to get out of yet another social responsibility, thus creating a greater recession in "social security" states. For if secondary education—from the official point of view—remains free but not mandatory, taking away one year from basic education to add to the secondary level is a clear step on the road we indicated above.

To be sure, history will one day reveal the fact that education was and still is one important door through which American influence is infiltrating in order to control minds. It is the toughest and most dangerous form of hegemony and domination.

#### **Columnist Calls Islamic Banks 'Exemplary Experiment'**

45040244A Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 12 Feb 89 p 7

[Commentary by Ahmad Zayn]

[Text] The Islamic banking experiment is without a doubt exemplary in the economic field. It is also a new experiment which is still young. Therefore, it is necessary to monitor and evaluate it and ascertain if it is headed for success, failure, or a stasis representing neither success nor failure.

I have before me a report prepared by accountant Samir Mutawalli on behalf of the International Federation of Islamic Banks. The report provides us with an indication as to how these banks are progressing. It states that deposits in 20 Islamic banks, which are members in the federation, total \$8.2 billion, and that the balance increased at a high rate of 14.9 percent, or by \$1.255 billion, from \$8.409 billion in 1406 A.H. to \$9.667 billion at the end of 1407 A.H. There was also a \$22-million increase in the income of the Islamic banks, from \$240 million last year A.H. to \$267 million.

The report also notes an increase of \$77 million in investment returns and an increase in deposits from \$6.691 billion to \$8.200 billion.

We should rely on this report in order to ascertain the extent of the success of the Islamic bank experiment, which means that this experiment has created a solution for a large number of people who believe that current banks offering a fixed return or fixed interest are usurious. Therefore, these people were gratified to find a form of Islamic investment which rejects anything suspected of being usurious. They approached this form of Islamic investment in a manner which has made it succeed and which has enabled it to offer successful investments.

There is no doubt that no one benefits if we insist upon creating a specific formula and attempt to impose it on the people when they want other Islamic formulae, regardless of what was or is said about the Islamic banks and the doubts regarding their investments, etc., because whoever places his hopes in the Islamic banks pursues a permissible course. Any violation occurring thereafter must be accounted for by the perpetrator of the violation, and not the depositor, because as long as these banks have announced that their investments are Islamic, anyone placing deposits in them bears no sin.

Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that this approach to Islamic investment requires us to create diverse forms of investments which people can trust. In this way, we will attract the reserves which we so greatly need. At the same time, we will ease the hearts and minds of the people. Therefore, Islamic companies are needed in Egypt as a system of investment that is trusted and sought by the people.

#### **Columnist Describes NDP Discussion on Unemployment**

45040236A Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 6 Feb 89 p 1

[Article by Musa Sabri: "Nobody Has the Rod of Moses"]

[Text] A big debate is going on in the political club of the National [Democratic] Party [NDP], headed by Husni Mubarak, on one of the most serious topics of the hour, namely, unemployment.

The party's committees were ready with their reports on how to quickly counter it in the context of a long range plan that takes into consideration the frightful annual increase in population.

The problem is primarily economic, but it is linked to all the social, educational, and other activities of society.

However, there is disagreement among the various researchers in the party's committees on where to start dealing with the problem. That is a clear sign of the size of the problem, as far as figures, and as far as the nature of those who have not found work.

There is an evaluation of the results of the first 5-year plan and an estimate of the requirements of the second plan, and here we read figures that differ from the reports presented by the specialized national councils. There is also a third set of figures presented by the statistical office.

The committees of the NDP have decided that they must agree on a standardized estimate of the scope of unemployment in Egypt and the nature of the unemployed.

I hope that they succeed in arriving at this standardized estimate on a sound, realistic, scientific basis, because otherwise we will not find ways to treat it, for, if the diagnosis of an illness lacks precision, the doctors will disagree on it.

The problem of sound statistics has existed in Egypt for a long time, and the complaint which the three presidents, 'Abd-al-Nasir, Sadat, and Mubarak, have voiced on more than one occasion, is that they receive differing figures on a single subject from the many numerous concerned parties. This is a chronic phenomenon in developing countries.

I imagine that the discussion will have to extend over more than one meeting, because nobody has the rod of Moses and nobody has a magic prescription.

## IRAQ

### Joint Space Program Negotiated With Brazil

33420045 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO  
in Portuguese 19 Mar 89 p C-7

[Text] Twenty years after it was created, the Brazilian Aeronautics Company (Embraer)—an aircraft manufacturer connected with the Ministry of Aviation—is getting ready to jump into a new business and technological field: it will participate in the manufacture of artificial satellites and equipment related to the exploration of space. During a trip to the Middle East 2 months ago, Ozilio Silva, the engineer who is president of Embraer, made arrangements with the Government of Iraq for a program valued at \$80 million (136 million new cruzados at the parallel market rate), to build a military

reconnaissance satellite and a laboratory for assembling and testing satellites similar to the one at the National Institute of Space Research (INPE) in Sao Paulo.

Ozilio Silva's mission in Baghdad (the Iraqi capital) doesn't mean that Embraer is going to curb its aircraft production. On the contrary; the company intends to increase its role in Iraq with a view to selling more planes—especially the AMX tactical fighter, of Italian-Brazilian design. However, the satellite project (which was first reported 2 weeks ago by FOLHA reporter Ricardo Julio) affords yet another very interesting prospect for Silva: it could open up new horizons for Orbita, a Sao Paulo firm. Created in January 1987—as a result of an association between Embraer, Engesa, Imbel (connected with the Ministry of the Army), and a group of smaller firms—to produce missiles, Orbita was the victim of over-optimistic estimates as to its potential, and today is virtually dormant. Ozilio Silva is chairman of the board of Orbita.

The satellite which the Iraqis ordered is of a much less sophisticated type than the major powers use. It will be built using INPE's experience in scientific projects, and then be fitted with optoelectronic equipment and a high-resolution camera for photographing military activities on the earth's surface.

### 'My Minister'

An important role in the construction of the Iraqi satellite has been set aside for Brigadier General (Reserve) Hugo de Oliveira Piva, former director of the Ministry of Aviation's Aerospace Technical Center (CTA), but it is really INPE, now part of the recently-created Science and Technology Secretariat, that will do the fundamental work. Headquartered in the Sao Paulo State municipality of Sao Jose dos Campos (85 km northeast of the city of Sao Paulo), INPE is just now finishing the construction of a data collection satellite that would have been put into space this year were it not for the fact that development of its launch rocket, a satellite launch vehicle (VLS) to be built by the Ministry of Aviation's Space Activities Institute (IAE), is running 2 years behind schedule.

The entire effort to fill the Iraqi order could already be well underway if it hadn't been for the change in INPE leadership as a result of the differences of opinion between the Institute and the Ministry of Aviation with respect to the Brazilian space program. The new INPE director, Marcio Barbosa, seems hesitant to conclude an agreement with Embraer and the companies that now comprise Orbita without formal approval from the government. About 2 weeks ago, when talking to a friend, Barbosa mentioned the pressure he had been getting from Ozilio Silva and Piva to sign the working agreement as quickly as possible: "They keep after me, but it won't help. I don't do anything without the permission of my minister."

The minister Marcio Barbosa was talking about was, at that time, the Minister of Industrial Development, Roberto Cardoso Alves. But "Big Bob"—as he was better known in political circles—is no longer responsible for science and technology, and since the INPE director is now without a minister, the Iraqi project is, temporarily, in limbo.

#### **Difficult Times in the Armaments Sector Facilitate Accord**

What the engineer Ozilio Silva is trying to do—harmonize the interests of several Brazilian companies in the war materiel sector into a single project, (the artificial satellite for Iraq), is not unheard of. What makes people sit up and take notice is that Silva has a chance of success—and that would indeed be news. Early in the Sarney administration, the chief of the armed forces General Staff (EMFA) at the time, Admiral Jose Maria do Amaral, dreamed of coordinating the cooperative efforts of several industrial firms in the area of rockets. He even imagined he might preside over a Brazilian equivalent of NASA. Neither dream came true.

Internally, the Brazilian companies that have the technological capacity to get involved in programs of this type persist in a rivalry that is difficult to circumvent. Two factors may, however, make Silva's task easier: first, the recognition that he heads a successful company that has plenty of military backing; and second, the circumstance that all the leading Brazilian armaments firms are experiencing very difficult times right now.

It's possible that the present combination of internal economic crisis and competition on the international market will force the domestic companies to march shoulder to shoulder to carve out a new niche in the market—in this case, artificial satellites for Third World countries. In that event, the likely leader would be Ozilio Silva, but the union will have been born of necessity. It remains to be seen whether an alliance of Brazilian companies set up to work on foreign shores might serve to open new vistas for the Brazilian space program which, controlled by the Ministry of Aviation, is going so badly here at home.

#### **Former President Was Against Project 'in the Stratosphere'**

"Minister, this company operates in the atmosphere, not in the stratosphere." With those words, pronounced mildly and in jest, Ozires Silva, a colonel in the reserve and the former president of Embraer, managed to resist throughout the entire previous administration the onslaughts by General Octavio Medeiros, then minister and chief of the National Intelligence Service (SNI) who, according to Silva, kept insisting that an astronautics affairs division be set up within Embraer.

Ozires Silva's position is not the one being taken by his successor, Ozilio Silva. Ozilio always dreamed of projects involving rockets and satellites. Medeiros felt the need for the new division because he was concerned about Brazil's military development. Ozilio sees satellites as yet another opportunity for Embraer to expand its business. The Embraer president has already described to Marcio Barbosa, director of INPE, his plan for getting Brazil into space activities on a commercial scale.

Ozilio believes that the contract with Iraq—to supply a military reconnaissance satellite and a satellite testing laboratory—could be drawn up by Engexco, the trading company for the Engesa group, and that an engineering firm should be the principal contractor on behalf of the group of Brazilian companies responsible for the project. He says this firm could be Esca—a shareholder in Orbita—or another company set up just for that purpose.

The Embraer president believes that there are other companies besides his company, INPE (which has the only team of scientists in Brazil especially trained in building and testing satellites), Engexco, and Esca, that could participate in the enterprise—such as Engetronica, which is also a part of the Engesa group. "Embraer is already making the entire carbon fiber structure of the data collection satellite that INPE is finishing building for the Brazilian space program, and is doing something in terms of bonded materials too. What we are going to do is develop the capabilities of each Brazilian company, and give a lot of people work to do," Ozilio Silva said.

### **ISRAEL**

#### **Foreign Ministry Formulation of Shamir's Proposals Given**

44000464 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST  
14 Apr 89 p 8

[Text] Following is the official Foreign Ministry formulation of the prime minister's proposals:

#### **The Four-Point Plan**

##### **1. The Camp David—Reconformation of the Commitment to Peace.**

Ten years ago, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was concluded on the basis of the Camp David Accords. When the accords were signed, it was expected that more Arab countries would shortly join the circle of peace. This expectation was not realized.

The strength of Israeli-Egyptian relations and the cooperation between the three partners to the accords have a decisive influence on the chances for Middle East peace, and the Israeli-Egyptian treaty is the cornerstone to the building of peace in the region.

Therefore, the prime minister has called on the three countries whose leaders affixed their signature to the Camp David Accords, the United States, Egypt and Israel, to renew, 10 years later, their commitment to the agreements and to peace.

## **2. The Arab Countries—From a State of War to a Process of Peace.**

The prime minister urged the United States and Egypt to call on the other Arab countries to desist from hostility towards Israel and to replace belligerency and boycott with negotiation and cooperation. Of all the Arab countries, only Egypt has recognized Israel and its right to exist. Many of these states actively participated in wars against Israel by direct involvement or indirect assistance. To this day, the Arab countries are partners in an economic boycott against Israel, refuse to recognize it and refuse to establish diplomatic relations with it.

The solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the building of confidence leading to a permanent settlement require a change in the attitude of the Arab countries towards Israel. Israel, therefore, calls on these states to put an end to this historic anomaly and to join direct bilateral negotiations aimed at normalization and peace.

## **3. A Solution to the Refugee Problem—An International Effort.**

The prime minister has called for an international effort, led by the United States, and with the significant participation of Israel, to solve the problem of the Arab refugees. The refugee problem has been perpetuated by the leaders of the Arab countries, while Israel with its meagre resources is absorbing hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab countries. Settling the refugees must not wait for a political process or come in its stead.

The matter must be viewed as a humanitarian problem and action must be taken to ease the human distress of the refugees and to ensure for their families appropriate living quarters and self respect.

Some 300,000 people live in refugee camps in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza District. In the 1970s, Israel unilaterally undertook the rehabilitation of residents of refugee camps in Gaza and erected 10 neighbourhoods in which 11,000 families reside. This operation was carried out in partnership with the residents despite PLO objections.

The time has now come to ensure appropriate infrastructure, living quarters and services for the rest of the residents of the camps who, at the same time, are victims of the conflict, hostages to it, and an element which perpetuates its continued existence.

Goodwill and an international effort to allocate the necessary resources will ensure a satisfactory solution to this humanitarian effort and will help improve the political climate in the region.

## **4. Free Elections in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza on the Road to Negotiations.**

In order to bring about a process of political negotiations and in order to locate legitimate representatives of the Palestinian population, the prime minister proposes that the free elections be held among the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza—elections that will be free of the intimidation and terror of the PLO.

These elections will permit the development of an authentic representation that is not self-appointed from the outside. This representation will be comprised of people who will be chosen by the population in free elections who will express, in advance, their willingness to take part in the following diplomatic process.

**The aim of the elections is to bring about the establishment of a delegation that will participate in negotiations on an interim settlement, in which a self-governing administration will be set up. The interim period will serve as an essential test of cooperation and coexistence. It will be followed by negotiations on the final settlement, in which Israel will be prepared to discuss any option which will be presented.**

The U.S. administration has expressed its support for the idea and following the prime minister's return, his proposals will be discussed here, and the various questions surrounding the holding of elections will be examined. Contacts necessary for the implementation of the proposals will be maintained.

### **Other Points Contained in Arens's Message:**

- Israel recognizes the fact that countries must take risks for peace, and it did so at Camp David. At the same time, Israel cannot be expected to take steps that would endanger its very existence. As is well known, our estimate is that the establishment of an additional state west of the Jordan will create a focus of instability which will endanger the peace, Israel, and the region as a whole.
- After a long freeze in the Middle East, the prime minister's initiative creates a new opportunity for moving the peace process forward. For movement towards peace, Israel needs partners, and it hopes that these will, indeed, be found.
- The involvement of Jordan in the diplomatic process is most important as it is Israel's neighbour, and—by virtue of its demographic and geographic characteristics—the connecting link between the Arab and the Palestinian aspects of the conflict.
- For your information, after the publication of the initiative, several Palestinian personalities said in private conversations that the proposals constitute a basis for progress. President Mubarak, too, did not

- initially reject the prime minister's proposals.
- During the prime minister's visit to Washington, it was learned that the Soviet Union is supplying attack aircraft to Libya and Syria, and the exchange of fire in Lebanon increased along with the Syrian involvement there. All these serve as a reminder of the wider context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- It should be noted that the main aspect of the conflict is the Arab threat to Israel and the refusal of Arab countries to recognize its existence. The quantities of weapons in the Middle East, the continued arming of Arab countries with sophisticated weapons, the recent Iraqi and Libyan use of chemical weapons on the battlefield and against civilians, the character of the regimes and their instability, fundamentalist extremism in the area—all of these serve as a daily reminder of the reality with which Israel must contend.

### **Muslim Leader Examines Islamic Gains in Local Elections**

44230074 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Mar 89 p 4

[Article by Avino'am Bar-Yosef]

[Text] Kafr Qasim, a modest, grille-framed store on the commercial route, the stronghold of Shaykh 'Abdallah, the leader of the Islamic movement in Israel. Here is where the movement's publication, AL-SIRAT, is edited. On the walls, the posters prepared for the local elections still flutter. On one of them, someone has written by hand, "2300 for Ibrahim 'Abdallah Sarsur, the movement candidate, against 1900 votes for the outgoing council chairman."

Taking into account the fact that these numbers were written down 2 weeks before the elections, it is impossible not to be very impressed with the accuracy of the prediction. Anyone well versed in what occurs in the Arab public in Israel might think that this was a matter of "mu'amlah," a transaction between clans. But not here in Kafr Qasim.

It is not that there were no prior agreements, but that according to the assurances given him in advance, the outgoing head of the local council, 'Abd-al-Rahim 'Isa, also was able to use the victory to win by a similar margin. The "betrayal," as he calls it, was in his own camp, his own family, his house.

Despite the sweeping victory of the Islamic movement in Umm al-Fahm, the movement carried on its real struggle in Kafr Qasim, the stronghold of Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish. In Umm al-Fahm, they say that the outgoing head of the council, Hashim Muhamid, stumbled so badly in his position that even "a Zionist candidate could have won."

Not so in Kafr Qasim. Council head 'Abd-al-Rahim 'Isa was successful in his position. He secured funds from the government and raised taxes, and the village has changed its appearance in the past years. In the center, there is a

pedestrian way unlike any in other Arab villages. The water system has been renovated and a sewer system installed. The schools would not shame many of the Jewish settlements.

This situation presented Shaykh 'Abdallah with a difficult challenge, especially as he had already turned his eyes towards the coming elections for the Knesset. It was possible that a defeat in his own backyard would damage his position as head of the movement, although the Islamic movement had placed at the top of their list a man whom the residents called a puppet opponent, someone who until then had been employed as a draftsman in the engineering department of the council.

In this struggle, all means were fair. Bans, "voodoo rites," and blessings placed on the ballot, that characterized the election war among the religious parties of Israel, serving as a source of inspiration. In Kafr Qasim, these methods failed.

Aside from the two-lane highway leading to the village, it is difficult at first glance to make out the changes passing over the settlement. On the central street, three young women dressed in Jilbar (traditional long dresses) and Hamar (a type of head scarf) direct us to the central mosque. It is afternoon, and many of the men are concentrated in the mosque although this is not a holy day. On Friday, the great mosque is so full that it can barely hold all the faithful.

Two boys dressed in jeans express dissatisfaction with the results. Eighteen years old, they have finished school and go around with nothing to do. "What is happening here since the results is that it is full of reporters and televisions from around the world," they say. "The shaykh's clique won. So what, we will bring them down, for good or bad. We want to live in the twentieth century. We want normal girls who do not cover their faces. We want beer to be sold here to anyone who wants to drink. We want progress and they are turning us back."

The two seat themselves on the patio of one of the cafes facing the pedestrian way and the mosque. There, inside, Shaykh 'Abdallah harbors no doubt that he is the true leader.

The charismatic shaykh, 41, is not dependent on the trappings of authority. Even in his modest store, he is surrounded by the devout who have not yet embraced the marks of religion. They understand by a glance of his eye whether he wants a book, a cigarette, or coffee.

On the metal table alongside the Koran are scattered the back pages of 'AL HAMISHMAR, a newspaper he diligently reads every morning. When he opens his mouth, absolute quiet descends. His speech and political pronouncements are both moderate.

"Palestinians have the right to a state next to Israel," the shaykh says. "We have seen enough blood. Dreams of all the land of Israel and of all of Palestine will meet only on the battlefield. We do not need to fight on the front of the Americans or the Russians.

"If I were on the negotiating team, I would not demand to eject a single Jew from his settlement. The Israeli leadership fears a people that wants peace. The Jews of Europe were sent to the gas chambers and here, not that I am making any comparison, the leadership of the two sides is casting us into chambers of fear."

He is a gifted preacher, they say.

In a private conversation in Hebrew, he still lectures. In his enunciation and the way he moves his lips, he brings to mind the deputy prime minister, David Levy.

He says that he was stung by the sharp words of the minister of the interior, Arye Der'i, and of Minister Ehud Olmert after the results in the Arab sector became known.

"What is this expression of yearning for RAKAH [New Communist List]? Are just these words meant to cast the movement outside the law? The situation in Umm al-Fahm embarrasses not just the Arab sector but Israel as well," the shaykh says.

On the Israeli side, there is growing concern over the rise of the fundamentalist Islamic movement in Israel under the leadership of Shaykh 'Abdallah. At the beginning of the 1980s, he was sentenced to 4 years in prison for his part in a hostile organization accused of arson in the south and for weapons possession.

Today, he does not hold back criticism of the Islamic extremists. "We have in this world secular people who have honored man, but not God. We have religious Muslims, Christians, and Jews who honor God, but not man. Truly religious people must honor both God and man."

During the conversations, he directs mildly critical comments towards Khomeyni and HAMAS (the Islamic Resistance Movement in the territories). But there are those in the village who relate that fundamentalist leaders from the West Bank and Gaza often come to consult him and to coordinate positions with him.

Concerning the Rushdie affair, he chooses to adopt the position of the official rabbinate. "It would be a stupid act to print the book in Israel. If they would come to me, I also would cancel the death sentence Khomeyni has issued against him. Instead of that, I would send Rushdie for observation and place him in a psychiatric hospital for many years."

What has formed the character of the Islamic leader?

It is clear that the massacre in Kafr Qasim had a traumatic effect on his personality. "Forty-nine innocent people were murdered in cold blood. Very cold. Like a freezer. To this day, I remember the curfew. How the soldiers went about in the street. I was a boy of 8. What happened struck fear in me. The soldiers fired from the north, the south, and the west. They did not fire from the east, because they wanted us to flee.

"That was the first tragedy. The second tragedy was what is called the 'sulhah' [reconciliation parley]. They called the heads of the families to an office. In a humiliating and repugnant way, they began to call out names and to pay compensation. That was the second murder, the murder of character!

"Therefore, when I grew up, I began to work in politics, to read newspapers, to listen to speeches by Rustum Bastoni of MAPAM [United Workers Party] and of Tawfiq Tubi and Shmu'el Mikonis of MAKI [Israeli Communist Party]. Today, I know enough to admire the peace camp in Israel that, despite its weakness these days, has spoken with the voice of justice."

After the Six Day War, Shaykh 'Abdallah, then a young man, went to study at the Islamic University in Nabulus. Slowly, but surely, he acquired his position in the religious world. He went to preach in the mosques of the Triangle. In Umm al-Fahm he had many admirers and some say that even on his many travels, he does not waste his time. While his driver takes him from village to village, he picks up hitchhikers who then hear him deliver a lesson from the Koran and on Palestinian nationalism.

The outgoing head of the council, 'Abd-al-Rahim 'Isa, is the opposite of the shaykh. Although 13 of his close relatives were killed in the massacre, he determined to work for truly close relations between Jews and Arabs. When he fell in love with a Jewish woman from Bat-Yam, he did not hesitate to marry her. She then converted to Islam, but kept her name, Yehudit. Today, his blond wife is accepted in society and his family.

In the villages, some have said that Yehudit 'Isa became one of the issues of the election campaign in which the successful head of the council was presented as a heretic. In conversations with women, the shaykh's followers promised the next world to anyone who would vote for them and, to the poor, annulment of debts and a sum of money. "The money flowed like water," they said.

No one clearly knows the source of the budgets of the Islamic movement. The estimation is that the Islamic movement in Israel, which served as a conduit for channeling money into Gaza in support of HAMAS, knew how to exploit its connections with Saudi Arabia to capture the municipalities.

The party particularly worried by the revolution in the Arab councils is the Christian community. The rule from the mosques concerns them. Dr 'Azzam Bisharah, a sociologist from Nazereth who works for the Communist Party, says that it is not necessary today to pay attention to the moderate words the Islamic movement is speaking. "That is a tactic. In the long term, they represent a serious threat. The councils are the first step towards competition for the Knesset."

For 'Abd-al-Rahim 'Isa, the beautiful pedestrian way that he built and the inner streets that he paved did not stand him in good stead. Against faith and religious preaching, it was difficult for him and his followers to compete.

Many in the Arab community fear that this is only the beginning and that, from the modest shop in Kafr Qasim, the spread of fundamentalism is starting and might bring about an explosion similar to that which was at the start, the intifadah [uprising] in the Gaza Strip.

**Arab Sector Benefits From Budget Allocations**  
44000457 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST  
in English 4 Apr 89 p 2

[Article by Marda Dunskey: "State Budget Gives Hefty Increase to Arab Sector"]

[Text] In a budget battle characterized by the slashing of allocations, the Arab sector emerged not only unscathed but with a NIS 43 million increase over last year's allocations, Alex Bligh, deputy adviser on Arab affairs to the prime minister, told THE JERUSALEM POST yesterday.

With fiscal crises plaguing various sectors ranging from Kupat Holim Kelalit to the kibbutzim, Bligh said the increase for the Arab sector represents "a major success under current circumstances."

He conceded, however, that the allocations would give rise to only a small improvement in conditions in the Arab sector: it would take increases four to six times that amount to bring about significant change.

The increase represents just over half the additional NIS 70m that Minister-without-Portfolio Ehud Olmert announced he would seek for the Arab sector in fiscal 1989 shortly after he became minister responsible for Arab affairs at the end of last year.

The NIS 70m figure included a special development budget of NIS 10m (at 1987 prices) for the upgrading of roads, sewage systems and water pipes as well the purchase of street cleaners and garbage trucks.

Bligh said the development funds were eliminated in the budgeting process, only to be restored in a compromise form at Olmert's insistence. In the end, the Treasury allocated NIS 10m to the Interior Ministry for the special budget, but it will be stretched over 1989 and 1990.

Bligh said Olmert's success in obtaining the increases was due to the fact that he, Finance Minister Shim'on Peres and Deputy Finance Minister Yosef Beilin "see eye-to-eye" on the importance of funding the Arab sector.

"We're not dealing here with a partisan problem, but a national problem," Bligh said. "If it gets too severe, every citizen of Israel will suffer, regardless of his political affiliation."

In a January interview, Olmert told THE JERUSALEM POST: "The situation is getting worse, and I'm afraid that without improving matters, too many young Israeli Arabs will say: 'We've got nothing to lose—so maybe we should do what our brothers and sisters are doing on the other side of the border.'"

In addition to the special development budget, the Interior Ministry was granted a NIS 9m increase to fund regular municipal budgets in the Arab sector, as well as a NIS 5m increase to improve sewage systems separate from the development budget.

Bligh said the Treasury also allotted increased for the minorities to the Housing Ministry in the amount of NIS 11m for improvements in the Druze, Circassian and Beduin communities; to the Education Ministry in the amount of NIS 10m for the construction of schools and additional classrooms and the funding of nursery schools and community centres; and an increase in the supplementary budget of the State Comptroller of NIS 3m to be applied to the Arab sector.

In addition, the Religious Affairs Ministry received a NIS 250,000 increase for the maintenance and preservation of churches and mosques.

Bligh added that "once the dust over the budget has settled," the Arab affairs bureau would begin to seek funds from the various ministries so that 20 to 25 Arab villages could be granted municipality status.

Each case, Bligh said, would cost NIS 2m, half for infrastructure costs and half for regular budgetary expenses.

**IDF Budget Debates Anticipated**  
44000465 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST  
in English 14 Apr 89 p 9

[Article by Kenneth Kaplan]

[Text] When officials from the IDF [Israel Defense Force], the Defence Ministry and the Treasury reopen the bitter debate over the defence budget next month,

more than just compensation of some NIS [New Israeli Shekels] 450m for intifadah expenses—the formal reason for convening the talks—will be on the line.

Among the other “essential projects” (to use Deputy Chief of General Staff Ehud Baraq’s wording) likely to be discussed will be the financing of such major procurement programmes as the purchase of Dolphin-class submarines from West Germany—now in doubt, though technically still planned—and McDonnell Douglas Apache attack helicopters from the United States.

One report this week said the Defence Ministry has decided to ask the Treasury for NIS 650m at the May meeting, while sources close to the Treasury believe the argument will ultimately be over some NIS 100m.

The General Staff’s recommendation that the submarine programme be postponed indefinitely shocked and angered senior commanders in the Navy. But more than that, it elicited harsh criticism of the IDF’s decision-making process.

How could it be, the critics asked, that a programme of the magnitude of the submarines (at least \$450m for the two) be dropped less than a year after it was approved, and that after nearly a decade-long delay of weighing proposals and counter-proposals?

Does the postponing of the Dolphin, coming shortly on the heels of the cancellation of the Lavi, mean the IDF is no longer capable of implementing a long-term programme to identify its needs and acquire the weapons systems to answer them?

Baraq, in a lengthy briefing to defence reporters last week in his bureau in Tel Aviv, angrily denied that contention, saying the IDF had no choice but to reassess its needs constantly, based on the changing threats and dwindling financial resources with which it is faced.

Reputed to be a leading opponent in the General Staff of the submarine project, Baraq said that among programmes more urgent than the acquisition of the submarines were expenditures on fire-control systems and night vision apparatus.

The crunch in the defence budget, Baraq said, has pitted vital programmes against one another, and it is one of the main responsibilities of the General Staff to make the difficult choice of which programme is more vital.

It is the General Staff’s assessment, he explained, that in the years during which the IDF would have to pay for the submarines, the budget would diminish to the point where mandatory payments for the vessels would block the pursuit of other essential programmes. Once the commitment is made, he said, there is no turning back, and the IDF’s hands would be tied.

The year 1988 brought into the public eye several new threats to Israel’s security: the end of the Iran-Iraq war, which resurrected fears of a united eastern front; the proliferation and use of the surface-to-surface missile capability in the Middle East and the growing danger of chemical warfare, and Saudi Arabia’s announced plans to purchase several billion dollars worth of sophisticated arms from Britain, including Panavia Tornado strategic bombers, which can attack Israel.

So far, 1989 has continued in the same vein, with the disclosure that Syria has returned to conducting offensive training maneuvers and is on the verge of acquiring more high-quality aircraft from the Soviet Union. And this week, there was a report that Libya has purchased a squadron of Su-24 strategic bombers from the Soviets.

Reports of the new threats swept the country just as the IDF put the finishing touches on its multi-year plan, a programme that was to maintain a minimum level of security in the short term, while preparing for the battlefield of the future.

Two versions of the plan were formulated: one based on a \$500m increase in the defence budget, the other on a freeze at the \$4b level. Neither version anticipated a cut in the budget, or the possibility that the IDF would not be reimbursed for the additional and unexpected expenses of fighting the Palestinian uprising.

In recent months, when asked if they felt Israel could keep pace with the increasing conventional and non-conventional military threat posed by the Arab world, senior commanders have been unanimous in pointing out that the answer lies with the Israeli public. It’s a simple matter of priorities, they say.

Last summer, when every two weeks brought news of another threat to Israel, the answer provided with numbing regularity was that the Israel Air Force [IAF] had an “answer.”

Among the new assignments: provide a strategic counterweight to the threat posed by long-range surface-to-surface missiles (improved-range Scud-Bs and accurate SS-21s); prevent the infiltration of Israeli air space by strategic bombers (Tornados and Su-24s), and defeat high-quality interceptors (Mig-29s). All this in addition to the normal functions of hitting enemy targets and providing close air support for advancing ground forces, which can only be carried out after the monumental task of achieving air-superiority and knocking out enemy missile-defences.

This is a tall order for an air force which has been forced to place some of its aircraft in storage. According to the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies [JCSS], the IAF has 682 combat aircraft, 90 of which (Kfirs and A-4 Skyhawks) are in storage. The JCSS lists 50 F-15s, 147 F-16s, 150 F-4s, 135 A-4s and 110 Kfirs in the IAF’s inventory.

On order are 60 more of the latest-model F-16s and 5 F-15s, ordered after the cancellation of the Lavi project, at a cost of some \$2b or four years' worth of planned outlays for the Lavi.

Air Force officers express confidence that the IAF will be able to achieve all its objectives, even in a worst-case scenario. Yet they also concede that the IAF will be spread somewhat thin. If the public is uncomfortable with that situation, some officers say, it will have to consider tightening its belt and spending more on defence.

What about tanks, which are still the decisive factor on the ground? Armoured forces are measured in the hundreds and thousands. Syria alone, for example, has 1,000 high-quality Soviet T-72s, another 1,000 T-62s and over 2,000 T-55s, for a total force of over 4,000 tanks.

Israel's tank fleet, according to the JCSS, includes some 600 Merkavas (Mark I and Mark II), 450 advanced and upgraded Pattons and another 2,700 or so assorted lesser-quality tanks (including Centurions and older Pattons).

The IDF has recently begun production of the Merkava Mark III, which is to be presented to the public on Independence Day. The IDF is calling it the best battle tank in the world, with improvements over earlier models including more firepower (a larger cannon which shoots 120mm rather than 105mm shells), a more powerful motor, stronger armour, and state-of-the-art fire-control systems. The price: nearly \$3m apiece.

The ghost of the Lavi fighter project continues to haunt the IDF. When the IDF urged the government to cancel the Lavi, it presented a list of development and procurement programmes which it said would be enabled by the cancellation of the fighter project. Cancel the Lavi, the IDF said, and it will compensate local defence industries by placing orders for other items.

This list became known as the "Lavi's replacements"—halufot halavi. Today it is considered almost a hostile act to raise the issue of halufot halavi with a senior officer, who no doubt expects the accusation that the IDF does not keep its promises.

The Israeli military industries which had a stake in the Lavi programme are unanimous in expressing their disappointment with the lack of Defence Ministry orders. Those firms which are succeeding do not forget to stress that their success is despite the lack of halufot halavi.

Lurking behind the debate on the leftovers from what Shimon Peres once called "Israel's space programme" is the persistent question: Is Israel causing irreparable damage to its military industrial base, and if so, who's to blame?

When confronted by this question, the IDF quickly brings up the issue of cuts in the military budget and, lately, the lack of compensation for the cost of the intifadah.

Said Baraq: "In 1989 there were cuts in the budget. In addition, the intifadah is not covered. We therefore have no alternative but to distribute the deficit as evenly as possible over all the IDF's activities: to reduce training slightly, worsen conditions of service a little, slightly reduce our stockpiles, halt the building up of the IDF's order of battle and slow the rate of placing orders for halufot halavi."

Baraq also hastens to cite figures showing a steady drop over the last decade in the defence budget's portion of the overall state budget.

"A slight increase in the amount spent on defence as a proportion of the GNP [gross national product] would help the IDF solve many of its problems," he said.

In the never-ending fight over limited public funds, the military is fighting a rearguard battle.

Individuals at the highest levels of the defence establishment had assumed that after so much had been said about the threats facing Israel, their request for a budget increase would be favourably received. Disappointment over the Treasury's eventual cuts was widespread (see story below).

Has the defence establishment erred by not putting its case forward strongly enough? Did Rabin commit a tactical error by waiting (several months) to present the IDF's multi-year plan to the cabinet until after the new government had decided on the state budget? (He rejected the contention out of hand when once asked.)

Senior sources in the IDF say the army is doing all it can to present its case. In a recent appearance by the IDF's top brass in a hearing of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, the committee members were convinced of the need to increase the defence budget, the sources said.

In his briefing to defence reporters last week, Deputy CGS [Chief of the General Staff] Baraq, while maintaining that war was unlikely in the near future, said it was the IDF's assessment that Syria "has not deviated from its essential policy, which seeks a resolution of the dispute in the Middle East through the use of force or by imposing its will from a position of strength."

Similar remarks warning of Syria's growing strength and apparent intentions are made periodically by top officers in the IDF. Do these statements register in the minds of a public constantly barraged with a multitude of other crises, in the fields of diplomacy, health, education, and the national economy itself?

Senior IDF officers point out that military organizations are not cost-effective on a day-to-day basis. They are only tested—one hopes—infrequently, if at all. That is why, the officers say, when there is a long lull between wars, the voices calling for a less expensive, defence-oriented military doctrine become louder. The phenomenon, they say, is not limited to Israel.

“The defensive military doctrine slogan is like a narcotic, because it’s always cheaper [to maintain a defensive posture], and politicians are looking for this,” one veteran commander explained to THE JERUSALEM POST recently. “The real test, however, is in war,” he added.

Chief of General Staff Dan Shomron supported that point in a defence of the IDF’s offensive military doctrine during his recent address at the Jaffee Centre. Shomron pointed out that it was Israel’s numerical inferiority vis-a-vis the Arab armies which necessitates a quick victory and hence, an offensive doctrine. Israel lacks the resources, he said, for a long, drawn-out and defensive campaign.

In the long run, so the argument goes, it is cheaper to win an offensive war than a defensive one.

Despite the attention given the accelerated introduction of surface-to-surface missiles in the Middle East over the past year, the main components of an offensive capability are still the battle tank on the ground and the jet fighter in the air.

While comparing force sizes does not necessarily give a complete picture of the balance of power, in times of crisis it is the number of tanks and aircraft they have at their disposal which gives decision-makers room to manoeuvre.

“Just think if there hadn’t been enough planes in ’67,” one commander said. “Amidst the fog of current events, we should still see that, 20 years down the road, we will need a military capability. That is, to win a major war with an offensive capability.”

#### **Palestinian Economist Analyzes Situation in Territories**

44000466 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST  
in English 29 Mar 89 p 7

[Article by Hisham Awartani, professor of economics at An-Najah University, Nablus, and president, Economic Development Group, an East Jerusalem think-tank development institution]

[Text] The economic collapse in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in recent months has attracted unusual attention in the Israeli and international news media and, for various reasons, has caused mounting concern to many on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The stories in the Israeli media seem to imply that the economic crash in both territories is only a recent phenomenon, and that it is more or less self-inflicted by the Palestinians as the cost of their intifadah. Very few Israelis—there are some—have raised questions about whether Israeli economic practices in the occupied territories may have contributed to the pressure that led to the intifadah.

Furthermore, there does not seem to be any realistic insight into the long-term consequences of the present suffering in the cause of peace, which, at least in theory, is a highly cherished priority on the agenda of all sides.

It is important to point out, up front, that the roots of economic deterioration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip go back long before the outbreak of the intifadah. That may sound like a surprise to most casual observers who have been bombarded for many years with tales of spectacular growth in the economy of the two territories and in the living standards of their residents.

It is true, as a matter of fact, that for nearly two decades the West Bank and Gaza Strip witnessed a pronounced rise in growth rates and living standards. But one does not have to be a professional economist to suspect that such achievements might have been underlain by transformations of a profoundly adverse nature.

The economy of the territories, for instance, was subordinated to that of Israel in a model of dependency that is much worse than typical models commonly reviewed in economic literature. This subordination permitted the emergence of excessive consumerism, a development viewed by many Palestinian activists with great concern, not only because it reflects unfounded affluence but also because it aggravates the vulnerability of the Palestinian society to political pressures.

Superficial affluence during the 1970s concealed serious transformations in the local productive base, of which the following are some disturbing examples:

- Agriculture has lost much of its relative weight in the national economy. Its share in gross domestic product (GDP) dropped by more than one third and its share in the labour force declined by nearly 50 percent. Not surprisingly, rural areas have become a reservoir of cheap labour, tapped gainfully by Israeli firms. The area under active cultivation (including natural pasture) has decreased by 21 percent.
- Industry has fared no better. Its share of the GDP remained at its pre-occupation level of about 8-10 percent, and it employed around 16 percent of the labour force. Growth in industry is confined largely to industrial branches that have flourished as a result of peripheral subordination to Israeli industrial firms.

Because of retarded growth in the local economic base, migration of workers to neighbouring labour markets, mainly in Israel, has become the panacea for economic

survival. Remittances from emigrant labourers constitute the backbone of the national economy, so much so that their GDP share exceeded (in some years) that of agriculture and industry combined.

Unemployment among the Palestinian elite has become a national hazard. A study conducted in 1985 revealed that only 15 percent of the annual crop of graduates succeeded in finding stable employment locally. The rest either remained redundant or sought employment in Israel.

It is true that achieving genuine economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is obstructed by numerous deep-rooted constraints—such as scarcity of resources and the small size of local markets. But many of the distortions that characterized the Palestinian economy over the past 22 years came about as a direct result of the occupation authorities' premeditated policies.

You do not have to subscribe to a grand conspiracy theory to conclude that Israeli economic policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were laid down after Israeli interests were carefully weighted against those of the local Palestinians. Reading through the records, Israeli interests pursued through economic means can be identified as follows:

- Expediting emigration to the furthest limit.
- Gaining control over the maximum of land and water resources.
- Maintaining the occupied territories as a captive market for the ailing Israeli economy.
- Drawing surplus cheap Palestinian labour into the Israeli labour market.
- Using economic decisions to enforce a carrot-and-stick policy.
- Undermining independent economic development to pre-empt the viability of a future Palestinian state.

Achieving these objectives was entrusted to the Civil Administration in the West Bank and Gaza, which is staffed with Israelis, most of them recruited from corresponding departments in Israel. Each department in the Civil Administration headquarters is headed by an officer invested with the duties and legal status of a minister.

Planning in all development-related departments has been routinely "coordinated" with corresponding Israeli institutions. And if anyone is in doubt about whose interests underlie the planning process, the answer is provided by Mr Rabin's vow that "there will be no development in the territories initiated by the Israeli government, and no permits given for expanding agriculture or industry that may compete with the State of Israel."

Exploitative planning for 22 years has undoubtedly drawn its heavy toll, as evidenced by the track record of Israeli planners in the West Bank and Gaza Strip:

- Employment potential in both territories has declined

so sharply that emigration absorbs about two thirds of the natural population growth (about 15,000 annually).

- Well over 50 percent of all West Bank land area is under Israeli control.
- Under the hypocritical premise that water resources in the West Bank should be shared "fairly" by both legitimate owners, Palestinians and Israelis, the latter exploit about 70 percent of the West Bank's usable reserves, and the Palestinians are left with only 30 percent.
- By restructuring bilateral trade so that Israeli produce is permitted free access to the markets of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as compared to the selective flow of goods in the opposite direction, Israel managed in 1987 to achieve a surplus of \$802 million vis-a-vis both territories, including East Jerusalem.

Israeli policies bearing on the West Bank and Gaza Strip economies have taken a sharp turn because of the intifadah. Following the failure of military measures to quell the Palestinian uprising, the Israeli authorities seem to have decided to mobilize all available means for the explicit objective of maximizing the suffering of the Palestinian residents. They apparently hope that at some point the Palestinians will realize that the cost of the intifadah outweighs its anticipated gains.

To that end, the lives of Palestinian residents have been linked in countless ways to the district officer of the Israeli Civil Administration. Every adult resident has to make the pilgrimage to those offices every time he seeks to conduct the bits and pieces of his normal life. Needless to emphasize, every signature he is asked to collect on his papers—and there are many—costs him time, humiliation, and sometimes exorbitant fees.

To complement other restrictive measures, the Israeli authorities decided to tighten the economic belts. This they managed to achieve swiftly by imposing draconian sanctions such as the following:

- Tax rates and collection harassments were escalated to the point where many firms chose to quit or scale down their operations to a minimum.
- Export permits to Jordan and Israel were denied for such major items as melons, vegetables, grapes and building stones.
- Regulations concerning the transfer of funds have been severely tightened, basically forbidding the entry of more than 200 Jordanian dinars (about New Israeli Shekels 600) per incoming traveller or bank transaction. This arbitrary restriction has greatly undermined economic activity, and has also made life very difficult for the great number of families who, in effect, subsist on remittances they receive from relatives.
- Long curfews and sieges have entailed far-reaching consequences for all economic sectors, especially agriculture. A recent study involving a sample of eight villages put the cumulative loss inflicted as a consequence of punitive measures during the first 10 months of the intifadah at \$6.5m.

- For unclear reasons, all car owners were required to change the plates of their cars, paying in the meantime an additional fee (nicknamed "Intifadah Tax") amounting to New Israeli Shekels 200-500 per car. With more than 62,000 vehicles in the West Bank and 25,000 in the Gaza Strip, the amount of shekels required for this purpose was certainly an important reason for the predicament of the Jordanian dinar.
- Punitive fines are imposed on parents for offences committed by their minors. The naive intent is to enlist all members in the family in the effort to help restrain their "stray" son.

The list of economic pressures is too long and too subtle to be fully exposed here. Nonetheless, one should admit that if those measures were devised to make the life of Palestinians as difficult as possible, their authors can congratulate themselves for a job well done.

Yes, the amount of suffering inflicted on Palestinians in the territories has reached alarming levels, with no remembered parallel in recent history. But if the architects of that suffering expect that they can thus quell the intifadah or serve the cause of peace—as they evidently do—they are grossly mistaken.

History is loaded with examples of the failure of economic sanctions in efforts to twist the arms of governments or dampen the will of people to fight for their freedom. Far from some Israelis' expectations, inflicting more suffering on the Palestinians will only aggravate bitterness and widen the rift between mainstream camps on both sides.

It is ironic and certainly tragic to see that the architects of Israeli policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip seem to fail to understand, or probably refuse to believe, that what Palestinians are fighting for is simply to restore their rights, as those rights are most modestly defined.

In their struggle for their rights, the Palestinians have forged a great amount of determination and settled to such a relaxed posture that they are able to stretch their tolerance and patience far beyond ordinary limits. So, instead of causing more agony and bitterness, as if not enough has been generated, the Israeli authorities have to realize that coercion and economic sanctions will solve no problem.

They should understand, once and for all, that the cornerstone for attaining peace and gaining recognition in this part of the world lies in resolving their conflict with the Palestinian people. Irrespective of tactical political maneuvers or occasional resort to military might, peace with the Palestinians can be achieved only on the basis of justice and mutual respect.

In the area of economics, justice means a lot. First and foremost, it means that the Israeli authorities should perform the moral act of surrendering authority over the economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to its legitimate owners. The whole world, and most Israelis, find it difficult to understand how Israel goes on abusing and exploiting the economy of another nation with which it supposedly aspires to live in peace.

## INDIA

### Gandhi Makes Changes in Congress-I Leadership

#### AICC-I Secretaries

46001381 Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
7 Mar 89 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, March 6—As uncertainty hung for the second day running over the fate of the resignations of the Bihar Chief Minister and the seven members of the Union Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister and Congress(I) president, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, revamped the party set-up, appointing a new general secretary and reorganising the charges of the others. This team of general secretaries, it was officially declared, would "continue until the general elections."

Elevating the AICC(I) [All India Congress Committee-I] joint secretary, Mr. A. R. Mallu, to the post of general secretary in Mr. Jagannath Pahadia's stead, Mr. Gandhi has also made significant changes in the portfolios of the other incumbents, with an eye on the general elections.

#### Crucial Change

The most notable change was making Mr. V. N. Gadgil, general secretary, in charge of the party's new think-tank on policies and programmes, spokesman for the party, in place of Mr. Ghulam Nabi Azad. Mr. Gadgil has also been put in charge of AICC(I) sessions, CWC [Ceylon Workers Congress] and parliamentary board affairs. He still holds the portfolio for policies and programmes. It is evident that Mr. Gadgil has been given a crucial role in the run-up to the elections, indicating an endorsement of the line that he and some of his colleagues have been taking within the party, arguing for a reinforcing of the party's socialist credentials. It was Mr. Gadgil who was the architect of the AICC(I) resolution, now incorporated in the Union Budget.

Mr. Ghulam Nabi Azad retains charge of the party's affairs in the critical State of Uttar Pradesh and in Punjab, while he has been allotted Haryana, Orissa, Himachal Pradesh and the Union Territories of Chandigarh and Delhi. Mr. Oscar Fernandes continues to hold charge of the party's front organisations, while he takes over the AICC(I) administration and all the party cells. The southern States have been placed in the charge of Mr. K. N. Singh, along with Jammu and Kashmir, the Andamans, Nicobar and Lakshadweep.

The other States, critical to the party's fortunes in the general elections, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Gujarat have been placed in the charge of Mrs. Sheila Kaul, who will also look after party affairs in Goa and the Union Territories in its vicinity. Bihar party affairs, the danger zone, highest on the party's list has been taken away from Mr. Oscar Fernandes and placed in the charge of the new general secretary, Mr. A. R. Mallu who is to look after the North-Eastern States also.

### Bihar Dominates

The AICC(I) reorganisation notwithstanding, it was Bihar that dominated the political agenda here with the Prime Minister holding a series of consultations with ministerial and party colleagues all day long. The indications are that the exercise of restructuring is likely to be an inter-connected one, involving both a decision on the leadership in Bihar and some changes in the Union Council of Ministers, given the dimension imparted to it by the resignations of the seven members of the Union Council of Ministers.

But complicating the task of an easy resolution were the factors relating to the party's overall political context. Although the en masse resignations had been designed to take the Bihar imbroglio out of the "either-or" situation and to free it from the implications of similar responses to the other flashpoints, Rajasthan and Gujarat, it was evident that the high command's response to the entire issue was being watched closely by the other State units and by the parliamentary party. The need to take into account these factors was evidently delaying the formulation of a response to the Bihar-related developments.

#### Uncertain of Implications

Interestingly, the members of the ruling party appear to be uncertain as to the meaning of the en masse resignations. There has been no welcoming statement or expression of appreciation from the parliamentary party members on these resignations, in visible contrast to the customary knee-jerk reactions of Congress(I) MPs.

Political speculation on the new leader for Bihar centred on two names, that of the former Chief Minister, Dr. Jagannath Mishra and of the Governor of Assam, Mr. Bhishma Narain Singh. The scales were reportedly tipped heavily in Dr. Mishra's favour as it was being argued that he would be best suited to lead the party in an electoral context. The completion of the restructuring exercise and the announcement of the changes would take another day or two, party sources said here.

#### New Coordination Committees

46001381 Calcutta *THE TELEGRAPH* in English  
9 Mar 89 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, March 8—The AICC(I) today announced appointment of coordination committees in all the 25 states to ensure a better rapport between the organisational and the ministerial wing of the party.

Making his maiden announcement as the newly-appointed general secretary of the AICC, Mr A. R. Mallu, said that each committee in the states would comprise a senior and a junior Union minister, chief minister wherever the Congress is in power, an AICC representative and the chief of the Pradesh Congress(I) Committee [PCC]. In non-Congress(I) ruled states, in place of the

chief minister, the leader of the Congress Legislature Party [CLP] will be a member. The number of members will range between four to six.

In larger states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, there will be three central ministers on the committee, whose purpose is also to monitor the implementation of development programmes and the AICC's economic policy resolutions, especially those on the poverty alleviation programmes.

The senior central minister will be chairman of the coordination committee while the AICC representative its convenor. There will also be other members besides the chief minister or CLP leader and PCC chief. In West Bengal, the committee will have the external affairs minister, Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao as chairman, and Mr Mallu the AICC representative as convenor, Mr Kalpnath Rai, Union minister of state for power, will be the fifth member. The committee for Bihar will include Mr Bhajan Lal, chairman, Mr Mallu, Mr Bhagwat Jha Azad, PCC chief Mr Tariq Anwar, Mrs R. K. Bajpai, and Mr Giridhar Gomongo.

The following is the list of the committees for other States:

Andhra Pradesh: Mr H. K. L. Bhagat, chairman, Mr K. N. Singh, convenor, CLP leader Mr Baga Reddy, member, PCC president Mr Janardhana Reddy, member, Mr Ajit Panja, member.

Arunachal Pradesh: Mr Santosh Mohan Dev, chairman, Mr A. R. Mallu, convenor, chief minister Mr Gagon Apang, member, PCC chief Mrs Omem Deori, member, Mr P. Namgyal, member.

Assam: Mr P. Shiv Shanker, chairman, Mr A. R. Mallu, convenor, CLP leader Mr Golok Rajbonshi, member, PCC chief Mr. Tarun Gogoi, member, Mr C. K. Jaffer Sharief, member.

Goa: Mr Sukh Ram, chairman, Mrs Sheila Kaul, convenor, chief minister, Pratap Singh Rane, member, PCC chief Mrs Sulochana Katkar, member, Mr Hari Krishna Shastri, member.

Gujarat: Mr M. L. Fotedar, chairman, Mrs Sheila Kaul, convenor, chief minister Mr Amarsinh Choudhary, member, PCC chief Mr Prabodh Rawal, member, Mr C. Panigrahi, member.

Haryana: Mr Brahm Dutt, chairman, Mr Gulam Nabi Azad, convenor, PCC chief Mr S. S. Surjewala, member, Mr Dalbir Singh, member.

Himachal Pradesh: Mr Madhavrao Scindia, chairman, Mr G. N. Azad, convenor, chief minister Mr Vir Bhadra Singh, member, PCC chief Mr K. D. Sultanpuri, member, Mr Shyamlal Yadav, members.

Jammu and Kashmir: Mr Buta Singh, chairman, Mr K. N. Singh, convenor, CLP leader Mr Mangat Ram Sharma, member, PCC chief Mr G. R. Kar, member, Mr Rafiq Alam, member.

Karnataka: Mrs Mohsina Kidwai, chairman, Mr K. N. Singh, convenor, CLP leader Mrs K. S. Nagarathnamma, member, PCC chief Mr Veerendra Patil, member, Mr M. Arunachalam, member.

Kerala: Mr J. Vengala Rao, chairman, Mr K. N. Singh, convenor, CLP leader Mr K. Karunakaran, member, PCC chief Mr A. K. Antony, member, Mr Shivraj Patil, member.

Madhya Pradesh: Mr Vasant Sathe, chairman, Mrs Sheila Kaul, convenor, chief minister, Mr Motilal Vora, member, PCC chief Mr C. L. Chandrakar, member, Mr Janardhan Poojari.

Maharashtra: Mr B. Shankaranand, chairman, Mrs Sheila Kaul, convenor, chief minister, Mr Sharad Pawar, member, PCC chief Mrs Pratibha Devisingh Patil, Mr Z. R. Ansari, member.

Manipur: Mr Biren Singh Engti, chairman, Mr A. R. Mallu, convenor, chief minister, Mr R. K. Jaichandra Singh, member, PCC chief Mr R. K. Dorendra Singh, member, Mr Santosh Mohan Dev, member.

Meghalaya: Mrs Margaret Alva, chairman, Mr A. R. Mallu, convenor, chief minister Mr P. A. Sangma, member, PCC chief Capt. W. A. Sangma, member, Mr Santosh Mohan Dev, member.

Mizoram: Mr Eduardo Faleiro, chairman, Mr A. R. Mallu, convenor, chief minister and PCC chief Mr Lalthanhawla, member, Mr Santosh Mohan Dev, member.

Nagaland: Mr M. M. Jacob, chairman, Mr A. R. Mallu, convenor, chief minister Mr S. C. Jamir, member, PCC chief Mr R. C. Chittan Jamir, member, Mr Santosh Mohan Dev, member.

Orissa: Mr Madhavsingh Solanki, chairman, Mr G. N. Azad, convenor, chief minister Mr J. B. Patnaik, member, PCC chief Mr K. C. Lenka, member, Ms Saroj Khaparade, member.

Punjab: Mr K. C. Pant, chairman, Mr G. N. Azad, convenor, PCC chief Mr Beant Singh, member, Mr K. K. Tewari, member.

Rajasthan: Mr Bir Bahadur Singh, chairman, Mrs Sheila Kaul, convenor, chief minister Mr S. C. Mathur, member, PCC chief Mr Ashok Gehlot, member, Mr L. P. Sahi, member.

Sikkim: Mr K. Natwar Singh, chairman, Mr A. R. Mallu, convenor, PCC chief (vacant) Mr R. Prabhu, member.

Tamil Nadu: Mr Dinesh Singh, chairman, Mr K. N. Singh, convenor, CLP leader and PCC chief Mr G. K. Moopanar, member, Mr K. R. Narayanan, member.

Tripura: Mr Jagdish Tytler, chairman, Mr A. R. Mallu, convenor, chief minister and PCC chief, Mr S. R. Majumder, member, Ms Sumati Oraon, member.

Uttar Pradesh: Mr S. B. Chavan, chairman, Mr G. N. Azad, convenor, chief minister Mr N. D. Tiwari, member, PCC chief Mr Balram Singh Yadav, member, Mr Ram Niwas Mirdha, member, Mr H. R. Bhardwaj, member.

### **Decisions of BJP National Executive Meeting Discussed**

46001399 Madras *THE HINDU in English*  
4 Mar 89 p 9

[Text] Udaipur, March 3—The BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] has ruled out any possibility of agreeing to a common manifesto with other Opposition parties in the next elections. Talking to newsmen after the inaugural session of the three-day national executive meeting of the party here on Friday, Mr. S. S. Bhandari, its national vice-president, said the BJP would face the electorate with its own manifesto and symbol. However, he said seat adjustments could be made with likeminded parties at State level.

Mr. Bhandari said the inaugural session discussed reports from two States—Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh [U.P.]—and found the situation prevailing there conducive for the party. The Maharashtra report, presented by Mr. Pramod Mahajan, M.P. and secretary of the State unit, observed that the joining of Mr. Sharad Pawar in the Congress(I) had proved beneficial for the Shiv Sena. Mr. Pawar had lost his image after his changeover and Mr. Bal Thackeray had emerged as an alternative to him, the report said.

The BJP was getting ready to contest from 225 out of the 288 Assembly seats and 35 out of the 48 Lok Sabha seats in Maharashtra, Mr. Bhandari said. He said the Shiv Sena had already indicated that it was not keen on contesting the Lok Sabha elections and that it was for the BJP to chalk out a programme. The party would be interested in making seat adjustments with the Janata Dal and likeminded parties like the PWP [Peasants Workers Party], if possible. However, Mr. Bhandari hastened to add that the recent statement by Mrs. Mrinal Gore, the Janata Dal president of Maharashtra, on the party's association with the Shiv Sena was a dampener.

Mr. Bhandari said, based on the report of Mr. Kalyan Singh, president of the U.P. unit, the party was readying itself to contest 50 out of the 85 Lok Sabha seats from the State. While 35 constituencies were BJP strongholds an understanding could be reached in the rest, he added. He expressed happiness over the performance of the BJP in the recent civic and zilla parishad polls in U.P.

### **"Party Growing Strong"**

Delivering the inaugural address, Mr. L. K. Advani, president of the BJP, observed that keeping away from the "wrangles" made in the name of Opposition unity had brought credibility to the party and a positive support from the people. The results of the recent civic elections in U.P. and the by-election in Maharashtra were an indication that the party was emerging strong, he said.

Mr. Advani also used the occasion to severely criticise leftist parties and their leaders, especially Mr. E. M. S. Namboodiripad (CPI-M), for their lenient attitude towards the Congress(I). He also said the recent outbursts of the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, against the Opposition only indicated that he was losing confidence after the elections in Tamil Nadu.

### **SGPC Secretary Removed for 'Misusing Power'**

46001387 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN in English*  
18 Mar 89 p 1

[Text] Chandigarh, March 17—In a dramatic development, Mr Manjit Singh Calcutta, the powerful secretary of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee [SGPC], was removed today from the coveted post by the executive of the Sikh body. A decision to remove Mr Calcutta as the SGPC secretary was taken at an emergency meeting of the SGPC executive here today. The meeting was presided over by Mr Harinder Singh Tarn Tarni, the acting SGPC president, and was attended by nine of the 12 members.

Mr Harinder Singh told reporters after the two-hour meeting that the SGPC executive decided to remove Mr Calcutta from the post on charges of misusing power. The SGPC acting president, however, did not elaborate the charges against Mr Calcutta, who was appointed SGPC secretary after the brutal assassination of Mr Bhan Singh, his predecessor at Ludhiana by terrorists last year. Mr Calcutta is also the general secretary of the Talwandi faction of the Unified Akali Dal.

Mr K. S. Bhatia, one of the assistant secretaries of the SGPC has been appointed acting secretary of the SGPC.

The SGPC executive today also placed under suspension three senior officials of the SGPC—Mr Ranjit Singh, manager of the Golden Temple, Mr Dayal Singh, the joint secretary of the SGPC and Mr Raj Singh, the additional manager of the Golden Temple, on the basis of the findings of an inquiry committee which had recently submitted its report regarding the mismanagement and alleged misappropriation of funds of the Sikh body.

### **Punjab Budget**

PTI adds from New Delhi: The Government today presented in the Lok Sabha a balanced budget for Punjab for 1989-90, leaving the carried forward deficit of Rs 76.84 crores of the previous year unchanged.

The budget, presented by the Minister of State for Finance, Mr B. K. Gadhvi, placed the receipts on the capital account at Rs 1,896.04 crores and expenditure, including loans and advances, at Rs 1,891.74 crores.

A special Central assistance of Rs 560 crores to the State highlights the budget.

UNI adds: The Punjab Government today decided to release 12 more Jodhpur detainees following the recommendations of the high-power committee appointed by Mr S. S. Ray to look into their cases. The committee, headed by Mr J. F. Ribeiro, held its meeting on March 15 and reviewed the cases of the remaining detainees who are still under judicial remand at Jalandhar Jail.

Terrorists gunned down 14 persons, including two Home Guards, and seriously injured four others, including three members of a family, in separate incidents in Amritsar district since last night.

The police said a six-member gang of the "Khalistan Commando Force [KCF]" struck in the Bikhiwind area and kidnapped two Home Guards—Baldev Singh (35) and Mukhtiar Singh (32)—from their homes in Bhani Gurmukh Singh village. The terrorists later shot them dead outside the village.

A "KCF" note found at the site of the crime said both victims had been warned against obtaining jobs in the Home Guard.

## IRAN

### Non-Oil Export Statistics Announced 46400070a Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 27 Feb 89 p 4

[Text] Rugs and pistachios comprised more than 50 percent of the total export of the country.

Economic Service: The statistics for non-oil export for the first 10 months of 1367 [21 Mar 1988 - 20 Mar 1989] was announced by the Customs Department of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

According to these statistics during the first 10 months of the current year 988,000 tons of goods with a total value of 53.306 billion rials [equivalent to 772 million dollars] were exported. Rugs, pistachios and shelled pistachios occupy the top of the list of export goods.

Total export of rugs during the 10 months in question approached 6000 tons with an equivalent value of 17 billion rials [32 percent of total export]. Likewise, a total of 42,700 tons of pistachios and shelled pistachios with an equivalent value of 10.315 billion rials [19.35 percent of the total export] were exported.

Export of copper ingots [cathode and anode bars] reached 19,900 tons with an equivalent value of 3.921 billion rials which comprised 7.35 percent of the total value of the exports. This figure in comparison with that of the similar period of a year ago shows 356 percent increase. Here it should be noted that 9,500 tons of this product was exported during the month of Dec [22 Dec - 20 Jan] alone.

Furthermore, during the first 10 months of the current year about 9000 tons of hides with an equivalent value of 3.6 billion rials, 759 tons of animal intestines with an equivalent value of 1.7 billion rials, 184,000 tons of fresh fruits and vegetables with an equivalent value of 1.5 billion rials, 69,000 tons of dried fruits with an equivalent value of 11.7 billion rials, 1,043 tons of marine products with an equivalent value of 2.8 billion rials and 220,000 tons of sulphur with an equivalent value of 1.6 billion rials were among the most important export items during the period in question. Moreover, it should be noted that the total amount of non-oil export of the country during the first 10 months of last year reached 1,024,000 tons with an equivalent value of 64.774 billion rials [about 912 million dollars] which were 11 billion rials more than that for the first 10 months of the current years.

### Official Details Extent of War Damage to Heavy Industries

46400070b Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
28 Feb 89 p 4

[Text] Tehran—IRNA: The damage sustained by the units under the Ministry of Heavy Industries during the continuation of the imposed war is estimated to be 27 billion rials.

Gholamreza Sabet, official in charge of the Reconstruction Staff of the Ministry of Heavy Industries and the Organization for Expansion and Renovation of Iranian Industries, yesterday in an interview with the IRNA while announcing the aforementioned statement also added: Of the damages caused by the Zionist enemy to the government division alone, 52 million dollars were sustained by foreign exchange.

He went on to add that the reconstruction policy of the heavy industries are based on the principle of rendering the damaged units operational as soon as possible. This policy has been carried out except in one unit.

With regard to the extent of the reconstruction work of the damaged units, he stated: Until now 42 percent of the reconstruction operation has been carried out; however, securing of foreign exchange for some of the key units have been faced with certain problems.

He further pointed out the cooperation between his staff and other ministries and organizations whose industrial units have sustained damages during the imposed war and said: The Reconstruction Staff of the Ministry of Heavy Industries and the Organization for the Expansion and

Renovation of Iranian Industries have assisted various other units of the Ministry of Industry and the Ministries of Oil and Energy in their reconstruction efforts.

Sabet stated: If the total amount of the required credit is secured, the matter of reconstruction of industrial units will become one hundred percent possible and that this will also be accompanied with some foreign exchange savings. Furthermore, the reconstruction of the industrial units will also induce the possibility for the employment of new manpower.

## PAKISTAN

**Jamaat-e Islami Chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad  
Interviewed**

46560025a Lahore SIYASI LOG in Urdu 21 Feb 89 p 4

[Interview by Abdul Karim Abid]

[Text] Q. Ever since the Pakistan People's Party [PPP] has come into power, it has embarked on a path of conflicts and confrontation. Is this a sentimental behavior or a premeditated action?

A. The People's Party has a psychological problem in that it is running in hot pursuit of complete and absolute power. Mr Bhutto enjoyed unlimited power but he was never satisfied and always wanted more. His constant quest for power proved costly for him, and he lost all the power he had and eventually met his fatal end. The leadership of the People's Party and Benazir have not learned any lessons from the fate of Bhutto. She, too, wants to gain power through undemocratic means, as a result of which she has chosen the path of confrontation. But this quest for power and conflict will not be in the best interest of People's Party.

Q. Does the People's Party have any secret plans about defense and foreign affairs?

A. I believe that the People's Party considers a strong army an obstacle to complete and absolute power. It wants to weaken the army by joining hands with India and accepting its domination. The underlying aim of holding peace talks and coming to an understanding with India is to find a reason for reducing and weakening the armed forces and saying that Pakistan does not need such a huge army.

Q. Can Pakistan and India come to an understanding?

A. India does not want to come to an understanding. It wants Pakistan to accept its domination. It has always wanted to be Pakistan's guardian. But, for Pakistan to accept Indian domination would amount to ending our very existence. During the recent SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] conference Prime Minister Benazir made it clear that she was prepared to accept Indian domination and make Pakistan a vassal state of India. The cultural agreement signed with India

also means the same thing - that we lose our Islamic identity. The new trend in the foreign policy is that our government is willing to accept Indian domination, and that in the name of SAARC and at the beck and call of the Hindus and Jews, we are prepared to increase our relations with the nonbelievers rather than the Muslim countries in the Middle East. India has stated its position clearly and in unambiguous terms that it is the headman of this region and everyone will have to accept its authority. According to India, the Kashmir issue has been settled because elections have been held in that state four times and, through these elections, the people have expressed their opinion. Now, there is no need to hold a referendum there. India also claims ownership over Pakistan's territory of Azad Kashmir. It insists that Pakistan has no right to maintain a big army and develop its atomic program. According to India, its army is sufficient to protect Pakistan and, for this reason, it mounts a protest whenever Pakistan receives weapons. It considers these weapons a threat to its security. Accepting the Indian position would mean an end to Pakistan's independence and autonomy because Pakistan will merely become a vassal state of India.

Q. Why is People's Party so adamant about abolishing the Eighth amendment?

A. First, because People's Party wants to possess absolute power and do whatever it wants. In other words they want to restore the 1973 constitution exactly in the form that Mr Bhutto left it. According to the 1973 constitution, the prime minister has unlimited powers, and the president is stripped of all his authority. This is the reason that the 1973 constitution will not be successful. No one wants president Ghulam Ishaq to become Chaudhry Fazal Elahie or the People's Party prime minister to regain the power and authority it had during Bhutto's regime. These powers were abused by Mr Bhutto who set a very bad example. Within two months after coming into power, the People's Party dissolved the Baluchistan assembly, and in the North-Western Frontier province it started bargaining with the members of Islamic Democratic Alliance. In the Punjab the People's Party openly initiated activities to end the Punjab government. A party with an undemocratic record once it gets authority is bound to destroy democracy. This is the reason that no one wants the prime minister to have absolute power through the abolition of Eighth amendment. Second, the People's Party government does not have any concrete program for solving the problems of the people. It is trying to boost its dwindling popularity by bringing up the Eighth amendment issue.

Q. What is the reason for the dwindling popularity of People's Party in the Punjab?

A. The only difference in Punjab is that at first votes opposing the People's Party were divided among other parties, but now all these votes have been won over by

the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad. All the elements opposing People's Party have now rejected the other parties and are giving their votes to IJI. If elections were to be held today, 61

of the votes would go to Islami Jamhoori Ittehad. Even if the People's Party votes were to remain the same, the party would still be defeated because the votes commanded by it have always been less than those of the groups opposing it. The thing that one should keep in mind is that, in Bhutto's time, the elements that opposed him were divided, but now they are united on the same platform.

Q. What is the situation in Sindh today? Will there be any change in this situation by the time of the next elections?

A. There will certainly be changes, because the People Party's success in Sindh is temporary. This situation cannot continue indefinitely. The People's Party government in Sind is confronted with problems because in the interior of Sind it obtained votes on the basis of Sindhi nationalism, whereas in the cities MQM (Muhajir Qaumi Movement) won on the basis of "muhajir" prejudice. May these two elements join hands and find a way out. But it appears that a confrontation between them is unavoidable since the two prejudices cannot survive together. Prejudice always tends to move toward extremes.

Q. It is said that if the People Party's government is terminated, India would intervene in Sind.

A. PPP's relations with India are an open secret. It was India that was most overjoyed at the Party's success. When the Indian prime minister arrived in Islamabad to attend the SAARC conference, he was given an extraordinary welcome. It is said that for this reason the People Party's government is capable of doing anything with India; nothing is inconceivable. But as soon as the real intentions of the People's Party are revealed, the whole nation will rise against it and reject it.

Q. It is said that the Islamic Democratic Alliance in the Punjab is arousing Punjabi nationalism.

A. The charter of the Alliance is open to all. Its leadership represents all the provinces and our slogans are Islamic. The accusations about the Alliance, in fact, are concerned with its holding power in the Punjab. The people do not want to see an attempt made to destabilize the current government of Punjab, and their sentiments in this regard are justifiable, and we can not say that those sentiments amount to a Punjabi nationalism.

Q. The Prime Minister says that the treasury is empty. Is the economic situation in the country really very critical?

A. Our treasury is not the treasury of the Moghul kings and as such it cannot be full of gold and silver bars. Our treasury is based on the modern system of credits and

debits. Money credited into the treasury is spent for public work, and this is how it should work. Our real asset is our people who are healthy, hard working and industrious. Our internal resources are the same as they were earlier, and foreign countries providing loans are continuing to do so. Similarly, as governments did before, the current government, too, can carry on its duties financially. There is no major problem. The real issue at hand is the incompetence of the present government, and, because of this incompetence, the government is not able to make any plans or do anything and has raised the hue and cry that the treasury is empty. The treasury as a rule should be empty because the money that comes into it should be spent on various plans under various heads. The income has not stopped coming. What then is the problem? It all boils down to incompetence and propaganda tactics to make the people quiet so that they may not expect their problems to be solved.

Q. What is the situation in Afghanistan?

A. The Afghan mujahedin have proved during this long period of time that they can rise above their differences and remain united. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Afghanistan now needs a strong Islamic government that can maintain peace in the country. The mujahedin leadership is passing through a test. May God guide them and give them courage and fortitude. The Afghan mujahedin have achieved an historical victory. They have restored the dwindling prestige of the followers of Islam during a period of degradation when Muslims were faced with disgrace and defeat. They gave honor and pride to all Muslims and we hope that after this glorious victory they will turn Afghanistan into an exemplary Islamic state. If the Soviet Union provides aid to its puppet regime, it will not help it to remain in power. If heavy and sophisticated weapons are supplied, these too will fall into the hands of the Afghan mujahedin and help in strengthening their hands. There is a risk that the Soviets may supply their allies with chemical weapons which may be used against the mujahedin and the Afghan civil population. But the fate of the communist Afghanistan is sealed, it is very near its end, and the Soviet Union will not succeed in saving it whatever it may do.

Q. What are the future prospects for the Islamic Democratic Alliance?

A. If this Alliance were to remain united and overcome its shortcomings which resulted in the course of its formation, then it will play a decisive role by creating an atmosphere of confidence. The biggest need now is to have respect for one another.

Q. Will the Jamaat-e Islami and Muslim League be able to remain united for a long time?

A. Both these parties can certainly remain united, and they have been for quite some time. The Jamaat-e Islami and the Muslim League have worked together in almost all the democratic alliances in the country. The Muslim

League not only has political votes, but also has candidates that can get votes. However, they did not have any central leadership. But now with the formation of the Islamic Democratic Alliance, the Muslim League has a center to which it belongs. The Islamic Democratic Alliance needs the Muslim League as well. The unity has inculcated a sense of confidence and a new enthusiasm in people.

Q. The People's Party is trying to bring about a change in the Punjab government? Will it be successful?

A. The PPP does not have a majority in the National Assembly. The president is not of their choice. He is neutral, but at the same time has power and authority. Today, the opposition in the center is larger and more united than ever before. Under these circumstances, if the People's Party gambles in the Punjab, they will be destroying themselves. If they wish to remain in office for their full term, they should be satisfied with whatever power has fallen to them as their share and stop intervening in the Punjab. Otherwise, they will lose whatever power and authority they have at present.

#### **Murtaza Bhutto's Return Favored**

46560024b Karachi AMN in Urdu 19 Feb 89 p 3

[Column "From Jumma Khan's Pen": "Discreditable Propaganda Against Murtaza Bhutto by Major Newspapers"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] It is a well-known fact that Murtaza Bhutto from the very beginning in the course of exile has been playing a vital role in politics. He left no stone unturned to gain favorable world opinion in order to save the life of his martyred father [Zulfiqar Ali] Bhutto. This perturbed Gen Zia so much that he not only filed new law-suits against Murtaza Bhutto within the country, but also outlined plans to target him outside Pakistan. Zia was not content with taking the deceased Bhutto's life, he started taking actions to destroy the entire Bhutto family and erase the very trace of the People's Party. In order to sow seeds of dissention in the People's Party and to render it weak, he bought various personalities through temptation and pressure. He deprived Begun Nusrat Bhutto of the facilities to obtain even the most essential medical treatment she needed. He got pleasure in keeping Miss Benazir Bhutto in solitary confinement and refused to provide her also with medical facilities. Thousands of the People's Party workers were entrapped in false law-suits and then whipped and hanged. He arranged for their economic destruction as well. His hired informants abroad kept strict vigilance over the Bhutto family and the leaders and workers of the People's Party residing in foreign countries. Under circumstances of this nature, suddenly one night martyr Bhutto's youthful son, Shahnawaz Bhutto, was mysteriously found dead in France. Several times, efforts was made to kill Murtaza Bhutto also but they were not successful.

Everyone inside Pakistan as well as outside knows that the People's Party is ruling now, and it has already announced a general pardon for all political prisoners. Many of them are already free, and law-suits against them have also been withdrawn. The exiled leaders also, taking advantage of the mass pardon, have returned home. Some complicated cases, however, could not be withdrawn so far. Due to legal complications, some leaders are still away from home. Murtaza Bhutto also is among them.

The newspaper THE OBSERVER alone would know the reason behind its publication of an interview with Murtaza Bhutto. However, the manner in which that interview was published in Pakistan without feeling the need for verification shows that the purpose was nothing except to organize a campaign against Murtaza Bhutto's return to Pakistan and to provide a new tool to the opposition to disgrace not only the People's Party but its government as well.

The claim that Murtaza Bhutto had returned to Pakistan was also published in big headlines. So far, all the eminent leaders who have returned home after a prolonged exile have been granted a very warm welcome, including Mr Ghulam Hussain and Mr Qayum Nizami. Those who published a false report about Mr Murtaza Bhutto, therefore, did not even realize that if Mr Murtaza Bhutto had returned home, he too would have been welcomed. There was no need for him to return home without anyone knowing about it. He has fought an immensely long political battle and whenever he returns home, he would receive an extremely warm welcome. [passage omitted]

#### **Motives Behind Protest Against Rushdie's Book Questioned**

46560023 Karachi AMN in Urdu 17 Feb 89 p 3

[Column "From Jumma Khan's Pen": "Why No Protest Was Lodged Against the Satanic Book During the Past Administration's Era"]

[Text] Almost a year ago, Gen Zia reigned over Pakistan. The association to protect the honor of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of God be upon him) must have been in existence then. Maulana Kausar Niazi was also alive then, as he is now, and all those people who recently proved that they possess an burning love for Islam in their heart were also active. In Britain, a book by a person called Salman Rushdie was published. Its title: "The Satanic Verses." When this book came on the market, the Indian intelligentsia were the first ones in Asia to take notice of it. It was severely condemned by Indian newspapers and magazines. The Indian Muslims also protested against it. Finally, the government of India banned the book. When India took this action, the Pakistanis, too, became alert. India's decision provided strong support to the Muslims residing in Britain, and their protest mounted against this blasphemous book. With this background, the Pakistani government also

banned the British book. All this happened at a time when the People's Party had not yet gained power. By appealing to the Islamic heads of state, a protest campaign against this blasphemous book could have been initiated throughout the Islamic world. Other actions could have been taken as well. But those in the Islamic Democratic Alliance today were either in power or secretly supporting the administration at that time. After banning the blasphemous book, there was no room for any protest in Pakistan. Neither did any party or an individual demand that the government take further action, since the book was published in Britain and its author, Salman Rushdie, also lived there. Under these circumstances, the only action the government of Pakistan could take was to ban the objectionable book. If there was more zealous love for Islam in the hearts of the rulers and the administration at that time, or if the political or religious leaders applied pressure, the so-called righteous and faithful Muslims could protest against the publication of the book. They could black-list the agency that published it. They could impose a ban on the import and sale of all its other books. All the political and religious bosses, however, regarded the ban on the book to be more than enough. There was no protest in any other Muslim country of the world. Some countries just maintained silence after banning the book.

The general elections were held in Pakistan after the ban on "The Satanic Verses." Gen Zia's reign too came to an end. The assemblies consisting of the representatives elected on party basis came into existence. The People's Party formed a government on the federal level. The Islamic Democratic Alliance ["Islami Jamhoori Ittehad"] [IJI] of Gen Zia's supporters could form a government only in Punjab. Later on, when a new government came into existence in Baluchistan, the IJI also joined the coalition government. The IJI is out of the government both in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind. A few days ago, the opposition presented a resolution of condemnation against Salman Rushdie's book in the National Assembly. The administration fully supported this resolution and also gave assurances that it will put pressure on other countries. Thus, the affair passed away peacefully. When prime minister Benazir Bhutto had to leave for an official visit to China, suddenly Maulana Kausar Niazi, on behalf of his organization, announced that there would be demonstrations held against The Satanic Verses in several cities including Islamabad.

The first demonstration was held on Sunday in Islamabad. Due to the firing by the armed persons among the demonstrators, a Muslim guard at the American Center became a martyr. Additionally, as a result of police firing, four more persons were killed. Why did the need for a demonstration arise, and why were the offices of the U.S. embassy attacked? Why were the offices of the People's Party, the ordinary people's shops and the office of the DAWN newspaper destroyed? This is a mystery. None of the leaders of the demonstrators has condemned the destruction. Was it a conspiracy to turn the prime minister's first foreign tour into a failure? Was it a plot

against democracy? Was the purpose of the protest campaign to put pressure on the United States in order to acquire better concessions in Afghanistan? Why were the sentiments that have been expressed now over a book that was published a year ago dormant during the reign of the so-called righteous and faithful man [Gen. Zia] and the caretaker government?

Maulana Kausar Niazi, Maulana Fazalur Rahman, Maulana Sattar Niazi and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, who led the procession in Islamabad on the "Black Sunday" should answer why they remained negligent for one full year and what their real motives are for the disturbances now? Why didn't the IJI people start their demonstrations soon after the ban on the book? What are they going to gain by initiating strikes and demonstrations now? Was there some religious or political strategy due to which it was deemed unnecessary to bring the people on the streets during the previous administration's rule? Just as the police firing was condemned, the destruction and burning also should have been condemned since they inflicted both human and financial loss. It is most regrettable, however, that none of the religious scholars is willing to condemn the disruption.

The most astonishing thing is that after the public protest and the death of five persons in Pakistan, Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a message in which, according to Radio Tehran, it was stated that Salman Rushdie should be killed, and, further, that if in an attempt to murder him a Muslim loses his own life, he would be a martyr.

As a matter of principle, the reaction of the scholars with regard to the author of the blasphemous British book should have come forth immediately after its publication. It is impossible to imagine that the Iranian government remained unaware of this book despite the fact that it was banned in India and Pakistan last year. Therefore, what we need to ponder over is why Ayatollah Khomeini and other scholars remained silent at that time when the book was banned. Should the edicts be issued only after some innocent Muslims have lost their lives?

#### **Return of Afghan Refugees Seen Unlikely** *46560024a Karachi AMN in Urdu 19 Feb 89 p 3*

[Editorial: "Question of the Return of Afghan Refugees From Pakistan"]

[Text] According to the Afghan pact, along with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the process of the return of 3.2 million Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan will also commence. Pakistan will also stop intervening in the affairs of Afghanistan. Under the treaty, which was signed by Pakistan also, the process of sending the Afghan mujahedin, after training them to use American weapons, in order to fight the Afghanistan

government and the Soviet troops also should have been suspended. In other words, our administration should have stopped intervening in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. This, however, did not happen. The only point of interest for the United States with regard to Afghanistan was that the Soviet troops should withdraw from there. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces was completed on 15 February, but the United States does not want that an Iran-type of government should be established in Afghanistan.

There are seven organizations of the Afghan mujahedin in Pakistan. There are eight such organizations in Iran. There simply is no unity among them. There were meetings of the Mujahedin Shoora (Advisory Council) held in Rawalpindi, but no consensus of opinion could be reached. None of the Afghan organizations based in Iran could be represented in this Shoora.

Under such circumstances, therefore, how will it be possible for the Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan to return to their homeland? The government of Pakistan has, nevertheless, already announced a step by step comprehensive plan for their return. Under this plan, the task of the return of the Afghans could be accomplished in 1-1/2 years. According to the details that the minister of tribal regions and state affairs, Mr Muhammad Hanif Khan, revealed in a press conference, the process of the return of the refugees will commence only after the situation in Afghanistan has become favorable.

During the Soviet occupation, 15,000 Afghan villages out of a total of 20,000 were completely destroyed. The refugees possess altogether 6,000 vehicles. They will be permitted to take along their belongings. However, the Afghan refugees will not be able to live in Pakistan after the conditions in Afghanistan become peaceful. Those who have illegally purchased properties here will also have to return to their homeland. Even those Afghans who have obtained either identity cards or Pakistani passports will be picked up and returned home. This, however, will take place only when an Islamic government is established in Afghanistan in place of the current one. According to this plan, every family at the time of its departure to its homeland will be provided with 3 months' ration. One hundred and seventy thousand

trucks will be needed to transport these Afghans and their belongings. The World Food Program is already busy making arrangements to provide Afghanistan for one year with a stock of 600,000 tons of wheat after the return of the refugees.

As is apparent from the details of the plan, the return of the Afghan refugees from Pakistan will be possible only when the conditions in Afghanistan become peaceful, and when an Islamic government is established there, although Fida Mohammad Larday, who is in charge of the Afghan consulate in Karachi, claims that the Afghan government can defend its revolution without the support of the Soviet forces. He also has a question, a reasonable one. The mujahedin organizations claimed that they were fighting to free Afghanistan from the Soviet forces. Now that the Soviet forces have left Afghanistan, against whom are they continuing their war? Mr Larday has invited the Shoora of the 7 mujahedin organizations to hold their meeting in Kabul instead of Rawalpindi. The Afghan government would provide them with full security. He has also inquired as to why the ruling People's Party is continuing with Ziaul Haq's Afghan policy when assurances had been given that the People's Party after attaining power would change the former president's policies. But perhaps Mr Larday is not acquainted with the background, or else he is purposely overlooking it. After the departure of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, how will the destruction and ruin so visible there be rectified? Does the Afghan government possess an enormous treasure which will reconstruct thousands of villages in a blink? Pakistan wishes to see the establishment of an Islamic government in Afghanistan, but Najib is not willing to recognize that government and the United States, too, does not want a government of the fundamentalists. On top of all this, there is no unity among the mujahedin organizations. Under such circumstances, therefore, won't Afghanistan come in the grips of a horrible civil war? Pakistan has made the return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland conditional on the establishment of complete law and order in Afghanistan. This only means that the conditions would not be met and the refugees would not return. For the time being, complete law and order in Afghanistan appears to be a mere dream. The first and foremost requirement, therefore, is that foreign intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan be stopped, and this is impossible without U.S. cooperation. On the other hand, yet another threat to Pakistan by the Soviet Union to stop intervening in Afghanistan cannot be ignored either.